The world of student associations, is not all what it seems to be. Here, like in the corporate boardroom, we find a world of personal ambition that drive unproductive acquisitions and other unwanted managerial behavior. Agency problems as studied by Jensen & Meckling (1976) and eloquently summarized by Gordon Gekko (1987) are major causes of the credit crisis of 2008.
The literature on how organizations respond to institutional pressure has shown that the individual decision-makers’ interpretation of institutional pressure played an important role in developing organizational responses. However, it has paid less attention to how this interpretation ultimately contributes to their range of organizational decisions when responding to the same institutional pressure. We address this gap by interviewing board members of U.S. and Dutch hospitals involved in adopting best practices regarding board evaluation. We found four qualitatively different cognitive frames that board members relied on to interpret institutional pressure, and which shaped their organizational response. We contribute to the literature on organizational response to institutional pressure by empirically investigating how decision-makers interpret institutional pressure, by suggesting prior experience and role definition as moderating factors of multidimensional cognitive frames, and by showing how these cognitive frames influence board members’ response to the same institutional pressure.
Triggered by highly publicised corporate scandals, changing societal expectations and the collapse of financial markets, the roles of boards of directors have changed significantly in safeguarding the interest of shareholders and other stakeholders. Yet, relatively little is known about contemporary challenges non–executive directors face and whether their boards are well–equipped for their new tasks. Based on self–assessment reports by supervisory boards, a survey and interviews with supervisory board members, this paper investigates the challenges non–executive directors face in the Netherlands, particularly after a decade of corporate governance reform. Non–executive directors' inadequate role in scrutinising executive directors' performance, information asymmetries and dysfunctional working relationships between executive and non–executive directors are among the greatest challenges indicated by non–executive directors on Dutch supervisory boards. The paper discusses several implications for scholars and practitioners and provides a unique insight in boardroom dynamics.
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