‘The fear of crime’ is “upon everybody’s tongue” nowadays (Farrall & Gadd 2004:1). The concept is widely accepted as social problem across the globe (Gray, Jackson & Farrall 2008, Garland 2001) as it is held to impinge ‘(…) upon the well-being of a large proportion of the population’ (Farralll et al. 1997:658). But do we actually have a valid picture of a genuine ‘social problem of striking dimensions’ (Ditton 1999:83)? Critical voices say we don’t. ‘The fear of crime’ - as we generally know it - is seen by them as ‘(…) a product of the way it has been researched rather than the way it is’ (Farrall et al. 1997:658). And still, 45 years after the start of research, ‘surprisingly little can be said conclusively about the fear of crime‘ (Ditton & Farrall 2000:xxi). This research contributes to a growing body of knowledge - from especially the last fifteen years - that treats ‘the fear of crime’ as ‘(…) a complex allocation of interacting feelings, perceptions, emotions, values and judgments on the personal as well as the societal level’ (Pleysier 2010:43). One often replicated and paradoxical observation catches the eye: citizens perceive a growing threat of crime to their society, but consequently perceive a low risk that they themselves will fall victim of crime. Taking a social psychological approach (e.g. see Farrall et al. 2000; Jackson 2008), we will search for suitable explanations for this paradoxical observation in the fear of crime’s research tradition. The aim of this research is ‘to integrate social psychological concepts related to the individual’s identity and evaluation of his position in an increasingly complex society, to enhance our understanding of the fear of crime concept’ (Pleysier & Cops 2016:3).
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Many organizations have undergone substantial reorganization in the last decade. They re-engineered their business processes and exchanged proprietary, not integrated applications for more standard solutions. Integration of structured data in relational databases has improved documentation of business transactions and increased data quality. But almost 90% of the information that organizations manage is unstructured, cannot easily be integrated into a traditional database. When used for organizational actions and transactions, structured and unstructured information are records. They are meant and used as evidence. Governments, courts and other stakeholders are making increasing demands for the trustworthiness of records. An analysis of literature of the information, organization and archival sciences illustrates that accountability needs the reconstruction of the past. Hypothesis of this paper is that for the reconstruction of the past each organization needs a combination of threemechanisms: enterprise records management, organizational memory and records auditing. Enterprise records management ensures that records meet the quality requirements needed for accountability: integrity, authenticity, controllability and historicity. They ensure records that can be trusted and enhance the possibilities for the reconstruction of the past. The organizational memory ensures that trusted records are preserved for as long as is necessary to comply with accountability regulations. It provides an ICT infrastructure to (indefinitely) store those records and to keep them accessible. Records auditing researches the first two mentioned mechanisms to assess the possibility to reconstruct past organizational actions and transactions. These mechanisms ensure that organizations have a documented understanding of [1] the processing of actions and transactions within business processes; [2] the dissemination of trusted records; [3] the way the organization accounts for the actions and transactions within its business processes; and [4] the reconstruction of actions and transactions from business processes over time. This understanding is crucial for the reconstruction of the past and for organizational accountability.
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De toeslagenaffaire is nog niet voorbij of de malaise van de WIA buitelt eroverheen. De chaos bij de overheid groeit zo uit tot ongekende proporties waardoor de democratie verder onder druk komt te staan. Niet door het gewoonlijke en bijbehorende politiek gekonkel in de Tweede Kamer, maar omdat het ambtelijk apparaat zich naar binnen heeft gekeerd en het contact met burgers en bedrijven heeft verloren, uitzonderingen daargelaten.Dus worden de oude systemen en bestaande technieken gebruikt om de problemen aan te pakken. In een zoektocht naar oplossingen lijkt geld niet het probleem: er zijn miljarden uitgegeven zonder resultaat. Maar over de echte aanpak van de toeslagenaffaire is nooit goed nagedacht. Welke feiten, middelen of regelingen waren nodig voor effectieve actie? Waarom werden toeslagen eigenlijk stopgezet bij vermeende fraude? Is het probleem überhaupt oplosbaar?Handmatige informatieverzameling zonder bruikbaarheid voor gedupeerden, medewerkers, belangenbehartigers en machines om intelligent over regelingen heen te redeneren, leveren geen resultaten op.
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The modern economy is largely data-driven and relies on the processing and sharing of data across organizations as a key contributor to its success. At the same time, the value, amount, and sensitivity of processed data is steadily increasing, making it a major target of cyber-attacks. A large fraction of the many reported data breaches happened in the healthcare sector, mostly affecting privacy-sensitive data such as medical records and other patient data. This puts data security technologies as a priority item on the agenda of many healthcare organizations, such as of the Dutch health insurance company Centraal Ziekenfonds (CZ). In particular when it comes to sharing data securely, practical data protection technologies are lacking as they mostly focus on securing the link between two organizations while being completely oblivious of what is happening with the data after sharing. For CZ, searchable encryption (SE) technologies that allow to share data in encrypted form, while enabling the private search on this encrypted data without the need to decrypt, are of particular interest. Unfortunately, existing efficient SE schemes completely leak the access pattern (= pattern of encrypted search results, e.g. identifiers of retrieved items) and the search pattern (= pattern of search queries, e.g. frequency of same queries), making them susceptible to leakage-abuse attacks that exploit this leakage to recover what has been queried for and/or (parts of) the shared data itself. The SHARE project will investigate ways to reduce the leakage in searchable encryption in order to mitigate the impact of leakage-abuse attacks while keeping the performance-level high enough for practical use. Concretely, we propose the construction of SE schemes that allow the leakage to be modeled as a statistic released on the queries and shared dataset in terms of ε-differential privacy, a well-established notion that informally says that, after observing the statistic, you learn approximately (determined by the ε-parameter) the same amount of information about an individual data item or query as if the item was not present in the dataset or the query has not been performed. Naturally, such an approach will produce false positives and negatives in the querying process, affecting the scheme’s performance. By calibrating the ε-parameter, we can achieve various leakage-performance trade-offs tailored to the needs of specific applications. SHARE will explore the idea of differentially-private leakage on different parts of SE with different search capabilities, starting with exact-keyword-match SE schemes with differentially-private leakage on the access pattern only, up to schemes with differentially-private leakage on the access and search pattern as well as on the shared dataset itself, allowing for more expressive query types like fuzzy match, range, or substring queries. SHARE comes with an attack lab in which we investigate existing and new types of leakage-abuse attacks to assess the mitigation-potential of our proposed combination of differential privacy with cryptographic guarantees in searchable encryption. To stimulate commercial exploitation of SHARE-results, our consortium partners CZ and TNO will take the lead on applying and evaluating our envisioned technologies in various healthcare use-cases.
