Social network analysis can be a powerful tool to better understand the social context of terrorist activities, and it may also offer potential leads for agencies to intervene. Our access to Dutch police information allows us to analyse the relational features of two networks that include actors who planned acts of terrorism and were active in the dissemination of a Salafi-Jihadi interpretation of Islam (n = 57; n = 26). Based on a mixed-method approach that combines qualitative and more formal statistical analysis (exponential random graph models), we analyse the structural characteristics of these networks, individual positions and the extent to which radical leaders, pre-existing family and friendship ties and radicalizing settings affect actors to form ties. We find that both networks resemble a core–periphery structure, with cores formed by a densely interconnected group of actors who frequently meet in radicalizing settings. Based on our findings, we discuss the potential effects of preventive and repressive measures developed within the Dutch counterterrorism framework.
Despite the widely held notion that processes of radicalization tend to happen in relation to others, systematic evidence on the social context in which actors meet and form ties is scarce. This is problematic, as without a more thorough understanding of the relational dimension of radicalization, any strategy to intervene may turn out less effective than perhaps hoped for. Based on our access to detailed police information on eleven Dutch Salafi-Jihadi networks (2001–2014; 273 actors), this article presents a descriptive analysis of the social context in which actors meet and form ties. In most networks, we observe pre-existing family and friendship ties, actors to frequent Salafi mosques and radicalizing settings, and committed actors engaged in functional roles. We also find indications for these elements to facilitate actors to form ties. It is important to note however that we also observe exceptions, both in terms of prevalence and impact of the relational factors we study. In the article, we describe our detailed empirical findings and reflect on the (differential) social context is which actors participating in Dutch Salafi-Jihadi networks meet and form ties.
At the end of the 1940s and the early 1950s, the question whether or not to rearm West Germany was a fiercely and hotly debated topic in Europe. The Americans suggested doing this by integrating the Federal Republic in NATO. However, many Europeans feared the resurgence of German militarism. Nowhere was this more true than in France. Therefore, the French Foreign Minister René Pleven launched the so-called Pleven Plan, designed to allow West German units to be established, but only in small units. That way, Europe could profit from West Germany’s manpower, without the country becoming a military threat. Discussions on the European Defence Community were tough, but in the end was signed by the six Founding Fathers. The Dutch did so reluctantly, especially because the Americans were left out, favouring security arrangements in NATO and rearming and incorporating West Germany in the Western alliance. To the Netherlands, it was essential to incorporate the British and especially the Americans in the Western defense; the Dutch always favoured an Atlantic alliance, opposing too much supranationality in the European integration project. The Federal Republic of Germany on the other hand, saw it as an opportunity to regain sovereignty. In the end, the French National Assembly did not ratify the EDC-Treaty, opening the way to rearming West Germany and making it a full member of NATO. https://www.ceeol.com/search/article-detail?id=735130 LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/martijn-lak-71793013/
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