Zoekresultaten

Deliberating justice policy in the European Union

Dit artikel stelt dat beleidsverandering binnen de Europese Unie (EU) ook voortkomt uit besluitvorming op dagelijks niveau. Om veranderingen aan te kunnen wijzen en te verklaren dient de traditionele rationele keuzetheorie en de oriëntatie op instrumenteel-strategisch handelen te worden aangevuld met een constructivistische zienswijze op discours als bron van verandering. Met de inzichten van constructivisten en communicatiewetenschappers wordt in dit artikel gekeken naar de voorwaarden en het zich voordoen van deliberatie als discursief proces dat beleidsverandering op dagelijks niveau bevordert. In dat verband is onderzoek verricht naar een tweetal besluitvormingsprocessen op het gebied van EU-justitiesamenwerking. De ene betreft een casestudie omtrent de onderhandelingen over de totstandkoming van het Europees Bewijsverkrijgingsbevel van 2008. De ander gaat over de onderhandelingen over een Raadsbesluit betreffende de toegang van politie tot het Visa Informatie Systeem. Uit beide casestudies blijkt dat onder bepaalde omstandigheden deliberatie uitmondend in beleidsverandering zich feitelijk heeft voorgedaan. ABSTRACT This paper argues that, in addition to the practice of strategic bargaining, one may very well find in the day-to-day running of the EU decision-making instances where changes in policy outcome result from occurrences of deliberation. Occurrences have indeed been signalled in both the 'EEW' and 'VIS' cases where negotiating parties engaged in reasoned exchanges of views that resulted in position shifts and even agreements on certain issues. Analysis of both cases demonstrates that in settings where the conditions of 'insulation','intensity' or 'access of non-state actors' were prominently present, deliberation and ensuing progress towards a more reasoned understanding of the issue concerned was more likely to occur. Furthermore, a certain detachment from technical detail, yet sufficient proximity to subject matter, absence of agenda constraints and small-group dynamics made it more likely that discussants were inclined to engage in more open-minded exchanges of views based on reason and argument. On balance, clearly identifiable occurrences of deliberation-promoting progress in decisionmaking have been found in the institutionally quite diversified and multifaceted environment of the EU. They can certainly be regarded as representative of other decision-making processes operating under similar conditions, processes of which the institutionally dense EU is particularly rich. In a way, the occurrences of deliberation identified constitute a path of progressive understanding that is bound to extend beyond the temporal boundaries of a specific decision-making procedure. Reasoned understandings on certain issues achieved in either the EEW or VIS process were likely to provide a fertile basis on which further reasoned discussion can evolve into other, future decision-making processes. As such the deliberative instances found in the EEW and the VIS cases are of all periods, including the post-Lisbon period, and should be examined as alternative sources of policy change in the EU, irrespective of the timeframe.

DNA in the criminal justice system

Awor nan ta yama nos criminal! (and now they can call us criminals!)

In this article, the author will question the seemingly obvious boundary between civil disobedience, as conceptualised by Rawls and Arendt, and several examples of criminal, or simply annoying, activities which don't meet their criteria, such as the case of the ‘Top 50'. The ‘Top 50' are multi-problem Dutch-Caribbean men, who refuse to adapt to predominant norms in Dutch society. IThe author argues that political aspects of their behaviour should be acknowledged, even if they engage in criminal behaviour and don't present explicit political goals. Firstly, she questions the way in which Rawls based his definition on a centralistic conception of governmental power and contrast it with Foucault's conception of normalising power, in which power is diffuse and cannot be restricted to the enactment of formal laws. Secondly, she discusses what the minimum requirements are to be able to classifyacts as civil disobedience. Rawls and Arendt draw a clear line between criminal behaviour and civil disobedience, but their requirements may be too strict. We might miss signals of injustice if actions that do not meet these criteria are excluded from the political discourse. The conclusion is that comparing Arendt's and Rawls' conception of civil disobedience with the behaviour of a marginal migrant group may be useful in questioning the boundaries of this concept and in making it more inclusive. A wider conception of civil disobedience may help to explain the meaning of deviant behaviour in terms of social critique and to challenge the traditional understanding of civil disobedience.

Restorative justice in a time of war

This critical, literature-review based research project, inspired by the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war, examines the limitations and possibilities of restorative justice in a time of war. Any armed conflict creates and amplifies the need for extreme militarisation and securitisation, accompanied by belligerent rhetoric. Thus, for restorative justice scholars and practitioners, the outbreak of war challenges the applicability of restorative justice values and practices, as bipolar interpretations of events, conflicts, and human suffering displace more balanced views. The purpose of our research is to critically discuss the applicability of restorative justice in times of war and in the context of the Russo-Ukrainian War in particular. Our motivation to focus on this specific war and to examine the (im)possibilities of restorative justice from Eurocentric perspective stems from three observations: (1) In the last 20 years restorative justice was continuously promoted in Europe as a new “culture” of justice; (2) The Russo-Ukrainian War currently takes place on the European continent and impacts the European security architecture more than that of other world regions; (3) This war has a particular meaning to the world (e.g., a violent clash between the (former) Cold War superpowers, an element of surprise, the shattered myth of overwhelming Russian military might, the nuclear threat coupled with a global energy crisis etc.).

Data Science and criminal law

This chapter explores the legal and moral implications of the use of data science in criminal justice at two levels: police surveillance and the criminal trial of a defendant. At the first level, police surveillance, data science is used to identify places and people at high risk of criminal activity, allowing police officers to target surveillance and take proactive measures to try to prevent crime (predictive policing). At the second level, the criminal trial of a defendant, data science is used to make risk assessments to support decisions about bail, sentencing, probation, and supervision and detention orders for high-risk offenders. The use of data science at these levels has one thing in common: it is about predicting risk. The uncertainty associated with risk prediction raises specific related legal and ethical dilemmas, for example in the areas of reasonable suspicion, presumption of innocence, privacy, and the principle of non-discrimination.

The interpretation of forensic conclusions by criminal justice professionals: The same evidence interpreted differently

Forensic reports use various types of conclusions, such as a categorical (CAT) conclusion or a likelihood ratio (LR). In order to correctly assess the evidence, users of forensic reports need to understand the conclusion and its evidential strength. The aim of this paper is to study the interpretation of the evidential strength of forensic conclusions by criminal justice professionals. In an online questionnaire 269 professionals assessed 768 reports on fingerprint examination and answered questions that measured self-proclaimed and actual understanding of the reports and conclusions. The reports entailed CAT, verbal LR and numerical LR conclusions with low or high evidential strength and were assessed by crime scene investigators, police detectives, public prosecutors, criminal lawyers, and judges. The results show that about a quarter of all questions measuring actual understanding of the reports were answered incorrectly. The CAT conclusion was best understood for the weak conclusions, the three strong conclusions were all assessed similarly. The weak CAT conclusion correctly emphasizes the uncertainty of any conclusion type used. However, most participants underestimated the strength of this weak CAT conclusion compared to the other weak conclusion types. Looking at the self-proclaimed understanding of all professionals, they in general overestimated their actual understanding of all conclusion types.