This article attempts to explore the main impulses that might have led to the destruction of Buddha statues by Taliban in the Bamiyan Valley of Afghanistan. Drawing on existing literature, and anecdotal evidence, this article suggests that the main impulses that have led to destruction are rather linked to the overall political context of that time (i.e., political iconoclasm) rather than to pure Islamic iconoclasm or an explicit condition of disharmony in heritage (i.e., dissonant heritage). First, the Taliban did not consider the statues as "their" cultural heritage. The act of destruction, therefore, cannot be subscribed to the Afghan cultural dynamics but rather to the political-religious ideology imported by Taliban from outside of the country. Secondly, it seemed that Mullah Omar was viewing the statues as a revenue source at the beginning and as a political bargain chip at the end. In both circumstances, religion seems not to have played the main role. Lastly, the destruction seems a political iconoclasm-that is, a political exploitation, if not a direct political act. The Taliban and especially their external allies were very well aware of the consequences of the act of destruction. It seems implausible to suggest that there were no religion and/or culture in play when ordering the destruction of the statues. The latter is the least what this article aims for. However, to conclude that the destruction was solely triggered by theological and cultural factors might also be improbable. The author does not, in any way, attempt to rationalize the act of destruction, let alone justify the barbaric act.
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Using political discourse analysis, this book examines the extent to which the salient approaches of previous leadership generations have translated into present day policies shepherded in by Xi Jinping. On the strategic political level, the book includes comparisons of China's recent leadership periods with a focus on Xi Jinping's era, and contains examples of whether and how specific topics and tactics reoccur across generations. The state development strategy section then goes on to include chapters on shaping China’s strategic narratives, neoliberal discourse within state developmentalism, and keyword evolution. The practical policies part looks at the issues of re-education, health, class, and ethnicity, analysing how the leaders talk about China’s poor, frame the representations of megaprojects on social media, and discursively display diplomatic strength. As a study of the rule of Xi Jinping and the rhetoric of the contemporary Chinese political system, this book will be of huge interest to students and scholars of Chinese politics and political science more broadly.
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Since independence in 1961, Tanzania’s political ideology (known as Ujamaa-familyhood) has gone hand in hand with the country’s education philosophy. The most important feature of this combination is that people should be educated to fit in Tanzania’s environment and culture. Education should emancipate man from mental slavery inherited from colonialism and help this very person to be master and conqueror of own environment. This is education for self-reliance introduced in 1967 during the Arusha declaration. It sounds ideal: But, where are we standing now? Has Tanzania’s education succeeded in its mission to transform Tanzanians into both African socialists as well as being able to develop from own resources?
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