To facilitate energy transition, in several countries regulators have devised ‘regulatory sandboxes’ to create a participatory experimentation environment for exploring revision of energy law. These sandboxes allow for a two-way regulatory dialogue between an experimenter and an approachable regulator to innovate regulation and enable new socio-technical arrangements. However, these experiments do not take place in a vacuum but need to be formulated and implemented in a multi-actor, polycentric decision-making system through collaboration with the regulator but also energy sector incumbents such as the distribution system operator. We are, therefore, exploring new roles and power division changes in the energy sector as a result of such a regulatory sandbox. We research the Dutch Energy Experimentation Decree (EED) that invites homeowners’ associations and energy cooperatives to propose projects prohibited by extant regulation. In order to localize, democratize and decentralize energy provision, local experimenters can, for instance, organise peer-to-peer supply and determine their own tariffs for energy transport. Theoretically, we rely on Ostrom’s concept of polycentricity to study the dynamics between actors involved in and engaging with the participatory experiments. Empirically, we examine 4 approved EED experiments through interviews and document analysis. Our conclusions focus on the potential and limitations of bottom-up, participatory innovation in a polycentric system. The most important lessons are that a more holistic approach to experimentation, inter-actor alignment, providing more incentives, and expert and financial support would benefit bottom-up participatory innovation.
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The article engages with the recent studies on multilevel regulation. The starting point for the argument is that contemporary multilevel regulation—as most other studies of (postnational) rulemaking—is limited in its analysis. The limitation concerns its monocentric approach that, in turn, deepens the social illegitimacy of contemporary multilevel regulation. The monocentric approach means that the study of multilevel regulation originates in the discussions on the foundation of modern States instead of returning to the origins of rules before the nation State was even created, which is where the actual social capital underlying (contemporary) rules can be found, or so I wish to argue. My aim in this article is to reframe the debate. I argue that we have an enormous reservoir of history, practices, and ideas ready to help us think through contemporary (social) legitimacy problems in multilevel regulation: namely all those practices which preceded the capture of law by the modern State system, such as historical alternative dispute resolution (ADR) practices.
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