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Returning to the Origins of Multilevel Regulation

The article engages with the recent studies on multilevel regulation. The starting point for the argument is that contemporary multilevel regulation—as most other studies of (postnational) rulemaking—is limited in its analysis. The limitation concerns its monocentric approach that, in turn, deepens the social illegitimacy of contemporary multilevel regulation. The monocentric approach means that the study of multilevel regulation originates in the discussions on the foundation of modern States instead of returning to the origins of rules before the nation State was even created, which is where the actual social capital underlying (contemporary) rules can be found, or so I wish to argue. My aim in this article is to reframe the debate. I argue that we have an enormous reservoir of history, practices, and ideas ready to help us think through contemporary (social) legitimacy problems in multilevel regulation: namely all those practices which preceded the capture of law by the modern State system, such as historical alternative dispute resolution (ADR) practices.

Bottom-up planning in the Netherlands and the identification of a legitimacy gap

The application of arbitration in transnational private regulation

This paper investigates the prospective application of arbitration by Transnational Private Regulation (TPR). It builds on the study of TPR developed by Fabrizio Cafaggi et al. TPR addresses the ever-increasing transfer of regulatory power from national to global levels, and from public to private regulators. TPR entails private regulatory co-operation be-yond the jurisdictional boundaries of States through voluntary standards. The regimes of TPR are built by a variety of actors, such as companies, NGOs, independent experts, and epistemic communities. Examples of TPR can be found in food safety, forestry management, trade, and derivatives, among other fields. More specifically, they concern private actors engaging in transnational coordination of standard setting such as the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) that was developed to foster responsible management of the world’s forests. There are four main characteristics of TPR: legitimacy, quality, effectiveness, and enforcement. I will describe those four characteristics in brief here. First, the legitimacy of TPR is built around consent through voluntary entry, participation, and exit of regulated entities. Important to this contribution is that the legitimacy of TPR goes beyond its legal dimension, measured by purely legal standards. Hence, the legitimacy of TPR is largely determined by standards developed by social and economic institutions relevant to specific TPR regimes. The role of those institutions in standard settings is higher in private TPR regimes than private-public TPR regimes, where some forms of compliance are mandatory. Second, the quality of TPR corresponds to the ex ante and ex post evaluation cycle of regulatory processes. It is also linked with the transparency of TPR. Third, the effectiveness of TPR is measured according to the extent to which the objectives of TPR (or selected TPR regimes) are met. And finally, enforcement of TPRis understood as ‘ensuring compliance with commitments’. Enforcement of TPR can take place through courts, administrative agencies, and private dispute resolution—including the arbitration at the core of this contribution. Cafaggi’s study identified rather selective use of arbitration in TPR, but also recommended changes to make arbitration law more adaptable to TPR. Furthermore, the study recommended that more specialized dispute resolution institutions are created to exclusively serve TPR. Against this background, I shift the main focus of analysis from TPR to arbitration. Whereas Cafaggi argued that arbitration may be suitable for TPR as a means of private enforcement, in this paper I go even further, arguing that arbitration as a means of informal, out-of-court dispute resolution is well suited to strengthen the normativity of TPR. This is so because private arbitration actors (including, inter alia, arbitrators and arbitral institutions) are already equipped with the tools necessary to facilitate cross-border TPR, which is done through informal standards and procedures with origins in the communitarian values and reputational mechanisms used by different communities before the development of modern States. The roots of most private justice regimes—including arbitration—are informed by communitarian values such as collaboration, participation, and personal trust. Those values, together with other core characteristics of arbitration correspond to all core characteristics of TPR, making both systems comparable and complementary. The analytical framework incorporated in this paper follows the four core characteristics of TPR. Hence, the paper is organized into five sections. The first section contains the introduction. In the second section, I analyze the legitimacy of arbitration vis-à-vis the legitimacy of TPR. In the third section, I investigate the accountability of arbitration as a means of quality signaling vis-à-vis TPR. In the fourth section, I focus on the remedies available to arbitrators in a view of TPR’s effectiveness. Finally, in the fifth section, I analyze enforcement through arbitration and its impact on the exclusiveness versus complementarity of TPR regimes. Conclusions follow, including recommendations for future research. Part of topic "The blurring distinction between public and private in international dispute resolution"

Roaming Urban Europe: How Can the Scope of Network Governance in the Multilevel Framework of the EU Explain the Performance of the Dutch Urban Envoy

This paper examines the network governance approach of the Dutch Urban Envoy in the context of multilevel governance in the European Union. This paper aims to answer the research question on how the scope of network governance can explore the performance of the Dutch Urban Envoy. By analyzing network characteristics, such as legitimacy, actor-level properties, and network-level properties, this paper seeks to provide a nuanced understanding of the performance of the Dutch Urban Envoy. Drawing on previous research, this paper identifies the applicability and limitations of assessing network characteristics in understanding advocacy processes. The paper successfully visualizes the networks of the Dutch Urban Envoy and explores their roles and mandates, contributing to determining the added value of their position. However, the network governance approach has limitations in explaining the tangible successes and challenges of the Dutch Urban Envoy that cannot be directly attributed to their overall performance.

Circular Moonshot: Understanding Shifts in Organizational Field Logics and Business Model Innovation

We aim to understand how actors respond to field logic plurality and maintain legitimacy through business model innovation. Drawing on a longitudinal field study in the fashion industry, we traced how de novo and incumbent firms incorporate circular logics in business models (for sustainability) and uncover how the intersection between issue and exchange fields creates institutional complexity and experimental spaces for business model innovation. Our findings showed a shift in the discourse on circular logic that diverted attention and resources from materials innovation (e.g., recycling) to business model innovation (e.g., circular business models). By juxtaposing institutional complexity and external pressure to maintain legitimacy, we derived four strategic business model innovation responses—preserve, detach, integrate and extend—that illuminate how actors leverage shifting logics and innovate extant business models (for sustainability). We make novel contributions to the literature on organizational fields, business models for sustainability, and business model innovation.

Negotiating consent in neighbourhood-based community development work

This chapter discusses the efforts of community workers to obtain consent in local communities as a basis for taking action on issues that are affecting local people’s lives. Crucial here is that community workers resist the initial urge to settle for consensus and as a consequencelimit the possibilities for creativity, exploration and interpersonal development. Drawing on two case studies, one from Amsterdam (the Netherlands) and one from Chelsea (US), the requirements and process of acquiring consent are outlined. Consent in general refers to a form of permission to act or take action. In this chapter we consider it as a sense of approval by neighbourhood community members to engage in a collective course of action. Community workers often play a crucial part in the acquisition of community consent as they support the process of recognition of the diversity of interests, opinions and values that characterises local life. Consent is necessary for creatingsustainable local initiatives, incorporating, instead of eliminating, conflicting positions. This acknowledgement of diversity can be seen as an ethical requirement in community development practice, but also as a strategic issue for community workers. After all, without being able to obtain legitimacy for their engagement with local issues, effective community development work is impossible.This chapter focuses on neighbourhood-based community development work in geographical communities. However, similar principles apply in all forms of community development, including work with communities of interest and identity. We use the term‘community worker’ to refer to someone who takes on a facilitating and coordinating role with members of communities to build community capacity and/or bring about social change. Such workers may be paid and professionally qualified, or unpaid volunteers andactivists. They may live in the communities where they work/are active, or reside outside these areas. These circumstances influence the legitimacy of their interventions, as well as how consent is gained and consensus reached.