By analysing intelligence-gathering reform legislation this article discusses access to justice for communications interception by the intelligence and security services. In the aftermath of the Snowden revelations, sophisticated oversight systems for bulk communications surveillance are being established across the globe. In the Netherlands prior judicial consent and a binding complaint procedure have been established. However, although checks and balances for targeted communications interference have been created, accountability mechanisms are less equipped to effectively remedy indiscriminate interference. Therefore, within the context of mass communications surveillance programs, access to justice for complainants remains a contentious issue.
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African citizens are increasingly being surveilled, profiled, and targeted online in ways that violate their rights. African governments frequently use pandemic or terrorism-related security risks to grant themselves additional surveillance rights and significantly increase their collection of monitoring apparatus and technologies while spending billions of dollars to conduct surveillance (Roberts et al. 2023). Surveillance is a prominent strategy African governments use to limit civic space (Roberts and Mohamed Ali 2021). Digital technologies are not the root of surveillance in Africa because surveillance practices predate the digital age (Munoriyarwa and Mare 2023). Surveillance practices were first used by colonial governments, continued by post-colonial governments, and are currently being digitalized and accelerated by African countries. Throughout history, surveillance has been passed down from colonizers to liberators, and some African leaders have now automated it (Roberts et al. 2023). Many studies have been conducted on illegal state surveillance in the United States, China, and Europe (Feldstein 2019; Feldstein 2021). Less is known about the supply of surveillance technologies to Africa. With a population of almost 1.5 billion people, Africa is a continent where many citizens face surveillance with malicious intent. As mentioned in previous chapters, documenting the dimensions and drivers of digital surveillance in Africa is
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In May 2018, the new Dutch Intelligence and Security Services Act 2017 (Wet op de Inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten, Wiv) will enter into force. It replaces the previous 2002 Act and incorporates many reforms to the information gathering powers of the two intelligence and security services as well as to the accountability and oversight mechanisms. Due to the technologyneutral approach, both the civil and the military intelligence services are now authorized to, for example, intercept communications in bulk, hack third parties, decrypt files, store DNA or use any other future innovative technology. Also, the national security legislation extends the possibilities for the indiscriminate collection of data, and for the processing, storage and analysis thereof. The process leading to the law includes substantial criticism from the various stakeholders involved. Upon publication of this report, an official consultative referendum is being organized on the new act. The aim of this policy brief is to provide an international audience with a comprehensive overview of the most relevant aspects of the act and its context. In addition, there is considerable focus on the checks and balances as well as the bottlenecks of the Dutch intelligence gathering reform. The selection of topics is based on the core issues addressed during the parliamentary debate and on the authors’ insights.
