Concerns about the negative consequences of the excessive underpricing of the current arrangement in the initial public offering (IPO) market for the provision of entrepreneurial finance—book building—have led to research into the viability of auctions for IPO pricing and allocation. IPO firms face a trade-off between the benefit of accurate and reliable IPO price discovery and the cost of underpricing. The main aim of this paper was to gain new scientific knowledge about this trade-off by measuring the impact of two key variables on this trade-off: capacity restraint and discount on the auction clearing price. Using controlled experiment methodology in multi-unit uniform price auctions we found that the most capacity-restricted auctions that also offer investors a discount are likely to produce the most accurate and reliable price discovery and consequently, the most predictable auction outcome. There are indications that a discount of 8% may suffice to incentivize investors to reliably contribute to price discovery. The resulting underpricing (and its variability) of these auctions is likely to be significantly lower than if book building would be used to price and allocate IPOs. Technological innovation in the IPO market through the application of recent advances in data science, experimental economics and artificial intelligence allows for the optimization of IPO mechanisms and crowdfunding platforms which in turn improves the access to equity required for entrepreneurial finance.
DOCUMENT
From the article: "To extend the lifetime of products, an agent is connected to the product. This agent has several roles. It depends on the phase of the lifecycle what these roles will be. One of the roles in the usage or recycling phase is to negotiate for buying spare parts in case a part of the product is broken. The same agent can also decide to offer spare parts to other agents to reuse working parts of a broken product. To accomplish this idea, a marketplace for agents has to be set up, where the auctions can take place. To support this concept, blockchain technology has been used. Blockchains are a new type of technology, known from bitcoins, but there are other cases where blockchains can be used. Blockchain is known for its decentralisation, transparency and for making trustful transactions. In this paper the working of different types of blockchains will be briefly explained and determined if they can be useful for online auctions by agents. A prototype of the marketplace using blockchains has been built."
LINK
Peer-to-peer (P2P) energy trading has been recognized as an important technology to increase the local self-consumption of photovoltaics in the local energy system. Different auction mechanisms and bidding strategies haven been investigated in previous studies. However, there has been no comparatively analysis on how different market structures influence the local energy system’s overall performance. This paper presents and compares two market structures, namely a centralized market and a decentralized market. Two pricing mechanisms in the centralized market and two bidding strategies in the decentralized market are developed. The results show that the centralized market leads to higher overall system self-consumption and profits. In the decentralized market, some electricity is directly sold to the grid due to unmatchable bids and asks. Bidding strategies based on the learning algorithm can achieve better performance compared to the random method.
DOCUMENT
