ABSTRACT. It is now generally accepted that the quality of the regulatory arrangements should be appraised not only by looking at the institutional design, but also by evaluating the factual enforcement and implementation of regulations. It is therefore advised that national governments take a more active stance in supervising the regulatory enforcement by different regulatory agencies. However, in some cases, government’s activism might be an impeding factor in regulatory enforcement. That this is not so crazy idea shows the analysis of the regulatory enforcement by Lithuanian Competition Authority in the area of competition policy during the years of integration to the European Union. For example, not only political and financial independence of the Competition Authority was difficult to establish, but also functions and competences of the regulatory agency were changed a number of times, which hampered the effectiveness of the agency’s performance while enforcing the competition law. In addition to often changes of functions, also the scope of competences was changing. As a result, the variety of tasks attributed to the Lithuanian Competition Authority caused the growing overload of work, which further hindered its regulatory practice. The question is who can be blamed for that? Was it just the inexperience of the government who was seeking for the best institutional design and could not stop with redesigning the regulatory agency or was it the intentional behaviour guided by some concrete interests as a result of a regulatory capture? The analysis of the regulatory enforcement during the period of 15 years does not allow for disregarding of the second possibility.
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Digital surveillance technologies using artificial intelligence (AI) tools such as computer vision and facial recognition are becoming cheaper and easier to integrate into governance practices worldwide. Morocco serves as an example of how such technologies are becoming key tools of governance in authoritarian contexts. Based on qualitative fieldwork including semi-structured interviews, observation, and extensive desk reviews, this chapter focusses on the role played by AI-enhanced technology in urban surveillance and the control of migration between the Moroccan–Spanish borders. Two cross-cutting issues emerge: first, while international donors provide funding for urban and border surveillance projects, their role in enforcing transparency mechanisms in their implementation remains limited; second, Morocco’s existing legal framework hinders any kind of public oversight. Video surveillance is treated as the sole prerogative of the security apparatus, and so far public actors have avoided to engage directly with the topic. The lack of institutional oversight and public debate on the matter raise serious concerns on the extent to which the deployment of such technologies affects citizens’ rights. AI-enhanced surveillance is thus an intrinsically transnational challenge in which private interests of economic gain and public interests of national security collide with citizens’ human rights across the Global North/Global South divide.
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The literature on responsive regulation argues that citizens should be involved in regulatory practices to avoid capture between regulator and regulatee. It also argues that including citizens can add an important perspective to regulatory practices. However, we know little about how citizens' perspectives are brought into regulatory practices. This paper draws on existing qualitative research to compare and analyze four cases of experimental participatory regulation in Dutch health care, focusing on the theoretical assumptions that citizen involvement (a) prevents capture, and (b) stimulates the inclusion of new perspectives. Our results show that involving citizens in regulation can increase transparency and trust in regulatory practices and familiarizes regulators with other perspectives. It is, however, up to the regulator to work on deriving benefits from that involvement—not only the practical work of organizing participatory regulation, but also the conceptual work of reflecting on their own assumptions and standards. We do find evidence for weak forms of capture and argue for the need to extend capture to involve multiple actors. We reflect on these results for theory development and regulatory practice.
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In May 2018, the new Dutch Intelligence and Security Services Act 2017 (Wet op de Inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten, Wiv) will enter into force. It replaces the previous 2002 Act and incorporates many reforms to the information gathering powers of the two intelligence and security services as well as to the accountability and oversight mechanisms. Due to the technologyneutral approach, both the civil and the military intelligence services are now authorized to, for example, intercept communications in bulk, hack third parties, decrypt files, store DNA or use any other future innovative technology. Also, the national security legislation extends the possibilities for the indiscriminate collection of data, and for the processing, storage and analysis thereof. The process leading to the law includes substantial criticism from the various stakeholders involved. Upon publication of this report, an official consultative referendum is being organized on the new act. The aim of this policy brief is to provide an international audience with a comprehensive overview of the most relevant aspects of the act and its context. In addition, there is considerable focus on the checks and balances as well as the bottlenecks of the Dutch intelligence gathering reform. The selection of topics is based on the core issues addressed during the parliamentary debate and on the authors’ insights.
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What you don’t know can’t hurt you: this seems to be the current approach for responding to disinformation by public regulators across the world. Nobody is able to say with any degree of certainty what is actually going on. This is in no small part because, at present, public regulators don’t have the slightest idea how disinformation actually works in practice. We believe that there are very good reasons for the current state of affairs, which stem from a lack of verifiable data available to public institutions. If an election board or a media regulator wants to know what types of digital content are being shared in their jurisdiction, they have no effective mechanisms for finding this data or ensuring its veracity. While there are many other reasons why governments would want access to this kind of data, the phenomenon of disinformation provides a particularly salient example of the consequences of a lack of access to this data for ensuring free and fair elections and informed democratic participation. This chapter will provide an overview of the main aspects of the problems associated with basing public regulatory decisions on unverified data, before sketching out some ideas of what a solution might look like. In order to do this, the chapter develops the concept of auditing intermediaries. After discussing which problems the concept of auditing intermediaries is designed to solve, it then discusses some of the main challenges associated with access to data, potential misuse of intermediaries, and the general lack of standards for the provision of data by large online platforms. In conclusion, the chapter suggests that there is an urgent need for an auditing mechanism to ensure the accuracy of transparency data provided by large online platform providers about the content on their services. Transparency data that have been audited would be considered verified data in this context. Without such a transparency verification mechanism, existing public debate is based merely on a whim, and digital dominance is likely to only become more pronounced.
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The AI Act, effective from August 1, 2024, introduces EU-wide standards to ensure the ethical and safe use of artificial intelligence (AI). Dutch municipalities must be fully compliant by 2026, navigating complex legal and operational challenges. This study assesses their readiness through survey data and interviews with municipal representatives. Although awareness of the Act is high, significant gaps remain between regulatory knowledge and implementation. Municipalities face issues such as limited legal capacity, uneven digital transformation, and ethical uncertainty—resulting in fragmented AI governance. While compliance frameworks are emerging, most approaches remain reactive. This study identifies key barriers and recommends measures to strengthen AI literacy, clarify regulations, and improve ethical oversight. A coordinated national strategy is essential to align local governance with policy goals. Drawing on theories of symbolic versus substantive compliance, policy-implementation gaps, and regulatory adaptation, the study contextualises the findings and calls for further research on best practices, intergovernmental collaboration, and long-term governance strategies.
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The growing sophistication, frequency and severity of cyberattacks targeting all sectors highlight their inevitability and the impossibility of completely protecting the integrity of critical computer systems. In this context, cyber-resilience offers an attractive alternative to the existing cybersecurity paradigm. We define cyber-resilience as the capacity to withstand, recover from and adapt to the external shocks caused by cyber-risks. This article seeks to provide a broader organizational understanding of cyber-resilience and the tensions associated with its implementation. We apply Weick's (1995) sensemaking framework to examine four foundational tensions of cyber-resilience: a definitional tension, an environmental tension, an internal tension, and a regulatory tension. We then document how these tensions are embedded in cyber-resilience practices at the preparatory, response and adaptive stages. We rely on qualitative data from a sample of 58 cybersecurity professionals to uncover these tensions and how they reverberate across cyber-resilience practices.
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The decision-making process in boardrooms has a significant impact on organizational performance. In the last two decades, scientific research on the decision-making process in boardrooms has increased. This resulted in a substantial body of knowledge about boardroom factors and their relation to organizational performance. However, the effectiveness of the decision-making process in boardrooms is still mainly a black box. Amongst other things, scientific findings seem to contradict each other, which could mean additional insights are still missing. This research aims to contribute to a better understanding of this black box.
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Organizations feel an urgency to develop and implement applications based on foundation models: AI-models that have been trained on large-scale general data and can be finetuned to domain-specific tasks. In this process organizations face many questions, regarding model training and deployment, but also concerning added business value, implementation risks and governance. They express a need for guidance to answer these questions in a suitable and responsible way. We intend to offer such guidance by the question matrix presented in this paper. The question matrix is adjusted from the model card, to match well with development of AIapplications rather than AI-models. First pilots with the question matrix revealed that it elicited discussions among developers and helped developers explicate their choices and intentions during development.
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The vast literature on accountability in the public sector (usually called ‘public accountability’originating from political science and public administration tends to emphasize the positive dimension of holding authorities to account. As formulated by one prominent scholar in the field, ‘[a]ccountability has become an icon for good governance’: it is perceived as ‘a Good Thing, and, so it seems, we can’t have enough of it’ (Bovens, 2005: 182, 183). Accountability has, thus, become one of the central values of democratic rule – varying on a well-known American slogan one could phrase this as ‘no public responsi bility without accountability’.
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