Early detection of radicalization processes that may lead to violent extremism takes place in a grey area. Primarily because no one can truly predict when someone poses a risk before there are any indications of criminal acts. The local police have been given an important role in countering violent extremism (CVE) policy; namely proactive information gathering at a stage in which people are still law-abiding citizens. However, little is known about how they perceive their role in CVE. Therefore, this article examines how community police officers deal with their mandate to engage in early detection, and discusses the side effects that accompany this practice. Based on open interviews with 22 constables in the Netherlands, we focus on the risk assessments made by these local professionals. In this article, we aim to contribute to a more thorough, inclusive, and well-informed debate about community policing with regard to suspicions of extremist behaviour among youth.
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In most models on terrorism, interaction with other radicals is a key factor. However, systematic empirical evidence that radical ties affect behaviour is scarce. Our access to detailed police information allows us to apply Social Network Analysis (SNA) on a Dutch Salafi-Jihadi network and analyse the social relationships and network positions of 80 actors, out of whom 20 turned to terrorist acts. The results suggest that ties to leaders and terrorist offenders, co-attendance of radicalising settings and greater structural embeddedness relate to the likelihood of individual actors turning to acts of terrorism. However, we also find some individual attributes that may offer competing explanations. In this paper we discuss our findings and address how future research may provide further insights into an important issue for agencies involved in countering terrorism: which radical actors, if any, are more likely to turn to acts of terrorism?
Frontline professionals such as social workers and civil servants play a crucial role in countering violent extremism.Because of their direct contac twith society,first liners are tasked with detecting individuals that may threaten national security and the democratic rule of law. Preliminary screening takes place during the pre-crime phase. However, without clear evidence or concrete indicators of unlawful action or physical violence, it is challenging to determine when someone poses a threat. There are no set patterns that can be used to identify cognitive radicalization processes that will result in violent extremism. Furthermore, prevention targets ideas and ideologies with no clear framework for assessing terrorism-risk. This article examines how civil servants responsible for public order, security and safety deal with their mandate to engage in early detection, and discusses the side effects that accompany this practice. Based on openinterviews with fifteen local security professionals in the Netherlands, we focus here on the risk assessments made by these professionals. To understand their performance, we used the following two research questions: First, what criteria do local security professionals use to determine whether or not someone forms a potential risk? Second, how do local security professionals substantiate their assessments of the radicalization processes that will develop into violent extremism? We conclude that such initial risk weightings rely strongly on ‘gut feelings’ or intuition. We conclude that this subjectivitymayleadto prejudiceand/oradministrativearbitrariness in relationtopreliminary risk assessment of particular youth.
