This paper reveals how the automatising of protocols ignited a public conflict between Dutch banks and their Small and Medium-sized Enterprise (SME) clients in the years after the Global Financial Crisis. The bank’s “infirmary departments” for Financial Restructuring and Recovery (FR&R) were accused of (mal)treating SMEs. The conflict resulted in no formal regulatory or legal change despite public support. Instead, the banks created self-regulation to improve communication with SMEs, leading to shifts in governing FR&R for SMEs. This way, the banks mitigated significant negative symptoms of automation and solved the conflict with the SMEs while keeping FR&R and ongoing automation intact. The research uses an interdisciplinary analytical framework to understand national financial conflicts in a digitalised (business) world. It contributes to the theory of institutionalising values in discursive contests between action fields. The paper highlights the material and causes of normative conflicts of interest among critical actors in established public-private networks through discourse analysis and process tracing.
De kernvraag van dit lectoraat is: hoe is governance effectief te organiseren in deze complexe netwerken? In dit essay wordt allereerst de veranderende wereld, de context waarin governance plaatsvindt, beschreven. Daarna zal worden ingegaan op de veranderende governance systemen zelf. Gevolgd door een beschrijving van wat in het optiek van dit lectoraat de centrale spelers in die nieuwe governance systemen zijn: beleidsmakers. Het essay sluit af met de contouren van een onderzoeksagenda voor dit lectoraat.
Understanding the decision-making process of a boardroom is one of the most fascinating parts of organizational research. We are all interested in power games, team dynamics and how the external environment could influence the decision of directors. One of the important buzzwords of today is “good governance” and many boards face a lot of societal pressure to implement best practices of governance. It goes beyond regulatory requirements and boards need to take a different perspective on integrating governance codes and best practices in their organizations. In this study, we focused on the role of individual directors in developing organizational responses to that pressure. More specifically, we looked at how directors’ own cognitive frames of governance influence the way boards choose best practices.
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