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3Parents who grew up without digital monitoring have a plethora of parental monitoring opportunities at their disposal. While they can engage in surveillance practices to safeguard their children, they also have to balance freedom against control. This research is based on in-depth interviews with eleven early adolescents and eleven parents to investigate everyday negotiations of parental monitoring. Parental monitoring is presented as a form of lateral surveillance because it entails parents engaging in surveillance practices to monitor their children. The results indicate that some parents are motivated to use digital monitoring tools to safeguard and guide their children, while others refrain from surveillance practices to prioritise freedom and trust. The most common forms of surveillance are location tracking and the monitoring of digital behaviour and screen time. Moreover, we provide unique insights into the use of student tracking systems as an impactful form of control. Early adolescents negotiate these parental monitoring practices, with responses ranging from acceptance to active forms of resistance. Some children also monitor their parents, showcasing a reciprocal form of lateral surveillance. In all families, monitoring practices are negotiated in open conversations that also foster digital resilience. This study shows that the concepts of parental monitoring and lateral surveillance fall short in grasping the reciprocal character of monitoring and the power dynamics in parent-child relations. We therefore propose that monitoring practices in families can best be understood as family surveillance, providing a novel concept to understand how surveillance is embedded in contemporary media practices among interconnected family members.
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African citizens are increasingly being surveilled, profiled, and targeted online in ways that violate their rights. African governments frequently use pandemic or terrorism-related security risks to grant themselves additional surveillance rights and significantly increase their collection of monitoring apparatus and technologies while spending billions of dollars to conduct surveillance (Roberts et al. 2023). Surveillance is a prominent strategy African governments use to limit civic space (Roberts and Mohamed Ali 2021). Digital technologies are not the root of surveillance in Africa because surveillance practices predate the digital age (Munoriyarwa and Mare 2023). Surveillance practices were first used by colonial governments, continued by post-colonial governments, and are currently being digitalized and accelerated by African countries. Throughout history, surveillance has been passed down from colonizers to liberators, and some African leaders have now automated it (Roberts et al. 2023). Many studies have been conducted on illegal state surveillance in the United States, China, and Europe (Feldstein 2019; Feldstein 2021). Less is known about the supply of surveillance technologies to Africa. With a population of almost 1.5 billion people, Africa is a continent where many citizens face surveillance with malicious intent. As mentioned in previous chapters, documenting the dimensions and drivers of digital surveillance in Africa is
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This paper describes the work done to track the supply chains of sur-veillance technologies from the global North to African governments for illegal surveillance of their citizens. We conducted desk research to analyse the supply side of surveillance technology exported to African countries. Our preliminary findings show nine key exporting states-actors for surveillance technologies to Africa. These are China; European Union agencies, and member states France, Germany, Italy; Israel, United Kingdom, Russia, and the United States of Amer-ica. Regarding the specific surveillance technologies being transferred, each export-ing state tends to have a focus area, both in geographic area and within the five surveillance technology categories covered by this study. The paper identified six motives for state surveillance, including the suppliers' perspective. These are: 1) surveillance as legitimacy for state security, 2) surveillance for political gain, 3) surveillance as diplomacy, 4) surveillance as a tool for development, 5) Surveil-lance as neocolonialism, and 6) surveillance as business opportunity. Further re-search is needed to deepen the analysis of surveillance technologies exports to the African continent and the human rights violations.
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De African Digital Rights Network (ADRN) heeft een nieuw rapport gepubliceerd waarin de toevoer en verspreiding van digitale surveillance technologie in Afrika in kaart is gebracht. Onderzoeker Anand Sheombar van het lectoraat Procesinnovatie & Informatiesystemen is betrokken bij het ADRN-collectief en heeft samen met de Engelse journalist Sebastian Klovig Skelton, door middel van desk research de aanvoerlijnen vanuit Westerse en Noordelijke landen geanalyseerd. De bevindingen zijn te lezen in dit Supply-side report hoofdstuk van het rapport. APA-bronvermelding: Klovig Skelton, S., & Sheombar, A. (2023). Mapping the supply of surveillance technologies to Africa Supply-side report. In T. Roberts (Ed.), Mapping the Supply of Surveillance Technologies to Africa: Case Studies from Nigeria, Ghana, Morocco, Malawi, and Zambia (pp. 136-167). Brighton, UK: Institute of Development Studies.
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Digital surveillance technologies using artificial intelligence (AI) tools such as computer vision and facial recognition are becoming cheaper and easier to integrate into governance practices worldwide. Morocco serves as an example of how such technologies are becoming key tools of governance in authoritarian contexts. Based on qualitative fieldwork including semi-structured interviews, observation, and extensive desk reviews, this chapter focusses on the role played by AI-enhanced technology in urban surveillance and the control of migration between the Moroccan–Spanish borders. Two cross-cutting issues emerge: first, while international donors provide funding for urban and border surveillance projects, their role in enforcing transparency mechanisms in their implementation remains limited; second, Morocco’s existing legal framework hinders any kind of public oversight. Video surveillance is treated as the sole prerogative of the security apparatus, and so far public actors have avoided to engage directly with the topic. The lack of institutional oversight and public debate on the matter raise serious concerns on the extent to which the deployment of such technologies affects citizens’ rights. AI-enhanced surveillance is thus an intrinsically transnational challenge in which private interests of economic gain and public interests of national security collide with citizens’ human rights across the Global North/Global South divide.
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By analysing intelligence-gathering reform legislation this article discusses access to justice for communications interception by the intelligence and security services. In the aftermath of the Snowden revelations, sophisticated oversight systems for bulk communications surveillance are being established across the globe. In the Netherlands prior judicial consent and a binding complaint procedure have been established. However, although checks and balances for targeted communications interference have been created, accountability mechanisms are less equipped to effectively remedy indiscriminate interference. Therefore, within the context of mass communications surveillance programs, access to justice for complainants remains a contentious issue.
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Super Bowl commercials teach us how to conceive of surveillance. While Apple promises to fight Big Brother with a personal computer, Coca-Cola invites us to think different, i.e. positively about security cameras. The whitewashing of surveillance accompanies the ‘big brotherization’ of Apple. However, the whitewashing may only be a distraction from another more subtle, more effective (and after all more amusing) progression towards a dystopian future: the constant sharing without friction and language and thus without the distance that would allow for reflection and critical thinking. In this essay, I discuss the symbolic value of the year 1984 and its link to the ongoing move from lingual to visual communication. It underlines that the television screen or smartphone is the sibling of the surveillance camera and shows why the dystopian future we fear won’t be like George Orwell’s 1984 or Anthony Burgess’ 1985.
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This article discusses the postdigital as a term that can be used to describe either a contemporary disenchantment with digital information systems and media gadgets, or a period in which our fascination with these systems and gadgets has become historical. After Edward Snowden’s disclosures of the NSA’s all-pervasive digital surveillance systems, this disenchantment has quickly grown from a niche ‘hipster’ phenomenon to a mainstream position — one which is likely to have a serious impact on all cultural and business practices based on networked electronic devices and Internet services.
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Pokémon Go, Facebook check-ins, Google Maps, public transport apps and especially smartphone apps are increasingly becoming traceable and locatable. As ‘check-in’, features in social media and games grow in popularity they pinpoint users in relation to everything else in the network, making physical context an essential input for online interactions. But what are the practical consequences of the increased proliferation of devices that can determine our location? Could one say that surveillance is already taken for granted as we passively provide our coordinates to others?
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The American company Amazon has made headlines several times for monitoring its workers in warehouses across Europe and beyond.1 What is new is that a national data protection authority has recently issued a substantial fine of €32 million to the e-commerce giant for breaching several provisions of the General Data Protection Regulation (gdpr) with its surveillance practices. On 27 December 2023, the Commission nationale de l’informatique et des libertés (cnil)—the French Data Protection Authority—determined that Amazon France Logistique infringed on, among others, Articles 6(1)(f) (principle of lawfulness) and 5(1)(c) (data minimization) gdpr by processing some of workers’ data collected by handheld scanner in the distribution centers of Lauwin-Planque and Montélimar.2 Scanners enable employees to perform direct tasks such as picking and scanning items while continuously collecting data on quality of work, productivity, and periods of inactivity.3 According to the company, this data processing is necessary for various purposes, including quality and safety in warehouse management, employee coaching and performance evaluation, and work planning.4 The cnil’s decision centers on data protection law, but its implications reach far beyond into workers’ fundamental right to health and safety at work. As noted in legal literature and policy documents, digital surveillance practices can have a significant impact on workers’ mental health and overall well-being.5 This commentary examines the cnil’s decision through the lens of European occupational health and safety (EU ohs). Its scope is limited to how the French authority has interpreted the data protection principle of lawfulness taking into account the impact of some of Amazon’s monitoring practices on workers’ fundamental right to health and safety.
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