OBJECTIVE: Our aim was to determine whether the impact of upward and downward social comparison information on individuals' motivation to manage their diabetes is dependent on their regulatory focus (promotion or prevention focus) and self-efficacy.DESIGN: The hypotheses were examined in a cross-sectional study. Patients with diabetes (N = 234) read a fictitious interview with a fellow patient, either an upward or a downward target, and they filled out questionnaires.MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES: Motivation to work on diabetes regulation.RESULTS: High promotion-focused patients reported more motivation than low promotion-focused patients when confronted with the upward target (positive role model). High prevention-focused patients reported more motivation than low prevention-focused patients when confronted with the downward target (negative role model). This latter finding was qualified by patients' self-efficacy, as it applied only to patients with relatively high levels of self-efficacy.CONCLUSION: The current study highlights the importance of considering individual differences when using role models to encourage self-care activities in persons with diabetes.
The authors used the INFRASTRATEGO simulation game to examine strategic behavior in a liberalizing electricity market and the effectiveness of different regulatory regimes in dealing with this strategic behavior. The game simulates the Dutch electricity market in the years 2002 to 2006. The game was played eight times with about 400 players, both professionals and students. Two regulatory regimes defined by (a) the policy-making model and (b) the regulation by negotiation model were evaluated. The authors found several patterns of strategic behavior such as regulatory capture, sometimes with rather disturbing effects with regard to the settlement of rates and long-term capacity planning.
To facilitate energy transition, in several countries regulators have devised ‘regulatory sandboxes’ to create a participatory experimentation environment for exploring revision of energy law. These sandboxes allow for a two-way regulatory dialogue between an experimenter and an approachable regulator to innovate regulation and enable new socio-technical arrangements. However, these experiments do not take place in a vacuum but need to be formulated and implemented in a multi-actor, polycentric decision-making system through collaboration with the regulator but also energy sector incumbents such as the distribution system operator. We are, therefore, exploring new roles and power division changes in the energy sector as a result of such a regulatory sandbox. We research the Dutch Energy Experimentation Decree (EED) that invites homeowners’ associations and energy cooperatives to propose projects prohibited by extant regulation. In order to localize, democratize and decentralize energy provision, local experimenters can, for instance, organise peer-to-peer supply and determine their own tariffs for energy transport. Theoretically, we rely on Ostrom’s concept of polycentricity to study the dynamics between actors involved in and engaging with the participatory experiments. Empirically, we examine 4 approved EED experiments through interviews and document analysis. Our conclusions focus on the potential and limitations of bottom-up, participatory innovation in a polycentric system. The most important lessons are that a more holistic approach to experimentation, inter-actor alignment, providing more incentives, and expert and financial support would benefit bottom-up participatory innovation.
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