From the article: Abstract Over the last decades, philosophers and cognitive scientists have argued that the brain constitutes only one of several contributing factors to cognition, the other factors being the body and the world. This position we refer to as Embodied Embedded Cognition (EEC). The main purpose of this paper is to consider what EEC implies for the task interpretation of the control system. We argue that the traditional view of the control system as involved in planning and decision making based on beliefs about the world runs into the problem of computational intractability. EEC views the control system as relying heavily on the naturally evolved fit between organism and environment. A ‘lazy’ control structure could be ‘ignorantly successful’ in a ‘user friendly’ world, by facilitating the transitory creation of a flexible and integrated set of behavioral layers that are constitutive of ongoing behavior. We close by discussing the types of questions this could imply for empirical research in cognitive neuroscience and robotics.
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This paper conducted a preliminary study of reviewing and exploring bias strategies using a framework of a different discipline: change management. The hypothesis here is: If the major problem of implicit bias strategies is that they do not translate into actual changes in behaviors, then it could be helpful to learn from studies that have contributed to successful change interventions such as reward management, social neuroscience, health behavioral change, and cognitive behavioral therapy. The result of this integrated approach is: (1) current bias strategies can be improved and new ones can be developed with insight from adjunct study fields in change management; (2) it could be more sustainable to invest in a holistic and proactive bias strategy approach that targets the social environment, eliminating the very condition under which biases arise; and (3) while implicit biases are automatic, future studies should invest more on strategies that empower people as “change agents” who can act proactively to regulate the very environment that gives rise to their biased thoughts and behaviors.
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In our world of VUCA (volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous), a capacity for change and adaption is vital. However, changing successfully has been a challenging task for both individuals and organizations. Taking into account the insights of neuroscience, this chapter introduces a framework of change management called STREAP-Be. The acronym represents 7 factors that could significantly influence the effect of change: safety; trigger; reward; emotion; alignment; people; and behavior.
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This paper proposes and showcases a methodology to develop an observational behavior assessment instrument to assess psychological competencies of police officers. We outline a step-by-step methodology for police organizations to measure and evaluate behavior in a meaningful way to assess these competencies. We illustrate the proposed methodology with a practical example. We posit that direct behavioral observation can be key in measuring the expression of psychological competence in practice, and that psychological competence in practice is what police organizations should care about. We hope this paper offers police organizations a methodology to perform scientifically informed observational behavior assessment of their police officers’ psychological competencies and inspires additional research efforts into this important area.
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Financially vulnerable consumers are often associated with suboptimal financial behaviors. Evaluated financial education programs so far show difficulties to effectively reach this target population. In our attempt to solve this problem, we built a behaviorally informed financial education program incorporating insights from both motivational and behavioral change theories. In a quasi-experimental field study among Dutch financially vulnerable people, we compared this program with both a control group and a traditional program group. In comparison with the control group, we found robust positive effects of the behaviorally informed program on financial skills and knowledge and self-reported financial behavior, but not on other outcomes. Additionally, we did not find evidence that the behaviorally informed program performed better than the traditional program. Finally, we discuss the findings and limitations of this study in light of the financial education literature and provide implications for policymaking and directions for future research.
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PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to conduct a critical analysis to address cultural metaphors – a much overlooked aspect of cross-cultural studies. Mainstream cultural metaphors (e.g. the iceberg, the software of the mind, the onion, and the distance) are not only limited in number, but are also overwhelmingly based on the static paradigm – as opposed to the dynamic paradigm that is often sidelined in academic discourse.Design/methodology/approachThe paper introduces the Diagram of Diversity Pathways – an interdisciplinary framework that sheds some light on how the inherent meaning and heuristic orientation of static cultural metaphors may stand at odds with evidence from the newly emerged field of neurobiology.FindingsThe implications of these metaphors are called into question, namely, culture is all about differences; values are stable; values guide behaviors; and values are seen as binaries.Research limitations/implicationsThe paper suggests that theorists and practitioners should pay more attention to the contribution and scholarly work of the dynamic paradigm since there appears to be substantial compatibility between them.Originality/valueThe matching of neurobiology and dynamic paradigm brings into focus alternative metaphors which not only offer insightful perspectives but also may open doors to perceive culture in a new way. Furthermore, cultural metaphors deserve more academic scrutiny because metaphors and theory development can have a symbiotic existence.
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Over the next 10 years, the City of Amsterdam plans to develop major housing schemes provide 90,000 new homes within the existing urban fabric. At the same time, an urban renewal program is being launched to revitalize the most deprived neighbourhoods. Together, these challenges call for more evidence based designprinciples to secure liveable places. Recent development in neuroscience, provides innovative tools to examine in a measurable, cause-effect way, the relationships between the physical fabric, users’ (visual) experience and their behavior in public spaces. In neuroscience, eye-tracking technology (ET) complements brain and behavioral measures (for overview see Eckstein et al. 2017). ET is already used to evaluate the spatial orienting of attention, behavioral response and emotional and cognitive impact in neuroscience, psychology and market research (Popa et al. 2015). ET may also radically change the way we (re)design and thus, experience cities (Sita et al. 2016; Andreani 2017). Until now, eye-tracking pilot studies collected eye fixation patterns of architecture using images in a lab-setting (Lebrun 2016).In our research project Sensing Streetscapes, we take eye-tracking outdoors and explore the potential ET may offer for city design. In collaboration with the municipality of Amsterdam and the local community, the H-neighborhood is used as a single case study. The main focus for urban renewal lies in the “transition-spaces”. They connect the neighborhood with the rapidly developing adjacent areas and are vital for improving the weak social-economic status. The commonly used design principles are validated (Alexander et al. 1977; Gehl 2011, 2014; Pallasmaa 2012) and the consistency of ET is tested, alongside (walk along) interviews and behavioral observations. In the next phase, the data will be analyzed by a panel of applied psychologists and urban designers. The initial results provide valuable lessons for the use of eye-tracking in urban design research. For example, a visual pattern analysis offers more accurate images of the spatial key-elements that matter when moving through transition spaces. More sensory-based city design research is needed to gather a full understanding of the relationships between the configuration of space, users’ (visual) experience, behavioral responses and in turn, perceptual decision making.
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Amsterdam faces the challenge of accommodating 50,000 to 90,000 new homes in the next five to ten years. That is equivalent to 10% of the city’s current total housing stock. The new homes have to be built within the existing urban fabric. This will entail high densities and the construction of new ‘un-Dutch’ typologies with high-rise residential buildings. Densification is currently accelerating in many Western cities and high-rise living environments are gaining ground as today’s typology. Yet these new typologies come with potentially serious risks to the liveability of cities in general and those new environments in particular (Asgarzadeh et al. 2012; Lindal and Hartig 2013; Gifford 2007). Urban designers and (landscape) architects are challenged to prevent and soften the negative impact that is often associated with extremely densified environments. This entails mitigating contradictive demands: to create high-density capacity andshape streetscapes that relate to a human scale. Designers might resort to the large body of applied design solutions and theories, yet these tend to be derived from more traditional urban fabrics of low-density developments (for example: e.g. Sennett 2018; Haas 2008; Jacobs 1993; Banerjee and Southworth 1990; Alexander et.al. 1977; Jacobs 1961).Therefore, the question of the research project Sensing Streetscape is if the classical design solutions are without any alterations, applicable in these new high density settings and able to create streetscapes with a human scale. A combination of emerging technologies and principles from both worlds; neuroscience and architecture offer the opportunity to investigate this question in-depth as a relation between the designed and the visually perceived streetscape.
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SummaryADHD and reificationThis thesis starts with a quote from eleven-year-old Sylvia, who thinks ADHD “is like a cancer (...) but you’re not going to die from it”. ADHD is no disease like cancer, but a con- cept from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), currently in its fifth edition. The DSM-5 defines ADHD with -partly overlapping- behavioral criteria such as “often has trouble waiting his/her turn” and “often interrupts or intrudes on others”. Thinking that the definitions in the DSM are concrete illnesses, such as Sylvia does, is acknowledged as a problematic phenomenon called reification. The most well- known mechanism of reification is called the “nominal fallacy”: naming behaviors carries the risk of thinking we have thereby explained them. In fact, constructs like ADHD only name these behaviors. However, confusing naming and explaining is just one of the mechanisms of reification. This thesis aims to answer the questions: how is ADHD reified in written discourse, and how often do these identified mechanisms of reification occur?Generalization and other mechanisms of reificationBesides confusing naming and explaining, generalizations can also lead to reification; particularly group-to-individual generalization. For instance, the authors of a large meta-analysis of brain-anatomy compared groups classified with ADHD with groups of “normal” individuals. They stated in their paper in 2017: “We confirm, with high-pow- ered analysis, that patients with ADHD have altered brains; therefore ADHD is a disorder of the brain. This message is clear for clinicians to convey to parents and patients”. The find- ings were in fact mere averages, and the case and control groups largely overlap. The authors wrongly suggest that all those classified with ADHD have different (smaller) brain parts. In fact, many with an ADHD classification have larger than average brain parts while many without an ADHD classification have brain parts that are smaller than average.There are many other reifying mechanisms. For instance, when reporting about case-control studies of neurophysiology and neurochemistry, researchers often select brain-images of the extremes from both samples. These images are then often pre- sented as allegedly representative of the brain activity and neurochemistry of a whole population of those classified with ADHD. In reality, case and control groups again show much overlap. Furthermore, brain activity differs strongly across people, regardless of an ADHD classification. Also within persons neurochemistry and physiology are not consistent through time.Medical jargon, for instance words like “symptom”, can also reify ADHD as the term implies that behaviors like interrupting others are the result of a disease or disorder. Speaking of criteria for ADHD is a more appropriate term, as this word refers to a stand- ard on which a decision may be based, and the word does not suggest the behaviors are caused by an innate problem.Similarly, by using metaphors, such as comparing ADHD to a meat-cleaver that splits the brains of those with ADHD, agency is ascribed to the ADHD-concept as a real entity that does damage to the human brain. This reifies ADHD and such a metaphor may also create fear and stigma. Another reifying mechanism is the suggestion of causality when only correlation is empirically proven. It is often suggested that ADHD can cause academic failure and maladaptation to the point of delinquency. However, as for instance child maltreatment can cause problems of inattention and restless behaviors –for which the ADHD-con- cept merely provides a name- both ADHD and delinquency can be confounded by adverse circumstances.ADHD can also be reified by “textual silence”: omitting important information that shows the construct does not represent a steady and reliable disorder. For instance: birth-month studies reveal that normal, age-related behaviors tend to be “diagnosed” with ADHD and medically treated. Not mentioning this important information can leave the perception of ADHD as a concrete entity intact.How often do these reifying mechanisms occur?Using a sample of 43 academic textbooks used at universities in the Netherlands, this thesis aims to quantify the occurrence of reifying mechanisms such as textual silence in relation to genetics. For instance, roughly half of the textbooks mention 60-80% heritability estimates of twin/family and adoption studies that compare behaviors of relatives to estimate the influence of genetics. At the same time, these textbooks omit that the more precise molecular genetic studies reveal a low direct influence of genes of about 5%. Only a quarter of the textbooks mention the contrasting findings, which reveal that twin/family and adoption studies cannot separate genetic from environ- mental influences very well. A quarter of the textbooks do contrast the high outcome of twin/family/adoption studies and the limited effects according to molecular studies. This “missing heritability problem”, as it is known, is not mentioned explicitly as such.Generalizations are also a common mechanism of reification. Of 36 textbooks that discuss brain anatomy in relation to ADHD, 21 (58%) do not mention that empirical outcomes are mere average findings that have little bearing on individuals classified as having ADHD. Fifteen chapters on ADHD did place such findings in perspective, by referring, for instance, to the fact that such findings are mere group outcomes. Only 3 of those, however, clearly mentioned that those with ADHD do not necessarily have different brains, or that “normal” controls can also have different/smaller brains. Only one chapter on ADHD mentioned both: no single deficit is necessary or sufficient to explain all cases of ADHD. Additionally, none of the chapters mentioned sampling bias due to the use of “supernormal” controls on the one hand and “refined phenotypes”, rigorously screened ADHD cases, on the other.Background of reificationReification is a concept from scholars filed under the sociological school of “Conflict Theory” that sees the quest for power as a foundation of social relationships. Framing ADHD as a hardwired genetic and brain-based illness can privilege medical profes- sionals. When described by the catch-all concept that ADHD is at risk of becoming, everyday behaviors like interrupting others are framed as medical problems and not as a normal part of socialization. As a result, non-medical professionals, like teachers, may feel inept.Conflict Theory also addresses the monetary basis at the heart of the production of knowledge. Differences in the availability of monetary resources (e.g. from pharma- ceutical companies) might further tilt the power balance, such as by financing dedicated companies that help to prepare presentations, write scientific papers (ghost writing) and recruit opinion leaders. However, a conflict theoretical perspective seems limited to explain the passion of some of those who believe strongly in the biological approach. Financial incentives might not necessarily have preceded this enthusiasm, and many researchers do not receive industry funding.Philosophers such as Trudy Dehue and Charles Taylor bring an additional, more “functional” perspective to explain our contemporary eagerness to reify concepts such as ADHD. Dehue, for instance, states that as biological explanations of behavior, concepts like ADHD are functional by providing an excuse for the person one is, par- ticularly if one fails to meet the neo-liberal norm of being self-reliant and successful. Taylor traced one of the roots of this neo-liberal ideology, which he calls “disengaged reason” all the way back to the likes of Plato and Descartes. Disengaged reason means that humans can find true beliefs about the world when being disengaged from it and being disengaged from one’s emotions. This ideal is represented well by Descartes’ “I think therefore I am”.The success of science, partly founded on this notion of disengaged reason, eroded the influence of the church. The influence of the normative framework that the church provided eroded as well and created a void that, from a functional perspective, needed to be filled. Psychiatry rose to the occasion to help fill this void with its’ own psychiatric bible –as the DSM is often called. Perhaps unsurprisingly, psychiatry, as the new sci- ence-based norm-setting institution, is engrained with this ideal of disengaged reason.ADHD and the ideal of disengaged reasonI argue that the rationalistic norms strongly surface in the ADHD-concept. We expect children to control their impulses, be silent in their play and await their turn. Also in the way we study human behavior and “diagnose” children as having a neurodevelopmental disorder - based on splicing their behaviors and counting “symptoms”, we lean towards disengaged reason. A diagnosis does not require asking for a child’s motives for his/ her behavior. So, both the norms we bestow upon children via the ADHD-concept, and the norms we bestow upon ourselves by the way we try to classify them without the need to involve children themselves to give meaning to their behaviour, reflect the dominance of this disengaged reason in my view.ImplicationsSo, possibly we reify and fail to be objective to the disappointing outcomes of empirical studies with the ADHD construct due to our own narrow (institutional) interests. Or, possibly we have historically embedded high hopes for the success of psychiatry’s nor- mative framework. Either way, such interests or high hopes do not necessarily overlap with the interests of the child, which should be our primary concern. So finally, some political and practical implications are offered to safeguard the child’s best interest.Future studies based on this thesis could estimate the prevalence of reifying mech- anisms and could also include different domains of discourse besides textbooks. Ad- ditionally, institutional dependency on constructs from the DSM should be examined critically. For instance, scientific funding agencies should consider the pros and many limitations of the study into the highly reified classifications and consider alternative classifications, such as using Research Domain Criteria. Another possible approach to research and providing care is using a more tentative, back-and fourth, normalizing approach such as stepped diagnosis and stepped care. From a political point of view the high interdependence of science and commercially vested interest calls for reconsider- ation of how we can use financial resources. One longstanding idea is to concentrate these resources in a fund with representatives from different branches of industry, science and government.Finally, medically framing children’s restlessness that is associated with a plethora of problems -such as the contemporary schooling system, divorce, poverty, trauma and loss- makes it easy to forget such larger issues. To avoid this, we should seek refuge in the institute that aims to protect the child’s autonomy, agency and safety in the face of the many individual and collective challenges that our children are confronted with: The Convention on the Rights of the Child. This institution should also safeguard that our current healthcare system with its classifications is part of the solution and not part of the problem.
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From the introduction: "There are two variants of fronto-temporal dementia: a behavioral variant (behavioral FTD, bvFTD, Neary et al. (1998)), which causes changes in behavior and personality but leaves syntax, phonology and semantics relatively intact, and a variant that causes impairments in the language processing system (Primary Progessive Aphasia, PPA (Gorno-Tempini et al., 2004). PPA can be subdivided into subtypes fluent (fluent but empty speech, comprehension of word meaning is affected / `semantic dementia') and non-fluent (agrammatism, hesitant or labored speech, word finding problems). Some identify logopenic aphasia as a FTD-variant: fluent aphasia with anomia but intact object recognition and underlying word meaning."
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