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Sustainable Tourism in the Wadden Sea Region

In this paper we position sustainable tourism of the Wadden. The aim is to clarify the complex issues at stake and therewith provide a framework for future actions and policies.

Open for Business: Pathways to strengthen CGIAR's responsible engagement with the private sector

Moving a taxi sector to become electric

The increased adoption of electric vehicles worldwide is largely caused by the uptake of private electric cars. In parallel other segments such as busses, city logistics and taxis, are increasingly becoming electrified. Amsterdam is an interesting case, as the municipality and the taxi sector have signed a voluntary agreement to realise a full electric taxi fleet by 2025. This paper investigates the results of a survey that was distributed amongst 3000 taxi drivers to examine perceptions and attitudes on the municipal charging incentives as well as taxi ride characteristics.

The effect of centralized financial and social incentives on cooperative behavior and its underlying neural mechanisms

Incentives are frequently used by governments and employers to encourage cooperation. Here, we investigated the effect of centralized incentives on cooperation, firstly in a behavioral study and then replicated in a subsequent neuroimaging (fMRI) study. In both studies, participants completed a novel version of the Public Goods Game, including experimental conditions in which the administration of centralized incentives was probabilistic and incentives were either of a financial or social nature. Behavioral results showed that the prospect of potentially receiving financial and social incentives significantly increased cooperation, with financial incentives yielding the strongest effect. Neuroimaging results showed that activation in the bilateral lateral orbitofrontal cortex and precuneus increased when participants were informed that incentives would be absent versus when they were present. Furthermore, activation in the medial orbitofrontal cortex increased when participants would potentially receive a social versus a financial incentive. These results speak to the efficacy of different types of centralized incentives in increasing cooperative behavior, and they show that incentives directly impact the neural mechanisms underlying cooperation.

The application of arbitration in transnational private regulation

This paper investigates the prospective application of arbitration by Transnational Private Regulation (TPR). It builds on the study of TPR developed by Fabrizio Cafaggi et al. TPR addresses the ever-increasing transfer of regulatory power from national to global levels, and from public to private regulators. TPR entails private regulatory co-operation be-yond the jurisdictional boundaries of States through voluntary standards. The regimes of TPR are built by a variety of actors, such as companies, NGOs, independent experts, and epistemic communities. Examples of TPR can be found in food safety, forestry management, trade, and derivatives, among other fields. More specifically, they concern private actors engaging in transnational coordination of standard setting such as the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) that was developed to foster responsible management of the world’s forests. There are four main characteristics of TPR: legitimacy, quality, effectiveness, and enforcement. I will describe those four characteristics in brief here. First, the legitimacy of TPR is built around consent through voluntary entry, participation, and exit of regulated entities. Important to this contribution is that the legitimacy of TPR goes beyond its legal dimension, measured by purely legal standards. Hence, the legitimacy of TPR is largely determined by standards developed by social and economic institutions relevant to specific TPR regimes. The role of those institutions in standard settings is higher in private TPR regimes than private-public TPR regimes, where some forms of compliance are mandatory. Second, the quality of TPR corresponds to the ex ante and ex post evaluation cycle of regulatory processes. It is also linked with the transparency of TPR. Third, the effectiveness of TPR is measured according to the extent to which the objectives of TPR (or selected TPR regimes) are met. And finally, enforcement of TPRis understood as ‘ensuring compliance with commitments’. Enforcement of TPR can take place through courts, administrative agencies, and private dispute resolution—including the arbitration at the core of this contribution. Cafaggi’s study identified rather selective use of arbitration in TPR, but also recommended changes to make arbitration law more adaptable to TPR. Furthermore, the study recommended that more specialized dispute resolution institutions are created to exclusively serve TPR. Against this background, I shift the main focus of analysis from TPR to arbitration. Whereas Cafaggi argued that arbitration may be suitable for TPR as a means of private enforcement, in this paper I go even further, arguing that arbitration as a means of informal, out-of-court dispute resolution is well suited to strengthen the normativity of TPR. This is so because private arbitration actors (including, inter alia, arbitrators and arbitral institutions) are already equipped with the tools necessary to facilitate cross-border TPR, which is done through informal standards and procedures with origins in the communitarian values and reputational mechanisms used by different communities before the development of modern States. The roots of most private justice regimes—including arbitration—are informed by communitarian values such as collaboration, participation, and personal trust. Those values, together with other core characteristics of arbitration correspond to all core characteristics of TPR, making both systems comparable and complementary. The analytical framework incorporated in this paper follows the four core characteristics of TPR. Hence, the paper is organized into five sections. The first section contains the introduction. In the second section, I analyze the legitimacy of arbitration vis-à-vis the legitimacy of TPR. In the third section, I investigate the accountability of arbitration as a means of quality signaling vis-à-vis TPR. In the fourth section, I focus on the remedies available to arbitrators in a view of TPR’s effectiveness. Finally, in the fifth section, I analyze enforcement through arbitration and its impact on the exclusiveness versus complementarity of TPR regimes. Conclusions follow, including recommendations for future research. Part of topic "The blurring distinction between public and private in international dispute resolution"

Comparison of Private Incentive Mechanisms for Improving Sustainability of Filipino Tuna Fisheries

This paper analyzes the influence of three private incentive mechanisms over decision making related to improved sustainability of fishing practices in Filipino tuna fisheries. The three mechanisms compared are the World Wildlife Fund for Nature’s fishery improvement project model, Marine Stewardship Council certification, and the International Seafood Sustainability Foundation Pro-Active Vessel Register. The main question addressed in this paper is how and to what extent the private incentive mechanisms support the development of fisher capabilities to respond to the requirements set out by these mechanisms. Applying a global value chain approach to analyze results collected from key actors involved in Philippine tuna fishers contributing to both domestic and regional economic development in the Western Pacific, we explore the structure and function of these private incentive mechanisms in achieving both environmental and economic development outcomes. Our results show that these private incentive mechanisms deliver different direct and indirect incentives for changing to more sustainable fishing practices, and that the success of these mechanisms is dependent on the extent to which the mechanisms support the development of target fisher capabilities to comply with their sustainability requirements. We conclude that the future success of these incentive mechanisms depends for a large part on stricter sustainability requirements, but also on the capacity of the mechanisms to incentivize the inclusion of more developing country fishers. These findings contribute to a wider understanding of how the capabilities of developing country producers are influenced by their relationship with chain and non-chain actors, and with the wide institutional arrangements that the producers operate in.