Cooperatives are special because the members not only own the cooperative, but also patronize it. CEO’s decision has an impact on the overall members’ interests. Understanding how CEOs differ from members regarding their evaluations on cooperative performance and what causes the differences, is valuable for CEOs to best serve the members. This paper evaluates the difference between CEO and member evaluation regarding their cooperatives, and further examines the role of governance in predicting the evaluations and differences in evaluations, based on a set of first-hand data containing Chinese agricultural cooperatives (240 CEOs and 543 members). Cooperative performance is measured by three indicators: member profitability, social influence in the local community, and overall performance. The results show that members have higher scores than CEOs regarding member profitability and overall performance, while CEOs have a higher evaluation regarding social influence. “This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in 'The Social Science Journal' on 27 Jan. 2020 available online: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1016/j.soscij.2019.01.006. LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/xiao-peng-20466772/
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To elucidate how authoritative knowledge is established for better dealing with unstructured urban problems, this article describes how collaborations between researchers and officials become an instrument for conceptualizing and addressing policy problems. A case study is used to describe a research consortium evaluating the controversial practice of ‘Lifestyle’ based housing allocation in the Dutch domain of social-housing. Analyzing this case in key episodes, we see researchers and policymakers selectively draw on established institutional practices—their so called ‘home practices’—to jointly (re-)structure problems. In addition, we find that restructuring problems is not only intertwined with, but also deliberately aimed at (re-)structuring the relations within and between the governmental practices, the actors are embedded in. It is by selectively tinkering with knowledges, values, norms, and criteria that the actors can deliberately enable and constrain the ways a real-world problem is addressed.
The vast literature on accountability in the public sector (usually called ‘public accountability’originating from political science and public administration tends to emphasize the positive dimension of holding authorities to account. As formulated by one prominent scholar in the field, ‘[a]ccountability has become an icon for good governance’: it is perceived as ‘a Good Thing, and, so it seems, we can’t have enough of it’ (Bovens, 2005: 182, 183). Accountability has, thus, become one of the central values of democratic rule – varying on a well-known American slogan one could phrase this as ‘no public responsi bility without accountability’.
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