This article examines China's public diplomacy strategy within Japan. The size and complexity of China renders the management of the country's image a challenging undertaking in any context, particularly so within Japan where the weight of historical issues between the two countries presents a significant obstacle to any attempts to implement image enhancement initiatives. A purposive sample of expert respondents were asked to give their perceptions of the impact of China's public diplomacy strategy in Japan. The results suggest that the level of success achieved to date has been low, although recent visits to Japan by Chinese leaders have been relatively well received in Japan, which may form the basis for better future outcomes for China's public diplomacy in Japan.
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De publicatielijst bevat alle publicaties waar Patrick Huntjens aan bijgedragen heeft in de periode 1998 - 2021
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In 2017, Denmark sent the first digital ambassador, Casper Klynge, to Silicon Valley. The aim of this move of ‘techplomacy’ was, as Klynge explained, not simply to distribute greetings notes by the Danish queen. Rather, the intention was to ‘update diplomacy’ based on the recognition that a few tech companies have obviously become much ‘more influential than some nation states’. Klynge framed the new political course in the manner of a well-known old but still utterly contemporary mantra: ‘There is no alternative’. In a similar vein, Denmark’s Foreign Minister Anders Samuelson highlighted the importance of the step as follows: ‘Just as we engage in a diplomatic dialogue with countries, we also need to establish and prioritize comprehensive relations with tech actors, such as Google, Facebook, Apple, and so on. (…) The idea is, we see a lot of companies and new technologies that will in many ways involve and be part of everyday life of citizens in Denmark.'
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De Duitse politieke en economische rol in Europa is de afgelopen decennia ingrijpend veranderd. De toekomst van Duitsland is onzeker, maar het is duidelijk dat onze oosterburen zich steeds verder ontwikkelen tot een economische en politieke grootmacht, niet alleen in Europa maar ook op wereldtoneel. Martijn Lak bespreekt vijf recente boeken over de ontwikkeling van de Duitse buitenlandse politiek van ‘soft power’ tot een assertievere grootmogendheid. LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/martijn-lak-71793013/
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African citizens are increasingly being surveilled, profiled, and targeted online in ways that violate their rights. African governments frequently use pandemic or terrorism-related security risks to grant themselves additional surveillance rights and significantly increase their collection of monitoring apparatus and technologies while spending billions of dollars to conduct surveillance (Roberts et al. 2023). Surveillance is a prominent strategy African governments use to limit civic space (Roberts and Mohamed Ali 2021). Digital technologies are not the root of surveillance in Africa because surveillance practices predate the digital age (Munoriyarwa and Mare 2023). Surveillance practices were first used by colonial governments, continued by post-colonial governments, and are currently being digitalized and accelerated by African countries. Throughout history, surveillance has been passed down from colonizers to liberators, and some African leaders have now automated it (Roberts et al. 2023). Many studies have been conducted on illegal state surveillance in the United States, China, and Europe (Feldstein 2019; Feldstein 2021). Less is known about the supply of surveillance technologies to Africa. With a population of almost 1.5 billion people, Africa is a continent where many citizens face surveillance with malicious intent. As mentioned in previous chapters, documenting the dimensions and drivers of digital surveillance in Africa is
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This paper describes the work done to track the supply chains of sur-veillance technologies from the global North to African governments for illegal surveillance of their citizens. We conducted desk research to analyse the supply side of surveillance technology exported to African countries. Our preliminary findings show nine key exporting states-actors for surveillance technologies to Africa. These are China; European Union agencies, and member states France, Germany, Italy; Israel, United Kingdom, Russia, and the United States of Amer-ica. Regarding the specific surveillance technologies being transferred, each export-ing state tends to have a focus area, both in geographic area and within the five surveillance technology categories covered by this study. The paper identified six motives for state surveillance, including the suppliers' perspective. These are: 1) surveillance as legitimacy for state security, 2) surveillance for political gain, 3) surveillance as diplomacy, 4) surveillance as a tool for development, 5) Surveil-lance as neocolonialism, and 6) surveillance as business opportunity. Further re-search is needed to deepen the analysis of surveillance technologies exports to the African continent and the human rights violations.
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