Hoofdstuk 15 15.1 Introduction 15.2 An international law perspective 15.3 The American position 15.4 International human rights developments 15.5 Effective remedy and reparations 15.6 Reflections References In the international arena there are some encouraging developments in relation to accountability and transparency for the use of armed drones. It is increasingly recognized that remote pilotless aircraft have become part of modern warfare, and that sometimes they are also used outside the context of armed conflict. Subsequently, both international humanitarian and human rights law can apply. The issue of access to justice, however, receives less explicit socio-political attention. Victims of armed remote pilotless aircraft strikes meet countless challenges in effectuating their right to an effective remedy. Often even a formal recognition that a strike has taken place is lacking. Furthermore, the states involved fail to publicly release information about their own investigations. This makes it difficult for those affected to substantiate their status as a victim and seek justice, including reparations. The international community should, in addition to urging involved states to independently and impartially investigate all armed drone strikes, ensure that access to an effective remedy for civilian victims, whether on an international, transnational or national level, becomes a reality.
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While there is extensive research on how Russian interference – in particular Russian disinformation operation – has played out in different European countries, indications of Russian interference directly targeting EU, its institutions or policies received little attention. This paper argues why there is good reason to assume that the EU, its institutions and its policies are an ideal a target for authoritarian regimes to exploit. It then explores in what ways, if any, Russian disinformation campaigning targeted EU institutions and their policies during the political and electoral campaigns leading up to the European Parliament (EP) elections of May 2019. In this context disinformation campaigning in terms of both network flows and contents (‘narratives’) have been examined, on the basis of a review of various reports identifying Russian interference and disinformation and of analyses of overall disinformation flows in Europe and the use of a database monitoring occurrences of disinformation.
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