This paper is about the political imbalance in the EU when it comes to attracting European agencies. Over the years, mainly due to the Brexit negotiations and for cost-efficiency reasons, many EU agencies moved from the UK to elsewhere, finding a new sea for headquarters functions or other departments. Whenever such a move is announced, EU countries and their candidate host cities jump into the breach to make a beneficial offer. The way these processes take place is a vector of the politicization of European integration. Nevertheless, these new locations of the EU agencies have won the bidding contest, is a process that usually takes place under the radar. The decision-making of these kinds of processes rests with the member states of the agency. Instead of choosing the most strategic place and ensuring an equal distribution among EU countries, which is the deal, often the highest bidder or the state contributing the most wins the agency. Interestingly, these processes have hardly been studied in the light of the increased politicization. This paper is an attempt to fill this research gap, by focusing on three cases and the processes of decision-making. The cases are the Collège européen de police (European Police College, CEPOL) which moved from the UK to Budapest in 2014, the European Medicine Agency (EMA) moving from London to Amsterdam in 2019, and the European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts (ECMWF) which moved its EU-funded program to Bonn and Helsinki mid-2021. The research strategy is as follows: the cases and the lobbying processes are described, then the main political actors are described, and the outcomes are described. The main research question is: How do these processes of political decision-making work out in practice? By answering this question, this study contributes to the discussion on globalized decision-making across the EU and the politicized imbalance which is the result of this.
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This paper presents the results of a literature review in regard to Social Media and participation. Besides that, to understand the meaning and impact of Social Media on elections, we show field results from the 2010 and 2011 elections in the Netherlands. There are several challenges when it comes to engaging people in party politics. The current findings in literature show us that previous efforts to shape public participation with prior Internet tools did not meet expectations. With Social Media this could change, because participation seems to be the key concept that explains the difference between ‘old’ web and ‘new’ Social Media. In the Netherlands, Social Media did not significantly influence voting behaviour during the local elections (2010/2011). But, during the national elections (2010), politicians with higher Social Media engagement got relatively more votes within most political parties. In conclusion, we propose a future research agenda to study how political parties could benefit from Social Media to reinvent and improve the way they work with their members and volunteers. Notice: © IFIP, 2011. This is the author’s version of the work. It is posted here by permission of IFIP for your personal use. Not for redistribution. The definitive version was published in Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 2011, Volume 6847/2011, 25-35, Boston: Springer.
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This article attempts to explore the main impulses that might have led to the destruction of Buddha statues by Taliban in the Bamiyan Valley of Afghanistan. Drawing on existing literature, and anecdotal evidence, this article suggests that the main impulses that have led to destruction are rather linked to the overall political context of that time (i.e., political iconoclasm) rather than to pure Islamic iconoclasm or an explicit condition of disharmony in heritage (i.e., dissonant heritage). First, the Taliban did not consider the statues as "their" cultural heritage. The act of destruction, therefore, cannot be subscribed to the Afghan cultural dynamics but rather to the political-religious ideology imported by Taliban from outside of the country. Secondly, it seemed that Mullah Omar was viewing the statues as a revenue source at the beginning and as a political bargain chip at the end. In both circumstances, religion seems not to have played the main role. Lastly, the destruction seems a political iconoclasm-that is, a political exploitation, if not a direct political act. The Taliban and especially their external allies were very well aware of the consequences of the act of destruction. It seems implausible to suggest that there were no religion and/or culture in play when ordering the destruction of the statues. The latter is the least what this article aims for. However, to conclude that the destruction was solely triggered by theological and cultural factors might also be improbable. The author does not, in any way, attempt to rationalize the act of destruction, let alone justify the barbaric act.
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Using political discourse analysis, this book examines the extent to which the salient approaches of previous leadership generations have translated into present day policies shepherded in by Xi Jinping. On the strategic political level, the book includes comparisons of China's recent leadership periods with a focus on Xi Jinping's era, and contains examples of whether and how specific topics and tactics reoccur across generations. The state development strategy section then goes on to include chapters on shaping China’s strategic narratives, neoliberal discourse within state developmentalism, and keyword evolution. The practical policies part looks at the issues of re-education, health, class, and ethnicity, analysing how the leaders talk about China’s poor, frame the representations of megaprojects on social media, and discursively display diplomatic strength. As a study of the rule of Xi Jinping and the rhetoric of the contemporary Chinese political system, this book will be of huge interest to students and scholars of Chinese politics and political science more broadly.
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In Western Europe, cities that host International Organizations (IOs) have to deal with more and more competition. The last decade many IOs settled in Eastern European and Asian countries. Distributing IOs over several cities in Europe for reasons of political balance and give-and-take among governments play a role in these decisions. However, public policy networks are more and more operational in these negotiations. Apart from the political and administrative actors, others – as private actors and external lobbyists – play a role as well. This often leads to increased complexity and ineffective decisions. This paper examines four cases in which political gameplay influenced the location decision-making of IOs in The Hague and Geneva. First, I will introduce the subject, research method and the four cases. Second, I will discuss how public policy networks are increasingly complicating factors to the settling processes of IOs. Third, a reconstruction of the settlement processes of four IOs will illustrate this.
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The Spanish party Podemos can be seen as a result of the Indignados movement, and it represents a shift in Spanish politics away from classical right versus left politics towards a emancipation of the 'demos'. Gepubliceerd bij de Kring voor Internationale Betrekkingen (KIB) van de Universiteit Leuven op 24 april 2016
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The research examines junk news, followers of problematic sources as well as artificial amplification on Instagram during the 2019 Dutch provincial and European parliamentary elections. First, this study looks at the circulation of junk content in high-engagement political spaces on Instagram. Second, it takes up the question of the mainstreaming of Dutch junk news providers by looking at the intersection between the followers of Dutch political entities and those of junk news sources. Third, it looks at the presence of artificial engagement tactics (specifically fake followers) employed by Dutch political entities and news sources on Instagram. In all it was found that Dutch political Instagram is a relatively healthy space, but not for all issues or political entities.
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The authors present a general argument for the political representation of non-humans that sits under the broad umbrella of ecocentrism but that does not rely on one specific non-anthropocentric ethical theory. As such, they hope to help move the debate towards a consensus on the need for such political representation. The argument itself has two main prongs. The first is an empirical one: It has the potential to give more effective representation of non-human interests than the alternative of simply having those interests accounted for through internalization within human needs and wishes. The second combines empirical and normative elements: It can add to the development of Earth jurisprudence by envisioning political decision-making processes that are broadly inclusive, so that the protection of non-human interests does not rely solely on legal protection in terms of, for example, tools employed during court hearings on a case-by-case basis. Two illustrative examples are presented, and the work of the the Global Ecocentric Network for Implementing Ecodemocracy (GENIE) is introduced. LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/helenkopnina/
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Fic-ctio-cra-cy /ˈfɪkʃ(ə)krəsi/ n. pl. – cies. 1. Political regime that, implicitly or explicitly, considers the distinction between fact and fiction irrelevant. 2. A political or social unit that has such regime. 3. The principles of word-building and transmedia storytelling applied to politics and journalism. 4. The title of this longform. [French fictiocracie, from Late Latin fictiocratia]
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This study focuses on how views on democracy develop during adolescence. A total of 40 Dutch adolescents were interviewed in their second and fourth year of secondary education. The study shows that the interviewed adolescents do become more familiar with politics but do not develop more nuanced views towards democracy. As the adolescents age, a one-dimensional perspective on democracy becomes more apparent. In the interviewees’ perspective, democracy increasingly equals majority rule. Other aspects, such as minority interests and finding consensus, are increasingly neglected. This study, therefore, suggests that adolescents do not ‘naturally’ develop more complex views on democracy when they age.
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