Game Mechanics is aimed at game design students and industry professionals who want to improve their understanding of how to design, build, and test the mechanics of a game. Game Mechanics will show you how to design, test, and tune the core mechanics of a game—any game, from a huge role-playing game to a casual mobile phone game to a board game. Along the way, we’ll use many examples from real games that you may know: Pac-Man, Monopoly, Civilization, StarCraft II, and others. The authors provide two features. One is a tool called Machinations that can be used to visualize and simulate game mechanics on your own computer, without writing any code or using a spreadsheet. The other is a design pattern library, including the deep structures of game economies that generate challenge and many kinds of feedback loops.
This article analyzes negative externalities that policymakers in one region or group may impose upon the citizens of neighboring regions or groups. These externalities may be material, but they may also be psychological (in the form of envy). The latter form of externality may arise from the production of `conspicuous public goods. As a result, decentralized provision of conspicuous public goods may be too high. Potentially, a centralized legislature may internalize negative externalities. However, in a model with strategic delegation, we argue that the median voter in each jurisdiction may anticipate a reduction in local public goods supply and delegate to a policymaker who cares more for public goods than she does herself. This last effect mitigates the expected benefits of policy centralization. The authors theory is then applied to the setting of civil conflict, where they discuss electoral outcomes in Northern Ireland and Yugoslavia before and after significant institutional changes that affected the degree of centralization. These case studies provide support for the authors theoretical predictions.
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Publicatie in het internationale peer reviewed tijdschrift American Politics Research (SSCI Ranking Political Science, 2019, 84/181, Journal Impact Factor 1.442). Citizen exposure to political incivility is increasing. Studies have found heterogeneous responses to incivility, but we know little about what drives this variation. This study investigates whether emotional responses to both civility and incivility are driven by moral value commitments. Drawing on Moral Foundations Theory, we argue that incivility should pose more of a threat to people who embrace an individualizing system of moral regulation than a binding system. To test this, we conduct a 3 × 3 between-subjects survey-embedded vignette experiment with a representative sample of 1,789 U.S. respondents. The vignettes describe interactions between two candidates in a debate. The findings show that respondents clearly distinguish between civil, neutral, and uncivil debate and that these conditions yield distinct emotional responses. Moreover, we show “individualizers” have a stronger emotional response to incivility than “binders.” Responses to civility, however, appear to be unaffected by moral value commitments.
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