In dit rapport wordt de governance van Nationale parken besproken. Daarna wordt uitleg gegeven over de governance scan en hoe deze toegepast kan worden bij Nationale parken.
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De versnippering van de internationale samenleving vermindert de kans op een overkoepelend model van global governance. Meer waarschijnlijk is het ontstaan van bepaalde processen van bestuur die zich ontwikkelen als reactie op specifieke mondiale vraagstukken. Dit artikel beschrijft het proces van implementatie van de US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) als een voorbeeld van een dergelijk bijzonder proces. Het FCPA 'model' wordt gekenmerkt door samenwerking en onderhandeling tussen de publieke en private sector. In dit model is het samenwerken voor het bieden van maatschappelijke veiligheid gebaseerd op wederzijds belang. De mogelijkheid van onderhandelde regelingen heeft een positief effect op het management van corruptie door bedrijven, dat zich verspreidt over de hele invloedsfeer van de onderneming. Tegelijkertijd biedt het de overheid toegang tot de informatie die nodig is om corruptie op te sporen, te onderzoeken en te vervolgen. Het in kaart brengen van dergelijke processen biedt nuttige inzichten over nieuwe benaderingen die nodig kunnen zijn om goed bestuur voor een veilige wereld te bereiken. ABSTRACT The fragmentation of international society reduces the likelihood of a single overarching model of global governance. More likely, is the emergence of particular processes of governance that develop in response to specific global issues. The paper describes the process of implementing the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) as an example of one such particular process. The FCPA 'model' is characterized by co-operation and negotiation between the public and private sector. In this model, partnering for the provision of security is based on mutual self- interest. The possibility of negotiated settlements has a positive effect on the management of corruption by corporations with a ripple effect throughout the corporations' sphere of influence. At the same time, it provides governments with access to the information necessary to detect, investigate and prosecute corruption. Mapping such processes provides useful insights about new approaches that may be needed to attain good governance for a safe world.
DOCUMENT
This paper investigates the prospective application of arbitration by Transnational Private Regulation (TPR). It builds on the study of TPR developed by Fabrizio Cafaggi et al. TPR addresses the ever-increasing transfer of regulatory power from national to global levels, and from public to private regulators. TPR entails private regulatory co-operation be-yond the jurisdictional boundaries of States through voluntary standards. The regimes of TPR are built by a variety of actors, such as companies, NGOs, independent experts, and epistemic communities. Examples of TPR can be found in food safety, forestry management, trade, and derivatives, among other fields. More specifically, they concern private actors engaging in transnational coordination of standard setting such as the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) that was developed to foster responsible management of the world’s forests. There are four main characteristics of TPR: legitimacy, quality, effectiveness, and enforcement. I will describe those four characteristics in brief here. First, the legitimacy of TPR is built around consent through voluntary entry, participation, and exit of regulated entities. Important to this contribution is that the legitimacy of TPR goes beyond its legal dimension, measured by purely legal standards. Hence, the legitimacy of TPR is largely determined by standards developed by social and economic institutions relevant to specific TPR regimes. The role of those institutions in standard settings is higher in private TPR regimes than private-public TPR regimes, where some forms of compliance are mandatory. Second, the quality of TPR corresponds to the ex ante and ex post evaluation cycle of regulatory processes. It is also linked with the transparency of TPR. Third, the effectiveness of TPR is measured according to the extent to which the objectives of TPR (or selected TPR regimes) are met. And finally, enforcement of TPRis understood as ‘ensuring compliance with commitments’. Enforcement of TPR can take place through courts, administrative agencies, and private dispute resolution—including the arbitration at the core of this contribution. Cafaggi’s study identified rather selective use of arbitration in TPR, but also recommended changes to make arbitration law more adaptable to TPR. Furthermore, the study recommended that more specialized dispute resolution institutions are created to exclusively serve TPR. Against this background, I shift the main focus of analysis from TPR to arbitration. Whereas Cafaggi argued that arbitration may be suitable for TPR as a means of private enforcement, in this paper I go even further, arguing that arbitration as a means of informal, out-of-court dispute resolution is well suited to strengthen the normativity of TPR. This is so because private arbitration actors (including, inter alia, arbitrators and arbitral institutions) are already equipped with the tools necessary to facilitate cross-border TPR, which is done through informal standards and procedures with origins in the communitarian values and reputational mechanisms used by different communities before the development of modern States. The roots of most private justice regimes—including arbitration—are informed by communitarian values such as collaboration, participation, and personal trust. Those values, together with other core characteristics of arbitration correspond to all core characteristics of TPR, making both systems comparable and complementary. The analytical framework incorporated in this paper follows the four core characteristics of TPR. Hence, the paper is organized into five sections. The first section contains the introduction. In the second section, I analyze the legitimacy of arbitration vis-à-vis the legitimacy of TPR. In the third section, I investigate the accountability of arbitration as a means of quality signaling vis-à-vis TPR. In the fourth section, I focus on the remedies available to arbitrators in a view of TPR’s effectiveness. Finally, in the fifth section, I analyze enforcement through arbitration and its impact on the exclusiveness versus complementarity of TPR regimes. Conclusions follow, including recommendations for future research. Part of topic "The blurring distinction between public and private in international dispute resolution"
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Het kabinet heeft 25 missies geformuleerd om maatschappelijke uitdagingen aan te pakken. Deze missies richten zich op gezondere levensjaren, voldoende schoon water en veilig voedsel, minder uitstoot van broeikasgassen, betaalbare duurzame energie en een veilig Nederland om in te wonen en te werken. Ambitieuze doelen moeten ondernemers en onderzoekers uitdagen tot baanbrekende oplossingen en bijdragen aan de concurrentiekracht van Nederland. Voor een klimaatbestendig, waterrobuust, duurzaam, gezond en veilig Nederland zijn zowel grote als kleine oplossingen nodig. De missies openen deuren voor nieuwe startups, mkb’ers, consortia van maatschappelijke organisaties en samenwerkingsverbanden met burgers. Het realiseren van deze missies vraagt ook om samenwerking over grenzen van topsectoren en landen heen. De Hogescholen voor Groen Onderwijs: Aeres, HAS, Inholland en Hogeschool Van Hall Larenstein werken samen in het Center of Expertise Groen om met voldoende focus en massa bijdragen te leveren aan maatschappelijke opgaven waarvoor de groene sectoren staan. Deze opgaven zijn vertaald naar meerjarige missies in de Kennis en Innovatie Agenda (KIA) voor het groene domein. Binnen de Missie Landbouw, Water en Voedsel wordt gewerkt aan noodzakelijke transities, die tevens een grote verwevenheid kennen met andere maatschappelijke sectoren. Samen met partners uit het groene domein alsook uit de publieke- en private sectoren, realiseert het CoE Groen een krachtige onderzoeksgroep die op maatschappelijk relevante thema’s nieuwe kennis ontwikkelt die daadwerkelijk van betekenis is. De onderzoeksgroep richt zich de eerstkomende jaren op 7 thema’s: (1) Veerkracht (resilience) van natuurlijke bronnen (2) Herontwerp (redesign) agrifood productiesystemen (3) Vitaliteit in stad en leefomgeving (4) Gezond voedsel met meerwaarde (5) Digitalisering en High tech (6) Nieuwe businessmodellen (7) Governance. Voor de SPRONG naar een krachtige onderzoeksgroep wordt ingezet op het vergroten van zichtbaarheid, het opleiden en verbinden van onderzoekslijnen, (regionale) netwerkontwikkeling, het verbeteren van kwaliteit van onderzoek en het realiseren van maatschappelijke impact.
Collaborative networks for sustainability are emerging rapidly to address urgent societal challenges. By bringing together organizations with different knowledge bases, resources and capabilities, collaborative networks enhance information exchange, knowledge sharing and learning opportunities to address these complex problems that cannot be solved by organizations individually. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the apparel sector, where examples of collaborative networks for sustainability are plenty, for example Sustainable Apparel Coalition, Zero Discharge Hazardous Chemicals, and the Fair Wear Foundation. Companies like C&A and H&M but also smaller players join these networks to take their social responsibility. Collaborative networks are unlike traditional forms of organizations; they are loosely structured collectives of different, often competing organizations, with dynamic membership and usually lack legal status. However, they do not emerge or organize on their own; they need network orchestrators who manage the network in terms of activities and participants. But network orchestrators face many challenges. They have to balance the interests of diverse companies and deal with tensions that often arise between them, like sharing their innovative knowledge. Orchestrators also have to “sell” the value of the network to potential new participants, who make decisions about which networks to join based on the benefits they expect to get from participating. Network orchestrators often do not know the best way to maintain engagement, commitment and enthusiasm or how to ensure knowledge and resource sharing, especially when competitors are involved. Furthermore, collaborative networks receive funding from grants or subsidies, creating financial uncertainty about its continuity. Raising financing from the private sector is difficult and network orchestrators compete more and more for resources. When networks dissolve or dysfunction (due to a lack of value creation and capture for participants, a lack of financing or a non-functioning business model), the collective value that has been created and accrued over time may be lost. This is problematic given that industrial transformations towards sustainability take many years and durable organizational forms are required to ensure ongoing support for this change. Network orchestration is a new profession. There are no guidelines, handbooks or good practices for how to perform this role, nor is there professional education or a professional association that represents network orchestrators. This is urgently needed as network orchestrators struggle with their role in governing networks so that they create and capture value for participants and ultimately ensure better network performance and survival. This project aims to foster the professionalization of the network orchestrator role by: (a) generating knowledge, developing and testing collaborative network governance models, facilitation tools and collaborative business modeling tools to enable network orchestrators to improve the performance of collaborative networks in terms of collective value creation (network level) and private value capture (network participant level) (b) organizing platform activities for network orchestrators to exchange ideas, best practices and learn from each other, thereby facilitating the formation of a professional identity, standards and community of network orchestrators.
The consortium would like to contribute to structural reduction of post-harvest and food losses and food quality improvement in Kenyan avocado and dairy value chains via the application of technical solutions and tools as well as improved chain governance competences in those food chains. The consortium has four types of partners: 1. Universities (2 Kenyan, 4 Dutch), 2. Private sector actors in those chains, 3. Organisations supporting those chains, and 4. Associate partners which support category 1 to 3 partners through co-financing, advice and reflection. The FORQLAB project targets two areas in Kenya for both commodities, a relatively well-developed chain in the central highlands and a less-develop chain in Western-Kenya. The approach is business to business and the selected regions have great potential for uptake of successful chain innovations as outcome of research results. The results are scalable for other fresh and processed product chains via a living lab network approach. The project consists of 5 work packages (WPs): 1. Inventory , status quo and inception, 2. Applied research, 3. Dissemination of research outputs through living lab networks, 4. Translation of project output in curricula and trainings, and 5. Communication among partners and WPs. The applied research will be implemented in cooperation with all partners, whereby students of the consortium universities will conduct most of the field studies and all other partners support and interact depending on the WPs. The expected outcomes are: two knowledge exchange platforms (Living Labs) supported with hands on sustainable food waste reduction implementation plans (agenda strategy); overview and proposals for ready ICT and other tech solutions; communication and teaching materials for universities and TVETs; action perspectives; and knowledge transfer and uptake.
