So-called fake news and problematic information on social media assume an increasingly important roles in political debate. Focusing on the (early) run-up to and aftermath of the 2020 U.S. presidential elections, this study examines the extent of the problematic information in the most engaged-with content and most active users in ‘political Twitter’. We demarcated three time spans, the first surrounding Super Tuesday (March 2-22, 2020), the second providing a snapshot of the aftermath of the elections and the run-up to both the Senate run-off elections in Georgia (December 24, 2020 – January 4, 2021) and the (unforeseen) Capitol Hill riots on January 6, 2021. In the third time span (March 10-21, 2021), when election activities had ceased, we examine the effects of Twitter’s deplatforming (or so-called purge) of accounts after the Capitol riots in January, 2021. In order to shed light on the magnitude of problematic information, we mapped shared sources, labelled them and assessed the actors engaged in their dissemination. It was found that overall, mainstream sources are shared more often than problematic ones, but the percentage of problematic sources was much higher in December compared to both the March, 2020 and 2021 periods. Significantly, (hyper)partisan sources are close to half of all sources shared in the first two periods, implying a robust presence of them on social media. By March 2021, both the share of problematic and of (hyper)partisan sources had decreased significantly, suggesting an impact from Twitter’s deplatforming actions. Additionally, highly active, problematic users (fake profiles, bots, or locked/suspended accounts) were found on both sides of the political spectrum, albeit more abundantly from conservative users.
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Increasingly, Instagram is discussed as a site for misinformation, inau-thentic activities, and polarization, particularly in recent studies aboutelections, the COVID-19 pandemic and vaccines. In this study, we havefound a different platform. By looking at the content that receives themost interactions over two time periods (in 2020) related to three U.S.presidential candidates and the issues of COVID-19, healthcare, 5G andgun control, we characterize Instagram as a site of earnest (as opposedto ambivalent) political campaigning and moral support, with a rela-tive absence of polarizing content (particularly from influencers) andlittle to no misinformation and artificial amplification practices. Mostimportantly, while misinformation and polarization might be spreadingon the platform, they do not receive much user interaction.
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This book is about markets for intermediate skills. It is also about the coordination within and between the (vocational) education system and the (sub-baccalaureate) labor market, and the institutions that govern them. Our goal was to improve our understanding of how particular governance regimes influence the operation of vocational education and training (VET) markets. We conducted an international comparison of three different governance regimes of VET markets in Germany, the Netherlands and the American state of Wisconsin. The central question underlying the national analyses and comparisons is: How do markets for intermediate skills operate in Germany, the Netherlands, and the American state of Wisconsin?
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