While there is extensive research on how Russian interference – in particular Russian disinformation operation – has played out in different European countries, indications of Russian interference directly targeting EU, its institutions or policies received little attention. This paper argues why there is good reason to assume that the EU, its institutions and its policies are an ideal a target for authoritarian regimes to exploit. It then explores in what ways, if any, Russian disinformation campaigning targeted EU institutions and their policies during the political and electoral campaigns leading up to the European Parliament (EP) elections of May 2019. In this context disinformation campaigning in terms of both network flows and contents (‘narratives’) have been examined, on the basis of a review of various reports identifying Russian interference and disinformation and of analyses of overall disinformation flows in Europe and the use of a database monitoring occurrences of disinformation.
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http://dx.doi.org/10.14261/postit/0C6A2C6A-5687-474F-99F06AAA881D88D4Conference paper of the Regional Innovation and Entrepreneurship Conference (RIEC) at Saxion University of Applied Sciences (2015/2016)Abstract: Since 2014 the EU and Russia have put in place a set of sanctions which limit trade between each other. In this study, the authors have found no serious effects of the sanctions on the regional economy of the region Twente. Some individual businesses became bankrupt, but most interviewed businesses reported that they were able to shift their sales to other markets.
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This critical, literature-review based research project, inspired by the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war, examines the limitations and possibilities of restorative justice in a time of war. Any armed conflict creates and amplifies the need for extreme militarisation and securitisation, accompanied by belligerent rhetoric. Thus, for restorative justice scholars and practitioners, the outbreak of war challenges the applicability of restorative justice values and practices, as bipolar interpretations of events, conflicts, and human suffering displace more balanced views. The purpose of our research is to critically discuss the applicability of restorative justice in times of war and in the context of the Russo-Ukrainian War in particular. Our motivation to focus on this specific war and to examine the (im)possibilities of restorative justice from Eurocentric perspective stems from three observations: (1) In the last 20 years restorative justice was continuously promoted in Europe as a new “culture” of justice; (2) The Russo-Ukrainian War currently takes place on the European continent and impacts the European security architecture more than that of other world regions; (3) This war has a particular meaning to the world (e.g., a violent clash between the (former) Cold War superpowers, an element of surprise, the shattered myth of overwhelming Russian military might, the nuclear threat coupled with a global energy crisis etc.).
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Europese landen worstelen met het ‘post Snowden’-tijdperk. Dit is zichtbaar in de nieuwe wetgeving die in veel landen recentelijk tot stand is gekomen. Grote thema’s daarbij zijn onder meer hoe om te gaan met de hedendaagse informatiesamenleving, die oneindige hoeveelheden data produceert en die zich kenmerkt door snelle technologische ontwikkelingen. Hoe kan worden voorkomen dat zich een tweede ‘Snowden’-onthulling gaat voordoen? Ook de Wet op de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten (Wiv) 2017 is opnieuw een product van zijn tijd. Deze wet probeert de nieuwe dilemma’s te ondervangen terwijl tegelijkertijd een werkbare situatie voor de bescherming van de rechtstaat via inlichtingen en veiligheidsdiensten wordt nagestreefd. Wij presenteren in dit artikel een aantal kanttekeningen bij de Wiv 2017. Dit doen wij door een aantal relevante in Nederland (Eskens e.a. 2016; Loof e.a. 2016) en in de Europese Unie1 verschenen overkoepelende studies over grondrechten te bespreken. Deze kanttekeningen zijn deels gebaseerd op normatieve uitgangspunten en aanbevelingen uit deze studies, deels ontleend aan nog lopend onderzoek. Gezien de aard en omvang van dit artikel is een selectie gemaakt en beperkt de analyse zich tot het schetsen van de belangrijkste dilemma’s.
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http://dx.doi.org/10.14261/postit/738706F3-E88F-4A5A-94415B281D8B9B1DIn 2015 and 2016, Saxion University of Applied Sciences organized the 2nd and 3rd edition of the Regional Innovation and Entrepreneurship Conference (RIEC).The authors put forward a hypothesis about absence of fear among modern generation’s young people that is connected with impossibility of business in Russia. On the base of the hypothesis authors have conducted a research by projective method within 156 respondents, studying at high school, on the base of which has been conclusion about a necessity of large-scale research in this field received.
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Huidige inburgeringscursussen zijn meestal gericht op taal en kennis en houden geen rekening met de complexe inspanningen die migranten moeten leveren om een nieuw bestaan op te bouwen in een vreemde samenleving. Sinds 2002 onderzoekt en ontwikkel ik samen met Vantrood Educational Services methoden voor psychosociale volwassenenonderwijs, toegespitst op een dubbele context benadering: de ontvangende samenleving, evenals de volwassen lerende migrant. In dit Position paper beschrijven we de theoretisch gefundeerde principes van deze effectieve pedagogische aanpak en bespreken we veronderstellingen van volwassenenonderwijs en inburgering om hiermee een constructieve bijdrage te leveren aan de doorontwikkeling van inburgeringscursussen.
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In this chapter, seven intercultural teaching experiences are contextualised by using the Hofstede (2011) model on cultural dimensions. The experiences are from Australia, China, France, Germany, Russia, India and Thailand. They are analysed using Hofstede’s four cultural dimensions of Power Distance, Individualism, Masculinity, and Uncertainty Avoidance. The results show that stereotypical behaviour in the teacher-student interaction is confirmed, but is also refuted in numerous instances and across the dimensions. The described cases also cover interactions between the guest lecturer and staff of the hosting universities in the seven countries. This anecdotal evidence shows more commonality with the Hofstede model than the teacher-student relationships do. Using Hofstede’s model to prepare for and carry out international guest lectures remains a useful tool. It is advised to keep an open mind and not take stereotypical behaviour for granted
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This paper describes the work done to track the supply chains of sur-veillance technologies from the global North to African governments for illegal surveillance of their citizens. We conducted desk research to analyse the supply side of surveillance technology exported to African countries. Our preliminary findings show nine key exporting states-actors for surveillance technologies to Africa. These are China; European Union agencies, and member states France, Germany, Italy; Israel, United Kingdom, Russia, and the United States of Amer-ica. Regarding the specific surveillance technologies being transferred, each export-ing state tends to have a focus area, both in geographic area and within the five surveillance technology categories covered by this study. The paper identified six motives for state surveillance, including the suppliers' perspective. These are: 1) surveillance as legitimacy for state security, 2) surveillance for political gain, 3) surveillance as diplomacy, 4) surveillance as a tool for development, 5) Surveil-lance as neocolonialism, and 6) surveillance as business opportunity. Further re-search is needed to deepen the analysis of surveillance technologies exports to the African continent and the human rights violations.
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De ransomware-aanval op de Universiteit Maastricht (2019) en de wiperware-aanval op Maersk (2017) hebben pijnlijk aangetoond dat grote incidenten niet te voorkomen zijn en zelfs kunnen uitmonden in een cybercrisis. De mate waarin organisaties in staat zijn om de impact van cybercrises te beperken, wordt onder andere bepaald door de bedrijfscontinuïteit- en crisismanagement organisatie. Maar hoe richt je deze beheersmaatregelen adequaat in?
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