Proper decision-making is one of the most important capabilities of an organization. Therefore, it is important to have a clear understanding and overview of the decisions an organization makes. A means to understanding and modeling decisions is the Decision Model and Notation (DMN) standard published by the Object Management Group in 2015. In this standard, it is possible to design and specify how a decision should be taken. However, DMN lacks elements to specify the actors that fulfil different roles in the decision-making process as well as not taking into account the autonomy of machines. In this paper, we re-address and-present our earlier work [1] that focuses on the construction of a framework that takes into account different roles in the decision-making process, and also includes the extent of the autonomy when machines are involved in the decision-making processes. Yet, we extended our previous research with more detailed discussion of the related literature, running cases, and results, which provides a grounded basis from which further research on the governance of (semi) automated decision-making can be conducted. The contributions of this paper are twofold; 1) a framework that combines both autonomy and separation of concerns aspects for decision-making in practice while 2) the proposed theory forms a grounded argument to enrich the current DMN standard.
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In case of a major cyber incident, organizations usually rely on external providers of Cyber Incident Response (CIR) services. CIR consultants operate in a dynamic and constantly changing environment in which they must actively engage in information management and problem solving while adapting to complex circumstances. In this challenging environment CIR consultants need to make critical decisions about what to advise clients that are impacted by a major cyber incident. Despite its relevance, CIR decision making is an understudied topic. The objective of this preliminary investigation is therefore to understand what decision-making strategies experienced CIR consultants use during challenging incidents and to offer suggestions for training and decision-aiding. A general understanding of operational decision making under pressure, uncertainty, and high stakes was established by reviewing the body of knowledge known as Naturalistic Decision Making (NDM). The general conclusion of NDM research is that experts usually make adequate decisions based on (fast) recognition of the situation and applying the most obvious (default) response pattern that has worked in similar situations in the past. In exceptional situations, however, this way of recognition-primed decision-making results in suboptimal decisions as experts are likely to miss conflicting cues once the situation is quickly recognized under pressure. Understanding the default response pattern and the rare occasions in which this response pattern could be ineffective is therefore key for improving and aiding cyber incident response decision making. Therefore, we interviewed six experienced CIR consultants and used the critical decision method (CDM) to learn how they made decisions under challenging conditions. The main conclusion is that the default response pattern for CIR consultants during cyber breaches is to reduce uncertainty as much as possible by gathering and investigating data and thus delay decision making about eradication until the investigation is completed. According to the respondents, this strategy usually works well and provides the most assurance that the threat actor can be completely removed from the network. However, the majority of respondents could recall at least one case in which this strategy (in hindsight) resulted in unnecessary theft of data or damage. Interestingly, this finding is strikingly different from other operational decision-making domains such as the military, police and fire service in which there is a general tendency to act rapidly instead of searching for more information. The main advice is that training and decision aiding of (novice) cyber incident responders should be aimed at the following: (a) make cyber incident responders aware of how recognition-primed decision making works; (b) discuss the default response strategy that typically works well in several scenarios; (c) explain the exception and how the exception can be recognized; (d) provide alternative response strategies that work better in exceptional situations.
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Objective: To construct the underlying value structure of shared decision making (SDM) models. Method: We included previously identified SDM models (n = 40) and 15 additional ones. Using a thematic analysis, we coded the data using Schwartz’s value theory to define values in SDM and to investigate value relations. Results: We identified and defined eight values and developed three themes based on their relations: shared control, a safe and supportive environment, and decisions tailored to patients. We constructed a value structure based on the value relations and themes: the interplay of healthcare professionals’ (HCPs) and patients’ skills [Achievement], support for a patient [Benevolence], and a good relationship between HCP and patient [Security] all facilitate patients’ autonomy [Self-Direction]. These values enable a more balanced relationship between HCP and patient and tailored decision making [Universalism]. Conclusion: SDM can be realized by an interplay of values. The values Benevolence and Security deserve more explicit attention, and may especially increase vulnerable patients’ Self-Direction. Practice implications: This value structure enables a comparison of values underlying SDM with those of specific populations, facilitating the incorporation of patients’ values into treatment decision making. It may also inform the development of SDM measures, interventions, education programs, and HCPs when practicing.
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