In this paper we research the following question: What motivational factors relate, in which degree, to intentions on compliance to ISP and how could these insights be utilized to promote endusers compliance within a given organization? The goal of this research is to provide more insight in the motivational factors applicable to ISP and their influence on end-user behavior, thereby broadening knowledge regarding information systems security behaviors in organizations from the viewpoint of non-malicious abuse and offer a theoretical explanation and empirical support. The outcomes are also useful for practitioners to complement their security training and awareness programs, in the end helping enterprises better effectuate their information security policies. In this study an instrument is developed that can be used in practice to measure an organizational context on the effects of six motivational factors recognized. These applicable motivational factors are determined from literature and subsequently evaluated and refined by subject matter experts. A survey is developed, tested in a pilot, refined and conducted within four organizations. From the statistical analysis, findings are reported and conclusions on the hypothesis are drawn. Recommended Citation Straver, Peter and Ravesteyn, Pascal (2018) "End-users Compliance to the Information Security Policy: A Comparison of Motivational Factors," Communications of the IIMA: Vol. 16 : Iss. 4 , Article 1. Available at: https://scholarworks.lib.csusb.edu/ciima/vol16/iss4/1
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Cybersecurity is meer dan alleen het nemen van technische maatregelen. En alhoewel gebruikers ten onrechte vaak alleen worden aangemerkt als ‘de zwakke schakel’ binnen die cybersecurity, moet een deel van de maatregelen zich toch echt wel richten op deze groep. Gebruikers gedragen zich immers soms bewust of onbewust onveilig: - ze klikken op hyperlinks als ze dat niet moeten doen; - reageren op een phishingmail; - gebruiken zwakke wachtwoorden; - hergebruiken wachtwoorden; - melden incidenten niet; - geven (te) veel gegevens prijs van zichzelf op social media; - maken niet consequent back-ups van hun data. Sinds jaar en dag lijken organisaties ‘awareness’ te zien als de sleutel om van gebruikers iets minder de zwakke schakel te maken. De gedachte daarachter is kortgezegd dat gebruikers zich ‘beter’ gaan gedragen als we ze voeden met informatie over dreigingen, goed en fout gedrag en het cybersecurity-beleid. Het is inmiddels echter wel duidelijk dat een beleid dat alleen gericht is op ‘awareness’ niet gaatzorgen voor het gewenste effect. Onderzoek toont bijvoorbeeld aan dat anti-phishingcampagnes, waar nepphishingmails worden verstuurd, niet heel lang beklijven. Cybersecuritybedrijven geven dan ook steeds vaker aan dat het niet alleen gaat om het verhogen van kennis en bewustwording, maar ook om andere aspecten die gedrag lijken te beïnvloeden. Recent wetenschappelijk experimenteel onderzoek laat zelfs zien dat het hebben van meer kennis kan leiden tot onveiliger gedrag: gebruikers die (een beetje) meer weten, gedragen zich nog onveiliger. Mogelijk komt dat doordat die groep zichzelf overschat en daardoor ten onrechte grotere risico’s durft te nemen. We moeten dus verder komen dan alleen awareness. Het lab observeert dat er twee grote vraagstukken spelen. 1. Wat moeten we dan verder nog doen? Het is duidelijk dat er geen simpele oplossing is voor het bevorderen van veilig cybergedrag. Toch is het goed om nieuwe oplossingsrichtingen te onderzoeken die richting geven aan het verbeteren van cyberveilig gedrag. 2. Hoe zorgen we ervoor dat organisaties daadwerkelijk verder gaan dan alleen het creëren van meer awareness? Individuele organisaties hebben lang niet altijd de kennis en kunde om dit zelf te doen. Moet de overheid dit stimuleren? Zo ja, hoe dan? Kan het aan de markt zelf (lees: cybersecurity bedrijven) overgelaten worden? Wat kunnen we leren over het stimuleren van effectieve gedragsinterventies binnen andere vakgebieden? https://nl.linkedin.com/in/rutgerleukfeldt
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From the article: This paper describes the external IT security analysis of an international corporate organization, containing a technical and a social perspective, resulting in a proposed repeatable approach and lessons learned for applying this approach. Part of the security analysis was the utilization of a social engineering experiment, as this could be used to discover employee related risks. This approach was based on multiple signals that indicated a low IT security awareness level among employees as well as the results of a preliminary technical analysis. To carry out the social engineering experiment, two techniques were used. The first technique was to send phishing emails to both the system administrators and other employees of the company. The second technique comprised the infiltration of the office itself to test the physical security, after which two probes were left behind. The social engineering experiment proved that general IT security awareness among employees was very low. The results allowed the research team to infiltrate the network and have the possibility to disable or hamper crucial processes. Social engineering experiments can play an important role in conducting security analyses, by showing security vulnerabilities and raising awareness within a company. Therefore, further research should focus on the standardization of social engineering experiments to be used in security analyses and further development of the approach itself. This paper provides a detailed description of the used methods and the reasoning behind them as a stepping stone for future research on this subject. van Liempd, D., Sjouw, A., Smakman, M., & Smit, K. (2019). Social Engineering As An Approach For Probing Organizations To Improve It Security: A Case Study At A Large International Firm In The Transport Industry. 119-126. https://doi.org/10.33965/es2019_201904l015
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Worldwide there is a lack of well-educated and experienced information security specialists. The first step to address this issue is arranging enough people with a well-known and acceptable basic level of information security competences. However, there might be a lot of information security education and training, but there is anything but a well-defined outflow level with a known and acceptable basic level of information security competences. There exists a chaotic situation in respect of the qualification of information security professionals, with the emergence of a large number of difficult to compare certificates and job titles. Apparently the information security field requires uniform qualifications that are internationally recognized. Such qualifications could be an excellent way of unambiguously clarifying the knowledge and skills of information security professionals. Furthermore it gives educational institutions a framework which facilitates the development of appropriate information security education and training.
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Safety and Security (S&S) have the same goal, that is to maintain the integrity of human, infrastructure, hardware, software, capital and intangible assets of a system. However, literature and practice indicate that the relationship between S&S has not yet been clearly defined and their boundaries remain blurry. The current paper presents a short review of academic and professional literature about the relationship between S&S. This relationship is examined by looking at the S&S dependencies, their similarities and differences, and the role of the human element in achieving and maintaining the desired S&S levels. The review of literature showed that (1) there is a tendency to emphasize on the effects of security on safety and underestimate the opposite, (2) human factors are not part of security training to the extent are addressed in safety training, (3) security and safety problems can be the result of both internal and external disturbances and agents, (4) the intentionality or not of outcomes, and not of the action, can stand as a valid criterion to classify an event as a security or a safety one correspondingly, (5) S&S issues can result in negative implications internally and externally to the system, and (6) the synergy between S&S is of paramount importance for achieving the optimum levels of system protection. The positions of this paper might comprise a basis for enriching educational programmes around S&S and igniting relevant research.
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COVID-19 arrived in the world suddenly and unexpectedly. It caused major disruptions at economical, operational and other levels. In the case of flight traffic, the operations were reduced to 10% of their original levels. The question after COVID-19 is how to restart the operations and how to keep the balance between safety and capacity. In this paper we present an analysis using simulation techniques for understanding the impact in a security area of an important airport in Latin America; the airport of Mexico City. The results allow to illustrate the potential congestion given by the implemented covid-19 restriction, even when the traffic recovers only by 25% of the pre-covid-19 traffic. The congestion can be mitigated by applying some layout changes (snake queue vs parallel queue) and when more capacity is added to the system (extra security line). The results will raise situational awareness for airport stakeholders when implementing the actions suggested by different international institutions like WHO, IATA or ICAO.
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Computer security incident response teams (CSIRTs) respond to a computer security incident when the need arises. Failure of these teams can have far-reaching effects for the economy and national security. CSIRTs often have to work on an ad hoc basis, in close cooperation with other teams, and in time constrained environments. It could be argued that under these working conditions CSIRTs would be likely to encounter problems. A needs assessment was done to see to which extent this argument holds true. We constructed an incident response needs model to assist in identifying areas that require improvement. We envisioned a model consisting of four assessment categories: Organization, Team, Individual and Instrumental. Central to this is the idea that both problems and needs can have an organizational, team, individual, or technical origin or a combination of these levels. To gather data we conducted a literature review. This resulted in a comprehensive list of challenges and needs that could hinder or improve, respectively, the performance of CSIRTs. Then, semi-structured in depth interviews were held with team coordinators and team members of five public and private sector Dutch CSIRTs to ground these findings in practice and to identify gaps between current and desired incident handling practices. This paper presents the findings of our needs assessment and ends with a discussion of potential solutions to problems with performance in incident response. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2017.02179 LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/rickvanderkleij1/
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This essay explores the notion of resilience by providing a theoretical context and subsequently linking it to the management of safety and security. The distinct worlds of international security, industrial safety and public security have distinct risks as well as distinct ‘core purposes and integrities’ as understood by resilience scholars. In dealing with risks one could argue there are three broad approaches: cost-benefit analysis, precaution and resilience. In order to distinguish the more recent approach of resilience, the idea of adaptation will be contrasted to mitigation. First, a general outline is provided of what resilience implies as a way to survive and thrive in the face of adversity. After that, a translation of resilience for the management of safety and security is described. LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/juul-gooren-phd-cpp-a1180622/
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ABSTRACT This study investigates how perceptions of radicalisation and co-occurring mental health issues differ between mental health care and the security domain, and how these perceptions affect intersectoral collaboration. It is generally thought that intersectoral collaboration is a useful strategy for preventing radicalisation and terrorism, especially when it concerns radicalised persons with mental health issues. It is not clear, however, what perceptions professionals have of radicalisation and collaboration with other disciplines. Data was obtained from focus groups and individual interviews with practitioners and trainers from mental health care and the security domain in the Netherlands. The results show a lack of knowledge about radicalisation in mental health care, whereas in the security domain, there is little understanding of mental health issues. This leads to a mad-bad dichotomy which has a negative effect on collaboration and risk management. Improvement of the intersectoral collaboration by cross-domain familiarization, and strengthening of trust and mutual understanding, should begin with the basic training of professionals in both domains. The Care and Safety Houses in the Netherlands offer a sound base for intersectoral collaboration. Future professionals from different domains ought to be familiarized with each other’s possibilities, limitations, tasks, and roles.
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The sense of safety and security of older people is a widely acknowledged action domain for policy and practice in age-friendly cities. Despite an extensive body of knowledge on the matter, the theory is fragmented, and a classification is lacking. Therefore, this study investigated how older people experience the sense of safety and security in an age-friendly city. A total of four focus group sessions were organised in The Hague comprising 38 older people. Based on the outcomes of the sessions, the sense of safety and security was classified into two main domains: a sense of safety and security impacted by intentional acts and negligence (for instance, burglary and violence), and a sense of safety and security impacted by non-intentional acts (for instance, incidents, making mistakes online). Both domains manifest into three separate contexts, namely the home environment, the outdoor environment and traffic and the digital environment. In the discussions with older people on these derived domains, ideas for potential improvements and priorities were also explored, which included access to information on what older people can do themselves to improve their sense of safety and security, the enforcement of rules, and continuous efforts to develop digital skills to improve safety online. Original article at MDPI; DOI: https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph19073960
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