De term criminele inmenging is reeds onderdeel van het maatschappelijk en criminologisch discours, maar binnen de academische literatuur niet gedefinieerd en geconceptualiseerd. Bij criminele inmenging maken criminele organisaties gebruik van bonafide bedrijven voor de facilitering van criminele bedrijfsprocessen. We introduceren een definitie op basis van empirisch onderzoek en onderscheiden hierbinnen drie vormen hoe bonafide bedrijven als facilitator kunnen optreden. Dit schijnt zowel licht op de vehikelfunctie van ondernemingen als op manieren waarop criminele organisaties die vehikelfunctie aanwenden. Door te illustreren hoe verweving plaatsvindt, hopen we handvatten te bieden om ongewenste verwevenheid te voorkomen.English: Summary:While not a new phenomenon, research on criminal intrusion in (small) businesses is often focussed on the perspective of the criminal, reconstructed after a crime has taken place. In this article we add the perspective of the entrepreneur from the moment he/she is confronted with early signs of possible criminal intrusion. Firstly, we introduce a definition of criminal intrusion, based on 18 cases of (attempted) criminal intrusion in small business: The process by which an actor of a criminal organization turns to and associates with a bona fide corporation, making that corporation a facilitator of criminal business process without its deliberate intent. Secondly, we distinguish three (not necessarily limitative) main practices on how this facilitation of crime takes place within the scope of criminal intrusion in bona fide businesses: 1) a transactional model, which focusses on an exchange of products or services between criminal organizations and businesses; 2) a parasitic relationship where operational processes are abused for criminal gains, and 3) infiltration, in which targeted infiltration, corruption of employees or ‘criminal investment’ takes place to gain a foothold within the business. By introducing a theoretical framework for the categorisation of cases, we hope to further develop the possibilities of (criminological) analysis of criminal intrusion, while simultaneously provide small business owners insights to strengthen their resilience against organised crime.
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Most multi‑problem young adults (18–27 years old) have been exposed to childhood maltreatment and/or have been involved in juvenile delinquency and, therefore, could have had Child Protection Service (CPS) interference during childhood. The extent to which their childhood problems persist and evolve into young adult‑ hood may differ substantially among cases. This might indicate heterogeneous profiles of CPS risk factors. These pro‑ files may identify combinations of closely interrelated childhood problems which may warrant specific approaches for problem recognition and intervention in clinical practice. The aim of this study was to retrospectively identify distinct statistical classes based on CPS data of multi‑problem young adults in The Netherlands and to explore whether these classes were related to current psychological dysfunctioning and delinquent behaviour. This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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Project objectives Radicalisation research leads to ethical and legal questions and issues. These issues need to be addressed in way that helps the project progress in ethically and legally acceptable manner. Description of Work The legal analysis in SAFIRE addressed questions such as which behavior associated with radicalisation is criminal behaviour. The ethical issues were addressed throughout the project in close cooperation between the ethicists and the researchers using a method called ethical parallel research. Results A legal analysis was made about criminal law and radicalisation. During the project lively discussions were held in the research team about ethical issues. An ethical justification for interventions in radicalisation processes has been written. With regard to research ethics: An indirect informed consent procedure for interviews with (former) radicals has been designed. Practical guidelines to prevent obtaining information that could lead to indirect identification of respondents were developed.
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By analysing intelligence-gathering reform legislation this article discusses access to justice for communications interception by the intelligence and security services. In the aftermath of the Snowden revelations, sophisticated oversight systems for bulk communications surveillance are being established across the globe. In the Netherlands prior judicial consent and a binding complaint procedure have been established. However, although checks and balances for targeted communications interference have been created, accountability mechanisms are less equipped to effectively remedy indiscriminate interference. Therefore, within the context of mass communications surveillance programs, access to justice for complainants remains a contentious issue.
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This report is the result of a research interest stemming from the case presented by the City of Budapest on the misalignment between EU funding opportunities and the interdependence of the national government. The main research question was “Which channels exist for a local or regional government to access EU funding directly, without the need for interference of the national government?”. Recent political developments in Hungary have led to an increasing amount of budgetary challenges for the City of Budapest. Besides domestic factors, the European Commission’s decision to suggest to withhold cohesion and RRF funds to Hungary raises the question of what different avenues of direct EU funding instruments might be at the city’s disposal. Therefore, the aim of this research is to provide recommendations on what avenues the City of Budapest might want to invest in in terms of advocacy activities on the EU level. We first conducted a desk research, mapping the current landscape of EU funding instruments under the direct management of the EU (the overview can be found in the appendix). Secondly, ten interviews were conducted in October and November 2022 with several multi-level stakeholders from the European Parliament, the European Commission, the umbrella organisation of cities in the European Union ‘Eurocities’, a Hungarian journalist and a regional representation in Central-Eastern Europe. Based on these conversations, we identified five main findings with corresponding recommendations for action.
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Uitspraak van het Europees Hof voor de Rechten van de Mens, met noot.
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In May 2018, the new Dutch Intelligence and Security Services Act 2017 (Wet op de Inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten, Wiv) will enter into force. It replaces the previous 2002 Act and incorporates many reforms to the information gathering powers of the two intelligence and security services as well as to the accountability and oversight mechanisms. Due to the technologyneutral approach, both the civil and the military intelligence services are now authorized to, for example, intercept communications in bulk, hack third parties, decrypt files, store DNA or use any other future innovative technology. Also, the national security legislation extends the possibilities for the indiscriminate collection of data, and for the processing, storage and analysis thereof. The process leading to the law includes substantial criticism from the various stakeholders involved. Upon publication of this report, an official consultative referendum is being organized on the new act. The aim of this policy brief is to provide an international audience with a comprehensive overview of the most relevant aspects of the act and its context. In addition, there is considerable focus on the checks and balances as well as the bottlenecks of the Dutch intelligence gathering reform. The selection of topics is based on the core issues addressed during the parliamentary debate and on the authors’ insights.
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Frontline professionals such as social workers and civil servants play a crucial role in countering violent extremism.Because of their direct contac twith society,first liners are tasked with detecting individuals that may threaten national security and the democratic rule of law. Preliminary screening takes place during the pre-crime phase. However, without clear evidence or concrete indicators of unlawful action or physical violence, it is challenging to determine when someone poses a threat. There are no set patterns that can be used to identify cognitive radicalization processes that will result in violent extremism. Furthermore, prevention targets ideas and ideologies with no clear framework for assessing terrorism-risk. This article examines how civil servants responsible for public order, security and safety deal with their mandate to engage in early detection, and discusses the side effects that accompany this practice. Based on openinterviews with fifteen local security professionals in the Netherlands, we focus here on the risk assessments made by these professionals. To understand their performance, we used the following two research questions: First, what criteria do local security professionals use to determine whether or not someone forms a potential risk? Second, how do local security professionals substantiate their assessments of the radicalization processes that will develop into violent extremism? We conclude that such initial risk weightings rely strongly on ‘gut feelings’ or intuition. We conclude that this subjectivitymayleadto prejudiceand/oradministrativearbitrariness in relationtopreliminary risk assessment of particular youth.
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This article discusses, from the local professional perspective, access to justice for person-specific interventions to prevent or counter (violent) extremism in Europe. Using a Dutch case study it focusses on legal protection for hand-tailored interferences that are part of a wider-ranging counter-terrorism policy. While the so-called person-specific interventions, carried out by professionals, target designated high-risk individuals and groups, it is primarily the municipal authority that coordinates these criminal –, administrative – or social based measures. Furthermore, although researchers and human rights advocates have repeatedly sounded the alarm over access to justice for those affected, little research has been done into how those responsible for implementation perceive the necessity of legal protection. Also, the potential side-effects such as executive arbitrariness are modestly reflected in the literature. Henceforth, by reviewing policy documents and conducting semi-structured interviews, this exploratory study concludes that as far as legal protection for hand-tailored interferences are concerned, local professionals have faith in the checks and balances of the criminal justice system. Yet from their perspective this was less self-evident in cases of administrative – or social measures. Therefore, one may wonder if legal protections for person-specific interventions that deal with (potential) extremists are sufficient in practice.
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In recent years, the fight against terrorism and political violence has focused more on anticipating the threats that they pose. Therefore, early detection of ideas by local professionals has become an important part of the preventive approach in countering radicalization. Frontline workers who operate in the arteries of society are encouraged to identify processes toward violent behavior at an early stage. To date, however, little is known about how these professionals take on this screening task at their own discretion. Research from the Netherlands suggests that subjective assessment appears to exist. In this article, we argue that the absence of a clear norm for preliminary judgments affects prejudice or administrative arbitrariness, which may cause side effects due to unjustified profiling.
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