Often, simplified cultural explanations of a nation‟s economy are common sense and taken for granted. Amidst the debate about the propensity of European countries to compete with other prosperous knowledge economies, some consultants in The Netherlands postulate that the Dutch will never be able to match the requirements of the new economy because of their „polder-model‟, a term used for the Dutch model of gaining consensus in which employers, syndicates and the government meet with each other to make agreements about labour. This postulation was made against the general opinion of some years ago, when this same polder-model was perceived as the main cause of the economic success of the Dutch in the 1990s: “Consensus lies at the heart of the Dutch success where unemployment has been cut to half (2% in 2000) of what it was in 1997. The government, with support of employers and unions, has cut public spending as a share of GDP from 60 to 50%. It is the combination of a quiet and flexible labour market with a solid monetary and fiscal policy and introducing more dynamic markets which is the core of the polder model.”
Policy makers are looking for effective ways to promote the adoption of electric vehicles (EVs). Among the options is the roll-out and management of charging infrastructure to meet the EV drivers’ refuelling needs. However, policies in this area do not only have a long-term effect on the adoption of EVs among prospective owners, they also have short-term impacts on the usage of public charging infrastructure among current EV owners and vice-versa. Presently, studies focusing on both effects simultaneously are lacking, missing out on possible cross-pollination between these areas. This study uniquely combines stated and revealed preference data to estimate the effect of particular policy measures aimed at EV adoption, on the one hand, and charging behaviour, on the other. Using a large dataset (1.7 million charging sessions) related to charging behaviour using public charging infrastructure in the Netherlands we quantify the effects of (i) daytime-parking (to manage parking pressure) and (ii) free parking (to promote purchase of EVs) policies on charging behaviour. To estimate the effects of these particular policies on EV purchase intentions, a stated choice experiment was conducted among potential EV-buyers. Results show that cross-pollinations between EV charging and adaptation policies exist and should be taken into account when designing policies for EV adoption.
MULTIFILE
The recent bank collapses and bailouts highlight the fragility of the banking system and our bank deposits. The digital euro is an opportunity to reconfigure our monetary system to serve the interests of people and society, by making money safer and more inclusive. However, the European Central Bank’s (ECB) current proposal for a digital euro falls short of this potential. The current plan relies heavily on private financial intermediaries and envisions putting important limitations on the use of digital euros, thereby impacting its capacity to be a universally accessible public good and risking undermining the uptake of the digital euro. By heeding to the bank lobby and baking their interests into the design of the digital euro, the ECB is missing an opportunity to develop an appealing and public digital alternative to private bank deposits. The digital euro must be developed with the aim of benefiting people and society over private interests, and these considerations should guide its design. In the short term, the digital euro should: 1. Be universally accessible. People should be able to access digital euros through a diverse range of intermediaries, which include non-profit and public entities. Implementing a tiered identification system for account-based digital euros, and introducing a value-based option, would ensure the availability of digital euros to the most vulnerable segments of society. 2. Be free of cost for users. Any future legislative framework on the digital euro should include a list of basic services that should be provided for free to users, such as opening and managing an account and the provision of a payment instrument (e.g. a card). 3. Offer a high level of privacy and data protection. Cash, which is fully anonymous, should be used as the baseline when developing the digital euro. A value-based option should be introduced alongside an account-based one, and it should be designed to be fully anonymous. For the account-based option, a ‘privacy threshold’ can ensure that users’ data for small transactions is protected. 4. Have a clear European Central Bank branding. Clear branding will help to differentiate public digital euros from private bank deposits. 5. Bring resilience to the payment system. By providing an offline value-based option, and by ensuring that the digital euro’s legal and technical core infrastructure is public and works independently of any private system, we can offer an alternative to existing payment rails and increase resiliency in case of outages. The digital euro is also an opportunity to improve financial stability by transforming the banking system, and helping central banks to more effectively carry out their monetary policy. The design of the digital euro should be flexible enough to allow for the achievement of these longterm goals, and more research should be conducted to explore how different features could help achieve them. For instance, a digital euro without any holding limit could reduce moral hazard in the banking sector, and the adjustment of interest rates on digital euro deposits and direct monetary transfers could improve the transmission of monetary policy.
