In the aftermath of the systemic financial crises of 2007-9, several scholars argued that the problem of systemic financial crises is not well understood. At the same time, the introduction of digital technologies led to new threats and opportunities for the design of the monetary and financial system. For example, thousands of private cryptocurrencies have been implemented and hundreds of research papers on the (possible) introduction of public digital currencies have been published. It is often not explained why these new forms of digital money are needed and which (systemic) problems they (can) solve. In addition, the literature does not provide requirements nor guidelines to shape the development of the monetary and financial system in the digital age. This thesis applies design science to the monetary and financial system as a whole. The application of this novel methodology offers new possibilities to examine this complex system. The contribution of this thesis is threefold. First, different theories on money, banking and systemic financial crises have been researched through an extensive literature review and balance sheets. Second, those theories have been used to develop design requirements and guidelines. Finally, the consensus and pivotal dissensions about the systemic problem(s) of the current monetary and financial system, requirements and guidelines among experts have been identified through semistructured interviews. This research process results in widely supported requirements that demarcate the design space and widely supported guidelines that aim to give direction within the design space, that is, to the future development of the monetary and financial system.
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Nakamoto, S. (2008). Bitcoin: A peer-to-peer electronic cash system. https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf outlined an alternative to the current monetary system in which banks are replaced by a peer-to-peer system to issue and transfer digital money: the Bitcoin. While Bitcoin has attracted a substantial investment volume, the system has not achieved the status of a viable alternative monetary system. However, the distributed ledger technology (DLT) underlying the payment system is being applied successfully by financial institutions and is likely to have important implications for the future of money and banking. In this paper we therefore focus on the most advanced distributed ledger application in the financial industry: R3 Corda. This paper is structured as follows. In the first section, we relate the debate about systems of money creation to the rise of Bitcoin. Next, the development of R3 Corda is discussed and the lessons learned for monetary reform. We conclude with an assessment of the scope and likelihood of monetary reform as a consequence of DLT applications by central banks.
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The recent bank collapses and bailouts highlight the fragility of the banking system and our bank deposits. The digital euro is an opportunity to reconfigure our monetary system to serve the interests of people and society, by making money safer and more inclusive. However, the European Central Bank’s (ECB) current proposal for a digital euro falls short of this potential. The current plan relies heavily on private financial intermediaries and envisions putting important limitations on the use of digital euros, thereby impacting its capacity to be a universally accessible public good and risking undermining the uptake of the digital euro. By heeding to the bank lobby and baking their interests into the design of the digital euro, the ECB is missing an opportunity to develop an appealing and public digital alternative to private bank deposits. The digital euro must be developed with the aim of benefiting people and society over private interests, and these considerations should guide its design. In the short term, the digital euro should: 1. Be universally accessible. People should be able to access digital euros through a diverse range of intermediaries, which include non-profit and public entities. Implementing a tiered identification system for account-based digital euros, and introducing a value-based option, would ensure the availability of digital euros to the most vulnerable segments of society. 2. Be free of cost for users. Any future legislative framework on the digital euro should include a list of basic services that should be provided for free to users, such as opening and managing an account and the provision of a payment instrument (e.g. a card). 3. Offer a high level of privacy and data protection. Cash, which is fully anonymous, should be used as the baseline when developing the digital euro. A value-based option should be introduced alongside an account-based one, and it should be designed to be fully anonymous. For the account-based option, a ‘privacy threshold’ can ensure that users’ data for small transactions is protected. 4. Have a clear European Central Bank branding. Clear branding will help to differentiate public digital euros from private bank deposits. 5. Bring resilience to the payment system. By providing an offline value-based option, and by ensuring that the digital euro’s legal and technical core infrastructure is public and works independently of any private system, we can offer an alternative to existing payment rails and increase resiliency in case of outages. The digital euro is also an opportunity to improve financial stability by transforming the banking system, and helping central banks to more effectively carry out their monetary policy. The design of the digital euro should be flexible enough to allow for the achievement of these longterm goals, and more research should be conducted to explore how different features could help achieve them. For instance, a digital euro without any holding limit could reduce moral hazard in the banking sector, and the adjustment of interest rates on digital euro deposits and direct monetary transfers could improve the transmission of monetary policy.
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Most European countries have to find a delicate balance between long term economic reform and short term impact on GDP.
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Als gevolg van nieuwe wetgeving zoals Sarbanes-Oxley en gedragscodes als die van de commissie Tabaksblat is het de expliciete verantwoordelijkheid van de directie om te zorgen voor een adequaat en effectief risicomanagement en intern beheersingssysteem. Het is opvallend dat deze nieuwe interne-controlevereisten de kredietcrisis niet hebben kunnen voorkomen in een zo streng gereguleerde bedrijfstak als die van de financiële dienstverlening. De grote vraag is dan ook hoe dit allemaal heeft kunnen gebeuren en welke mogelijke lessen er te trekken zijn.
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After the unconditional surrender of the Third Reich in May 1945, Germany no longer existed as a sovereign, independent nation. It was occupied by the four Allied powers: France, Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union. When it came to the postwar European recovery, the biggest obstacle was that the economy in Germany, the dominant continental economic power before the Second World War, was at an almost complete standstill. This not only had severe consequences for Germany itself, but also had strong economic repercussions for surrounding countries, especially the Netherlands. As Germany had been the former’s most important trading partner since the middle of the nineteenth century, it was clear that the Netherlands would be unable to recover economically without a healthy Germany. However, Allied policy, especially that of the British and the Americans, made this impossible for years. This article therefore focuses on the early postwar Dutch-German trade relations and the consequences of Allied policy. While much has been written about the occupation of Germany, far less attention has been paid to the results of this policy on neighbouring countries. Moreover, the main claim of this article is that it was not Marshall Aid which was responsible for the quick and remarkable Dutch economic growth as of 1949, but the opening of the German market for Dutch exports that same year. https://doi.org/10.1515/jbwg-2018-0009 LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/martijn-lak-71793013/
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„Der Druck auf die alliierten und deutschen Autoritäten, den Transfer von Kapitalerträgen aus Deutschland zu erlauben, darf den Versuchen, die Exporte nach Deutschland zu erhöhen, definitiv nicht untergeordnet werden“, schrieb der niederländische Ökonom P. J. van den Burg in der ökonomischen Wochenzeitschrift Economisch-Statistische Berichten Anfang 1949.1 Seine Beobachtung war nur zu verständlich: In der niederländischen Politik gegenüber Deutschland bestand eine deutliche Ambivalenz zwischen Versuchen, Vorkriegsvermögen zurückzuerhalten, und den Versuchen, niederländisch-deutsche Handels- und Wirtschaftsbeziehungen wiederherzustellen. In den Niederlanden war dieser Dualismus besonders akut, weil Deutschland, seit dem späten 19.Jahrhundert die dominante Wirtschaftsmacht Kontinentaleuropas, seit etwa 1850 der wichtigste Handelspartner der Niederlande gewesen war.2 Zudem hatten niederländische Unternehmen, Banken und Privatpersonen in der ersten Dekade nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg in Deutschland im Allgemeinen und im Ruhrgebiet im Besonderen große Investitionen getätigt. Jedoch verloren niederländische Eigentümer und Firmen 1931, als die Konvertibilität der Reichsmark aufgegeben wurde, die Kontrolle über ihre Besitzungen und Investitionen im Dritten Reich. Die deutsche Besetzung der Niederlande zwischen 1940 und 1945 verschlimmerte diesen Zustand noch. https://doi.org/10.1515/hzhz-2018-0035 LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/martijn-lak-71793013/
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Many, many comparisons have been drawn in recent years between the current rise of (right-wing) populism and the financial crisis of 2008 that shook and continues to shake Europe to its core, and the tumultuous and horrifying events of the 1930s, which in the end resulted in the Second World War. A number of recent studies which (partially) focus on this decade carry ominous titles like To Hell and Back, The Age of Catastrophe and The Triumph of the Dark. Referred to by some historians as the second Thirty Years’ War, the period from the First World War to the end of the Second still continues to draw much academic and indeed public attention. In many cases, Germany deservedly plays a central role in the analysis, either in the form of the Kaiserreich or the ill-fated Weimar Republic and, of course, Nazi Germany. The five books under review here discuss European history between 1914 and 1950 in general, and that of Germany in particular, in this period. What do these books tell us about Europe’s and Germany’s path in the first half of the twentieth century, and what new insights do they provide? https://doi.org/10.1177/0265691418777981 LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/martijn-lak-71793013/
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During an interview at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service one student questioned Prime Minister Rutte about an official apology for slavery. The Dutch Prime Minister assured that each island-nation to whom the Kingdom apologized “has full power to decide to leave the Kingdom. They are not colonized. They are independent.” Rutte described the current role of The Netherlands as that of a “gateway” to bring their products to Europe. The emphasis on trade relationship smacks of neo-colonial interests. Rutte’s portrayal of The Netherlands acting as the “in” to the European market for the former colonies is far from the recovery that one would expect for the descendants of the enslaved. In fact, the Slavery Past Dialogue made a number of recommendations to the Dutch Kingdom, including “active prevention of discrimination and institutional racism throughout society” and “the establishment of a Kingdom Fund […] for structural and sustainable financing of recovery measures.” The Dutch Prime Minister’s comments belie a singular focus on trade with the Caribbean nations rather than a holistic approach, looking at non-pecuniary interests involving the well-being of the descendants and the societies in which they live today. The “republicanization” serves as a backdrop to the years-long journey during which the Dutch government (and the Dutch crown) seemingly dragged their feet, refusing to issue a formal apology for the trade of Africans by the Dutch West Indies corporation. That much-solicited apology was finally issued in December 2022, despite warnings that any gesture that excluded reparations would not be favorably received by the Dutch Caribbean nations.
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This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in INTERNATIONAL SPECTATOR on 31-01-2022, available online: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03932729.2021.2007610 In July 2015, after intense negotiations with its creditors, Greece received a bailout in exchange for fiscal restraint. The coalition government at that time, led by the left-wing SYRIZA party, elected on the basis of an anti-austerity platform, eventually accepted the prevalent austerity frames of the creditors. Through the aid of Q-method, an analysis of Greek opinion leaders’ views of the negotiation highlights that this outcome can be explained in two different ways. The first posits that the ideological overtones that ruling SYRIZA injected in its negotiation strategy exhibited a lack of socialisation and undermined Greece’s already weak bargaining position. The second focuses on the institutional status quo bias in the Eurogroup in Germany’s favour, which discourages any change in the Eurozone. These two views may have partly been influenced by questions of political accountability.
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