Research has shown that irregular migrants were disproportionally present in jihadi networks in the Netherlands between 2001 and 2005. Building on this study, by analysing files of closed criminal investigations and interviewing imams and personnel within asylum seeker centres and detention centres, this article explains the attractiveness of jihadi networks by a combination of pragmatic and ideological factors. The studied cases demonstrate how jihadi networks are able to satisfy certain needs of these irregular immigrants in a pragmatic way and how criminal activities play an important role in this process. They also show how jihadi networks can fill a void for some of these irregular migrants who are in search for meaning and identity. The Jihadi-Salafi ideology does not seem to be the core pull factor explaining the attractiveness of the jihadi networks in this study.
In most models on terrorism, interaction with other radicals is a key factor. However, systematic empirical evidence that radical ties affect behaviour is scarce. Our access to detailed police information allows us to apply Social Network Analysis (SNA) on a Dutch Salafi-Jihadi network and analyse the social relationships and network positions of 80 actors, out of whom 20 turned to terrorist acts. The results suggest that ties to leaders and terrorist offenders, co-attendance of radicalising settings and greater structural embeddedness relate to the likelihood of individual actors turning to acts of terrorism. However, we also find some individual attributes that may offer competing explanations. In this paper we discuss our findings and address how future research may provide further insights into an important issue for agencies involved in countering terrorism: which radical actors, if any, are more likely to turn to acts of terrorism?
Social network analysis can be a powerful tool to better understand the social context of terrorist activities, and it may also offer potential leads for agencies to intervene. Our access to Dutch police information allows us to analyse the relational features of two networks that include actors who planned acts of terrorism and were active in the dissemination of a Salafi-Jihadi interpretation of Islam (n = 57; n = 26). Based on a mixed-method approach that combines qualitative and more formal statistical analysis (exponential random graph models), we analyse the structural characteristics of these networks, individual positions and the extent to which radical leaders, pre-existing family and friendship ties and radicalizing settings affect actors to form ties. We find that both networks resemble a core–periphery structure, with cores formed by a densely interconnected group of actors who frequently meet in radicalizing settings. Based on our findings, we discuss the potential effects of preventive and repressive measures developed within the Dutch counterterrorism framework.
