What you don’t know can’t hurt you: this seems to be the current approach for responding to disinformation by public regulators across the world. Nobody is able to say with any degree of certainty what is actually going on. This is in no small part because, at present, public regulators don’t have the slightest idea how disinformation actually works in practice. We believe that there are very good reasons for the current state of affairs, which stem from a lack of verifiable data available to public institutions. If an election board or a media regulator wants to know what types of digital content are being shared in their jurisdiction, they have no effective mechanisms for finding this data or ensuring its veracity. While there are many other reasons why governments would want access to this kind of data, the phenomenon of disinformation provides a particularly salient example of the consequences of a lack of access to this data for ensuring free and fair elections and informed democratic participation. This chapter will provide an overview of the main aspects of the problems associated with basing public regulatory decisions on unverified data, before sketching out some ideas of what a solution might look like. In order to do this, the chapter develops the concept of auditing intermediaries. After discussing which problems the concept of auditing intermediaries is designed to solve, it then discusses some of the main challenges associated with access to data, potential misuse of intermediaries, and the general lack of standards for the provision of data by large online platforms. In conclusion, the chapter suggests that there is an urgent need for an auditing mechanism to ensure the accuracy of transparency data provided by large online platform providers about the content on their services. Transparency data that have been audited would be considered verified data in this context. Without such a transparency verification mechanism, existing public debate is based merely on a whim, and digital dominance is likely to only become more pronounced.
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Copyright enforcement by private third parties – does it work uniformly across the EU? Since the inception of Napster, home copying of digital files has taken a flight. The first providers of software or infrastructure for the illegal exchange of files were held contributory or vicariously liable for copyright infringement. In response, they quickly diluted the chain of liability to such an extent that neither the software producers, nor the service providers could be held liable. Moving further down the communication chain, the rights holders are now requiring Internet Service Providers (ISPs) that provide access to end customers to help them with the enforcement of their rights. This article discusses case-law regarding the enforcement of copyright by Internet Access Providers throughout Europe. At first glance, copyright enforcement has been harmonised by means of a number of directives, and article 8(3) of the Copyright Directive (2001/29/EC) regulates that EU Member States must ensure the position of rights holders with regard to injunctions against ISPs. Problem solved? Case law from Denmark, Ireland, Belgium, Norway, England, The Netherlands, Austria and the Court of Justice of the EU was studied. In addition, the legal practice in Germany was examined. The period of time covered by case law is from 2003 to 2013, the case law gives insight into the differences that still exist after the implementation of the directive.
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This article analyzes negative externalities that policymakers in one region or group may impose upon the citizens of neighboring regions or groups. These externalities may be material, but they may also be psychological (in the form of envy). The latter form of externality may arise from the production of `conspicuous public goods. As a result, decentralized provision of conspicuous public goods may be too high. Potentially, a centralized legislature may internalize negative externalities. However, in a model with strategic delegation, we argue that the median voter in each jurisdiction may anticipate a reduction in local public goods supply and delegate to a policymaker who cares more for public goods than she does herself. This last effect mitigates the expected benefits of policy centralization. The authors theory is then applied to the setting of civil conflict, where they discuss electoral outcomes in Northern Ireland and Yugoslavia before and after significant institutional changes that affected the degree of centralization. These case studies provide support for the authors theoretical predictions.
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The goal of UPIN is to develop and evaluate a scalable distributed system that enables users to cryptographically verify and easily control the paths through which their data travels through an inter-domain network like the Internet, both in terms of router-to-router hops as well as in terms of router attributes (e.g., their location, operator, security level, and manufacturer). UPIN will thus provide the solution to a very relevant and current problem, namely that it is becoming increasingly opaque for users on the Internet who processes their data (e.g., in terms of service providers their data passes through as well as what jurisdictions apply) and that they have no control over how it is being routed. This is a risk for people’s privacy (e.g., a malicious network compromising a user’s data) as well as for their safety (e.g., an untrusted network disrupting a remote surgery). Motivating examples in which (sensitive) user data typically travels across the Internet without user awareness or control are: - Internet of Things for consumers: sensors such as sleep trackers and light switches that collect information about a user’s physical environment and send it across the Internet to remote services for analysis. - Medical records: health care providers requiring medical information (e.g., health records of patients or remote surgery telemetry) to travel between medical institutions according to specified agreements. - Intelligent transport systems: communication plays a crucial role in future autonomous transportation systems, for instance to avoid freight drones colliding or to ensure smooth passing of trucks through busy urban areas. The UPIN project is novel in three ways: 1. UPIN gives users the ability to control and verify the path that their data takes through the network all the way to the destination endpoint, both in terms of hops and attributes of routers traversed. UPIN accomplishes this by adding and improving remote attestation techniques for on-path routers to existing path verification mechanisms, and by adopting and further developing in-packet path selection directives for control. 2. We develop and simulate data and control plane protocols and router extensions to include the UPIN system in inter-domain networking systems such as IP (e.g., using BGP and segment routing) and emerging systems such as SCION and RINA. 3. We evaluate the scalability and performance of the UPIN system using a multi-site testbed of open programmable P4 routers, which is necessary because UPIN requires novel packet processing functions in the data plane. We validate the system using the earlier motivating examples as use cases. The impact we target is: - Increased trust from users (individuals and organizations) in network services because they are able to verify how their data travels through the network to the destination endpoint and because the UPIN APIs enable novel applications that use these network functions. - More empowered users because they are able to control how their data travels through inter-domain networks, which increases self-determination, both at the level of individual users as well as at the societal level.
