Int. Arch. Photogramm. Remote Sens. Spatial Inf. Sci., XL-8, 147-154, 2014www.int-arch-photogramm-remote-sens-spatial-inf-sci.net/XL-8/147/2014/doi:10.5194/isprsarchives-XL-8-147-2014Integrated flood disaster management and spatial information: Case studies ofNetherlands and IndiaS. Zlatanova1, T. Ghawana2, A. Kaur2, and J. M. M. Neuvel31Faculty of Architecture, Jullianalaan, TU Delft, 134, 2628BL Delft, the Netherlands2Centre for Disaster Management Studies, Guru Gobind Singh Indraprastha University, Sector-16C, Dwarka, New Delhi, P.O. Box-110078, India3Saxion University of Applied Sciences, Risk management, Handelskade 75, 7417 DH Deventer, the NetherlandsKeywords: Floods, Spatial Information Infrastructure, GIS, Risk Management, Emergency Management Abstract. Spatial Information is an integral part of flood management practices which include risk management &emergency response processes. Although risk & emergency management activities have their own characteristics, forexample, related to the time scales, time pressure, activities & actors involved, it is still possible to identify at least onecommon challenge that constrains the ability of risk & emergency management to plan for & manage emergencieseffectively and efficiently i.e. the need for better information. Considering this aspect, this paper explores flood managementin Netherlands& India with an emphasis on spatial information requirements of each system. The paper examines theactivities, actors & information needs related to flood management. Changing perspectives on flood management inNetherlands are studied where additional attention is being paid to the organization and preparation of flood emergencymanagement. Role of different key actors involved in risk management is explored. Indian Flood management guidelines, byNational Disaster Management Authority, are analyzed in context of their history, institutional framework, achievements andgaps. Flood Forecasting System of Central Water Commission of India is also analyzed in context of spatial dimensions.Further, information overlap between risk & emergency management from the perspectives of spatial planners & emergencyresponders and role of GIS based modelling / simulation is analyzed. Finally, the need for an integrated spatial informationstructure is explained & discussed in detail. This examination of flood management practices in the Netherlands and Indiawith an emphasis on the required spatial information in these practices has revealed an increased recognition of the stronginterdependence between risk management and emergency response processes. Consequently, the importance of anintegrated spatial information infrastructure that facilitates the process of both risk and emergency management isaddressed.Conference Paper (PDF, 1063 KB) Int. Arch. Photogramm. Remote Sens. Spatial Inf. Sci., XL-8, 147-154, 2014www.int-arch-photogramm-remote-sens-spatial-inf-sci.net/XL-8/147/2014/doi:10.5194/isprsarchives-XL-8-147-2014Integrated flood disaster management and spatial information: Case studies ofNetherlands and IndiaS. Zlatanova1, T. Ghawana2, A. Kaur2, and J. M. M. Neuvel31Faculty of Architecture, Jullianalaan, TU Delft, 134, 2628BL Delft, the Netherlands2Centre for Disaster Management Studies, Guru Gobind Singh Indraprastha University, Sector-16C, Dwarka, New Delhi, P.O. Box-110078, India3Saxion University of Applied Sciences, Risk management, Handelskade 75, 7417 DH Deventer, the NetherlandsKeywords: Floods, Spatial Information Infrastructure, GIS, Risk Management, Emergency ManagementAbstract. Spatial Information is an integral part of flood management practices which include risk management &emergency response processes. Although risk & emergency management activities have their own characteristics, forexample, related to the time scales, time pressure, activities & actors involved, it is still possible to identify at least onecommon&
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Op basis van bijna 400 uur observatie in twee Nederlandse ziekenhuizen schetst dit rapport een gedetailleerd en indringend beeld van de leefwereld van de spoedeisende hulp. Agressie, zo bleek, is geen objectief gegeven, maar ontstaat in interactie met mensen en dingen. Gedrag wat de een ervaart als een persoonlijke bedreiging is voor de ander een begrijpelijke uiting van pijn. En wat voor de een teken is van professionele kalmte is voor de ander een gebrek aan empathie. In veel agressieincidenten blijkt het niet eenvoudig om ‘daders’ en ‘slachtoffers’ van elkaar te onderscheiden.
In case of a major cyber incident, organizations usually rely on external providers of Cyber Incident Response (CIR) services. CIR consultants operate in a dynamic and constantly changing environment in which they must actively engage in information management and problem solving while adapting to complex circumstances. In this challenging environment CIR consultants need to make critical decisions about what to advise clients that are impacted by a major cyber incident. Despite its relevance, CIR decision making is an understudied topic. The objective of this preliminary investigation is therefore to understand what decision-making strategies experienced CIR consultants use during challenging incidents and to offer suggestions for training and decision-aiding. A general understanding of operational decision making under pressure, uncertainty, and high stakes was established by reviewing the body of knowledge known as Naturalistic Decision Making (NDM). The general conclusion of NDM research is that experts usually make adequate decisions based on (fast) recognition of the situation and applying the most obvious (default) response pattern that has worked in similar situations in the past. In exceptional situations, however, this way of recognition-primed decision-making results in suboptimal decisions as experts are likely to miss conflicting cues once the situation is quickly recognized under pressure. Understanding the default response pattern and the rare occasions in which this response pattern could be ineffective is therefore key for improving and aiding cyber incident response decision making. Therefore, we interviewed six experienced CIR consultants and used the critical decision method (CDM) to learn how they made decisions under challenging conditions. The main conclusion is that the default response pattern for CIR consultants during cyber breaches is to reduce uncertainty as much as possible by gathering and investigating data and thus delay decision making about eradication until the investigation is completed. According to the respondents, this strategy usually works well and provides the most assurance that the threat actor can be completely removed from the network. However, the majority of respondents could recall at least one case in which this strategy (in hindsight) resulted in unnecessary theft of data or damage. Interestingly, this finding is strikingly different from other operational decision-making domains such as the military, police and fire service in which there is a general tendency to act rapidly instead of searching for more information. The main advice is that training and decision aiding of (novice) cyber incident responders should be aimed at the following: (a) make cyber incident responders aware of how recognition-primed decision making works; (b) discuss the default response strategy that typically works well in several scenarios; (c) explain the exception and how the exception can be recognized; (d) provide alternative response strategies that work better in exceptional situations.
