The first reason for this study is that a gap appears to exist in the available theories on corruption; very little research is available on corruption by a network, nor does the network theory thoroughly discuss the risks or pitfalls of networks. The second reason for this study is the observation that policies and investigations appear to be limited in dealing with corruption in network-like structures, while at the same time international and European organisations refer to ‘trading in influence’, political and high-profile corruption and the need to eradicate these forms of corruption. The descriptions of both trading in influence and ‘political corruption’ are such that they refer to a web, circle or network in which corruption occurs. The current literature and research on corruption in network-like structures is not extensive, nor do literature and research on networks extensively discuss the pitfalls of networks or how such a collective can become corrupt. This study seeks to bridge both themes, thereby learning from the day-to-day reality of large corruption cases which are difficult to investigate, and comparing them to what is described in the existing bodies of literature on corruption and networks. Thus, understanding network corruption is relevant to prevent, detect and address corruption in our modern society. It will help create awareness and understanding of when social capital becomes corrupted. In this study I consider the structure of the network and the responsibility in these networks in real-life cases: what consequences this has in terms of how the conduct should be assessed; what it means when corruption is a collective behaviour; and whether the behaviour of individuals can be assessed independently of the network. We need to understand which norms are laid down in the anti-corruption policies and models and compare them with the norms upheld in social networks, to explore whether it is possible to distinguish networks from network corruption. In particular, the various roles that individuals take on in such networks needs consideration. The three case studies (the FIFA case, the News of the World case and the Roermond case) concerned serious misconduct by a given set of persons having some form of loose association, but sometimes with little individual behaviour being criminal. In this study the link between networks and corruption is explored by means of the following central question: In what way and to what extent is corruption linked to the functioning of social networks, and what does this entail for our knowledge of corruption and networks and the policies to eradicate corruption?
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Among politicians and businessmen in the Netherlands, the general feeling is that integrity comes first in their businesslike relationships. Corruption is something that goes on in the Third World. This perception is strengthened annually by Transparency International’s publication of the so-called ‘Corruption Perceptions Index’ (CPI), which ranks the Netherlands, more often than not, among the top ten countries of the world in terms of integrity.What do observers from their posts in international agencies see as the reality? Do they agree? The following documentation contains data and views from sources made available by UNODC, UN Global Compact, OECD, GRECO (Council of Europe), Transparency International, European Union, and others, which do not conform to the prevailing views held by Dutch politicians and businesspeople concerning their own integrity.
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De versnippering van de internationale samenleving vermindert de kans op een overkoepelend model van global governance. Meer waarschijnlijk is het ontstaan van bepaalde processen van bestuur die zich ontwikkelen als reactie op specifieke mondiale vraagstukken. Dit artikel beschrijft het proces van implementatie van de US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) als een voorbeeld van een dergelijk bijzonder proces. Het FCPA 'model' wordt gekenmerkt door samenwerking en onderhandeling tussen de publieke en private sector. In dit model is het samenwerken voor het bieden van maatschappelijke veiligheid gebaseerd op wederzijds belang. De mogelijkheid van onderhandelde regelingen heeft een positief effect op het management van corruptie door bedrijven, dat zich verspreidt over de hele invloedsfeer van de onderneming. Tegelijkertijd biedt het de overheid toegang tot de informatie die nodig is om corruptie op te sporen, te onderzoeken en te vervolgen. Het in kaart brengen van dergelijke processen biedt nuttige inzichten over nieuwe benaderingen die nodig kunnen zijn om goed bestuur voor een veilige wereld te bereiken. ABSTRACT The fragmentation of international society reduces the likelihood of a single overarching model of global governance. More likely, is the emergence of particular processes of governance that develop in response to specific global issues. The paper describes the process of implementing the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) as an example of one such particular process. The FCPA 'model' is characterized by co-operation and negotiation between the public and private sector. In this model, partnering for the provision of security is based on mutual self- interest. The possibility of negotiated settlements has a positive effect on the management of corruption by corporations with a ripple effect throughout the corporations' sphere of influence. At the same time, it provides governments with access to the information necessary to detect, investigate and prosecute corruption. Mapping such processes provides useful insights about new approaches that may be needed to attain good governance for a safe world.
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Established in 1993, Transparency International (TI) defines itself as “the global civil society organization leading the fight against corruption, that brings people together in a powerful worldwide coalition to end the devastating impact of corruption on men, women and children around the world”. Its stated goal is “to take action to combat corruption and prevent criminal activities arising from corruption so as to help build a world in which Government, politics, business, civil society and the daily lives of people are free of corruption, because of the potential of corruption to undermine economic development, generate poverty, foster political instability and create global insecurity”. TI is politically non-partisan and does not undertake investigations of alleged corruption or expose individual cases. It attempts to combat corruption at the international level, and through its National Chapters at the national level, by raising public awareness of the occurrence and impact of corruption; developing coalitions to address it; developing and disseminating tools to curb it; promoting transparency and accountability in politics and business; monitoring the control of corruption; and supporting institutions and mechanisms to combat it. TI is guided by its Charter; its Statement of Vision, Values and Guiding Principles; a Code of Conduct; and the TI Conflict of Interests Policy. It is registered in Germany as a society (Verein) in the court register of societies (Vereinsregister) of Berlin Charlottenburg. TI’s International Secretariat is located in Berlin.
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This booklet was published as a result of the inaugural lectures by Johan Wempe and Michel van Hulten. Within Saxion, professors cooperate in knowledgecentres, the advantage being that they can set up joint multidisciplinary research lines in addition to their own research.
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De term criminele inmenging is reeds onderdeel van het maatschappelijk en criminologisch discours, maar binnen de academische literatuur niet gedefinieerd en geconceptualiseerd. Bij criminele inmenging maken criminele organisaties gebruik van bonafide bedrijven voor de facilitering van criminele bedrijfsprocessen. We introduceren een definitie op basis van empirisch onderzoek en onderscheiden hierbinnen drie vormen hoe bonafide bedrijven als facilitator kunnen optreden. Dit schijnt zowel licht op de vehikelfunctie van ondernemingen als op manieren waarop criminele organisaties die vehikelfunctie aanwenden. Door te illustreren hoe verweving plaatsvindt, hopen we handvatten te bieden om ongewenste verwevenheid te voorkomen.English: Summary:While not a new phenomenon, research on criminal intrusion in (small) businesses is often focussed on the perspective of the criminal, reconstructed after a crime has taken place. In this article we add the perspective of the entrepreneur from the moment he/she is confronted with early signs of possible criminal intrusion. Firstly, we introduce a definition of criminal intrusion, based on 18 cases of (attempted) criminal intrusion in small business: The process by which an actor of a criminal organization turns to and associates with a bona fide corporation, making that corporation a facilitator of criminal business process without its deliberate intent. Secondly, we distinguish three (not necessarily limitative) main practices on how this facilitation of crime takes place within the scope of criminal intrusion in bona fide businesses: 1) a transactional model, which focusses on an exchange of products or services between criminal organizations and businesses; 2) a parasitic relationship where operational processes are abused for criminal gains, and 3) infiltration, in which targeted infiltration, corruption of employees or ‘criminal investment’ takes place to gain a foothold within the business. By introducing a theoretical framework for the categorisation of cases, we hope to further develop the possibilities of (criminological) analysis of criminal intrusion, while simultaneously provide small business owners insights to strengthen their resilience against organised crime.
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This article explains how considering the systemic character of influencemarket corruption can help the Council of Europe and its Member States in their fightagainst trading in influence. By applying article 12 of the Council of Europe’s CriminalConvention on Corruption on two recent cases in the Netherlands and France, it is beingtested whether the provision provides an effective solution for scrutinising the trading ininfluence phenomenon. Both cases provide an example of the trading in influence phenomenon,which is symptomatic in western influence markets and which has implicationsfar greater than the ones immediately apparent.
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The annual publication (since 1995) of the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) by Transparency International (TI) Secretariat in Berlin, gives the scores of the perceptions which selected observers have of the prevalence of corruption in their countries. They do not report about facts. Moreover, these observers are not at random chosen from whatever universum of respondents. Those contributing are predominantly male, between 25 and 50 years of age, well-paid and expatriate, white collar workers, with diplomas of MBA and similar studies, anglophone. Perceptions of women, poor, locals, blue collar workers, francophone and lusophone, are predominantly missing. The automatic result is that rich countries rank in the top, are perceived as less corrupt, ‘clean’. Poor countries rank at the bottom end of the list. The result is unreliable, unscientific, and should not be used – as is generally done by governments and the media – as a yardstick for the level of corruption in particular countries. (TI-Berlin has announced that beginning with the CPI of December 2012, it will use another methodology with more reliable results. As soon as this is published such information and comments will become available on this website).
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Op 1 oktober jl. heeft de Commissie Toekomst Accountancysector (CTA) haar voorlopige bevindingen [12] gepresenteerd in het kader van het door de minister van Financiën ingestelde onderzoek naar de mogelijkheden om de kwaliteit van de wettelijke accountantscontrole duurzaam te verhogen. In deze voorlopige bevindingen, bestaande uit – 348 bullets verdeeld over 101 pagina’s en over 12 hoofdstukken – gaat het veel over kwaliteit en slechts beperkt over transparantie. Het (deel)woord ‘kwaliteit’ komt 402 maal voor. Het woord ‘transparantie’ komt daarentegen slechts 18 maal voor. Op verzoek van de CTA heeft het Erasmus Competition & Regulation institute (ECRi) een literatuurstudie uitgevoerd naar kwaliteitsverbeterende maatregelen in de accountancysector [11]. In deze literatuurstudie komt het woord ‘transparantie’ 10 maal voor (transparency, 2 maal).
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