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Attracting EU agencies

This paper is about the political imbalance in the EU when it comes to attracting European agencies. Over the years, mainly due to the Brexit negotiations and for cost-efficiency reasons, many EU agencies moved from the UK to elsewhere, finding a new sea for headquarters functions or other departments. Whenever such a move is announced, EU countries and their candidate host cities jump into the breach to make a beneficial offer. The way these processes take place is a vector of the politicization of European integration. Nevertheless, these new locations of the EU agencies have won the bidding contest, is a process that usually takes place under the radar. The decision-making of these kinds of processes rests with the member states of the agency. Instead of choosing the most strategic place and ensuring an equal distribution among EU countries, which is the deal, often the highest bidder or the state contributing the most wins the agency. Interestingly, these processes have hardly been studied in the light of the increased politicization. This paper is an attempt to fill this research gap, by focusing on three cases and the processes of decision-making. The cases are the Collège européen de police (European Police College, CEPOL) which moved from the UK to Budapest in 2014, the European Medicine Agency (EMA) moving from London to Amsterdam in 2019, and the European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts (ECMWF) which moved its EU-funded program to Bonn and Helsinki mid-2021. The research strategy is as follows: the cases and the lobbying processes are described, then the main political actors are described, and the outcomes are described. The main research question is: How do these processes of political decision-making work out in practice? By answering this question, this study contributes to the discussion on globalized decision-making across the EU and the politicized imbalance which is the result of this.

Towards an Optimal IPO Mechanism

Concerns about the negative consequences of the excessive underpricing of the current arrangement in the initial public offering (IPO) market for the provision of entrepreneurial finance—book building—have led to research into the viability of auctions for IPO pricing and allocation. IPO firms face a trade-off between the benefit of accurate and reliable IPO price discovery and the cost of underpricing. The main aim of this paper was to gain new scientific knowledge about this trade-off by measuring the impact of two key variables on this trade-off: capacity restraint and discount on the auction clearing price. Using controlled experiment methodology in multi-unit uniform price auctions we found that the most capacity-restricted auctions that also offer investors a discount are likely to produce the most accurate and reliable price discovery and consequently, the most predictable auction outcome. There are indications that a discount of 8% may suffice to incentivize investors to reliably contribute to price discovery. The resulting underpricing (and its variability) of these auctions is likely to be significantly lower than if book building would be used to price and allocate IPOs. Technological innovation in the IPO market through the application of recent advances in data science, experimental economics and artificial intelligence allows for the optimization of IPO mechanisms and crowdfunding platforms which in turn improves the access to equity required for entrepreneurial finance.

Bidding for success? impacts of the european capital of culture bid

Comparative analysis of market structures of P2P energy trading in a local energy system

Peer-to-peer (P2P) energy trading has been recognized as an important technology to increase the local self-consumption of photovoltaics in the local energy system. Different auction mechanisms and bidding strategies haven been investigated in previous studies. However, there has been no comparatively analysis on how different market structures influence the local energy system’s overall performance. This paper presents and compares two market structures, namely a centralized market and a decentralized market. Two pricing mechanisms in the centralized market and two bidding strategies in the decentralized market are developed. The results show that the centralized market leads to higher overall system self-consumption and profits. In the decentralized market, some electricity is directly sold to the grid due to unmatchable bids and asks. Bidding strategies based on the learning algorithm can achieve better performance compared to the random method.

Bidding for Success? Impacts of the European Capital of Culture Bid

The increasingly multifaceted nature of event impacts makes them even more attractive as a potential solution to a range of urban and regional problems. As a result, competition to stage major cultural and sporting events is intensifying, and the cost of bidding is also rising. Given that such bidding processes only produce one winner, this means that a growing number of disappointed cities have to justify the costs of bidding for major events. In this context, we analyse the bidding process for the European Capital of Culture in the Netherlands (2018) and its impacts on local social structures. In particular the article focuses on the less tangible, non-economic effects of bidding for events, establishing a framework based on network formation, public support for the bidding process and social cohesion. The conclusions point to the key role of sociality and networking for events, which should therefore be developed throughout the bidding process for successful impacts, whether the event is won or not.

The bidding paradox

The ambition to host mega sports events is (or can be) perfectly justifiable with various arguments. The most persistently used argument is the supposed financial or direct economic gain for the host economy, of which the compelling body of evidence is discouraging. This implies that the justification for hosting should come from a different, broader economic angle. This paper provides a critical discussion of the myriad of economic and frequently intangible effects that could be put forward in the public debate preceding the submission of a bid. Paradoxically, most of these effects are not, or infrequently employed in public debates.