Within recent years, Financial Credit Risk Assessment (FCRA) has become an increasingly important issue within the financial industry. Therefore, the search for features that can predict the credit risk of an organization has increased. Using multiple statistical techniques, a variance of features has been proposed. Applying a structured literature review, 258 papers have been selected. From the selected papers, 835 features have been identified. The features have been analyzed with respect to the type of feature, the information sources needed and the type of organization that applies the features. Based on the results of the analysis, the features have been plotted in the FCRA Model. The results show that most features focus on hard information from a transactional source, based on official information with a high latency. In this paper, we readdress and -present our earlier work [1]. We extended the previous research with more detailed descriptions of the related literature, findings, and results, which provides a grounded basis from which further research on FCRA can be conducted.
Using a framework for educational design research, this article reports and evaluates the (process of the) design of a financial education program. The program is designed for high school students in the prevocational track in the Netherlands. The aim of the program is to improve students’ financial knowledge, attitudes, self-efficacy, and (savings) behavior. The main outcome of this study is the identification of design principles that can be used by others for the design of financial education programs: setting a personal savings goal, commitment with and reflection on this goal, discussing money issues with peers and family, hands-on activities with autonomy, and explicit instruction through animated video clips. The results show that our program, called “SaveWise,” improves high school students’ financial knowledge and skills, financial awareness, attitudes towards money, self-efficacy, and financial behavior.
Incentives are frequently used by governments and employers to encourage cooperation. Here, we investigated the effect of centralized incentives on cooperation, firstly in a behavioral study and then replicated in a subsequent neuroimaging (fMRI) study. In both studies, participants completed a novel version of the Public Goods Game, including experimental conditions in which the administration of centralized incentives was probabilistic and incentives were either of a financial or social nature. Behavioral results showed that the prospect of potentially receiving financial and social incentives significantly increased cooperation, with financial incentives yielding the strongest effect. Neuroimaging results showed that activation in the bilateral lateral orbitofrontal cortex and precuneus increased when participants were informed that incentives would be absent versus when they were present. Furthermore, activation in the medial orbitofrontal cortex increased when participants would potentially receive a social versus a financial incentive. These results speak to the efficacy of different types of centralized incentives in increasing cooperative behavior, and they show that incentives directly impact the neural mechanisms underlying cooperation.
