This article attempts to explore the main impulses that might have led to the destruction of Buddha statues by Taliban in the Bamiyan Valley of Afghanistan. Drawing on existing literature, and anecdotal evidence, this article suggests that the main impulses that have led to destruction are rather linked to the overall political context of that time (i.e., political iconoclasm) rather than to pure Islamic iconoclasm or an explicit condition of disharmony in heritage (i.e., dissonant heritage). First, the Taliban did not consider the statues as "their" cultural heritage. The act of destruction, therefore, cannot be subscribed to the Afghan cultural dynamics but rather to the political-religious ideology imported by Taliban from outside of the country. Secondly, it seemed that Mullah Omar was viewing the statues as a revenue source at the beginning and as a political bargain chip at the end. In both circumstances, religion seems not to have played the main role. Lastly, the destruction seems a political iconoclasm-that is, a political exploitation, if not a direct political act. The Taliban and especially their external allies were very well aware of the consequences of the act of destruction. It seems implausible to suggest that there were no religion and/or culture in play when ordering the destruction of the statues. The latter is the least what this article aims for. However, to conclude that the destruction was solely triggered by theological and cultural factors might also be improbable. The author does not, in any way, attempt to rationalize the act of destruction, let alone justify the barbaric act.
The sense of safety and security of older people is a widely acknowledged action domain for policy and practice in age-friendly cities. Despite an extensive body of knowledge on the matter, the theory is fragmented, and a classification is lacking. Therefore, this study investigated how older people experience the sense of safety and security in an age-friendly city. A total of four focus group sessions were organised in The Hague comprising 38 older people. Based on the outcomes of the sessions, the sense of safety and security was classified into two main domains: a sense of safety and security impacted by intentional acts and negligence (for instance, burglary and violence), and a sense of safety and security impacted by non-intentional acts (for instance, incidents, making mistakes online). Both domains manifest into three separate contexts, namely the home environment, the outdoor environment and traffic and the digital environment. In the discussions with older people on these derived domains, ideas for potential improvements and priorities were also explored, which included access to information on what older people can do themselves to improve their sense of safety and security, the enforcement of rules, and continuous efforts to develop digital skills to improve safety online. Original article at MDPI; DOI: https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph19073960
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This article is about the effect of local tailored interventions to counter (violent) extremism, and therefore contributes to the academic and policy debates. It focusses on local, professional perspectives on person-specific interventions utilising a Dutch case study as the basis. The interventions are part of the wider-ranging counter terrorism policy that entails (local) measures that are deployed in relation to designated high-risk individuals and groups. By reviewing policy documents and conducting semi-structured interviews, the exploratory study concludes that the key factors for a hand-tailored intervention are a solid network, expert knowledge to assess potential signs of extremist ideology, an awareness of not having too many concurrent measures, good inter-institutional cooperation and information-sharing. The professionals involved felt that person-specific interventions have contributed to reducing the threat of religious extremism in the Netherlands. Nonetheless, municipal officials and security agents emphasised the importance of setting realistic goals and a focus on preventive rather than repressive measures. Furthermore, despite the central role that municipal actors play, they run up against problems such as cooperation within the security and care sector. National entities appear to emphasize information-gathering and monitoring more than community-focused cooperation. Thereby questioning whether, on the national level, local professionals are perceived as playing a key role in dealing with extremism.
