In this article, the author will question the seemingly obvious boundary between civil disobedience, as conceptualised by Rawls and Arendt, and several examples of criminal, or simply annoying, activities which don't meet their criteria, such as the case of the ‘Top 50'. The ‘Top 50' are multi-problem Dutch-Caribbean men, who refuse to adapt to predominant norms in Dutch society. IThe author argues that political aspects of their behaviour should be acknowledged, even if they engage in criminal behaviour and don't present explicit political goals. Firstly, she questions the way in which Rawls based his definition on a centralistic conception of governmental power and contrast it with Foucault's conception of normalising power, in which power is diffuse and cannot be restricted to the enactment of formal laws. Secondly, she discusses what the minimum requirements are to be able to classifyacts as civil disobedience. Rawls and Arendt draw a clear line between criminal behaviour and civil disobedience, but their requirements may be too strict. We might miss signals of injustice if actions that do not meet these criteria are excluded from the political discourse. The conclusion is that comparing Arendt's and Rawls' conception of civil disobedience with the behaviour of a marginal migrant group may be useful in questioning the boundaries of this concept and in making it more inclusive. A wider conception of civil disobedience may help to explain the meaning of deviant behaviour in terms of social critique and to challenge the traditional understanding of civil disobedience.
Het onderzoek dat ten grondslag ligt aan dit artikel onderzoekt hoe de overheid markten reguleert voor (financiële) producten en diensten teneinde falen van de markt te voorkomen. Het behandelt specifiek EU Richtlijn 2014/57/EU betreffende strafrechtelijke sancties voor marktmisbruik en de implementatie daarvan in Nederland en opvolgend gebruik door het Openbaar Ministerie en Autoriteit Financiële Markten en hun Convenant ter voorkoming van ongeoorloofde samenloop van bestuurlijke en strafrechtelijke sancties. Het beantwoord de vraag of deze richtlijn de ontwikkeling van effectief reguleren van de financiële markt bevordert of remt. De slotsom ten aanzien van de implementatie van Richtlijn 2014/57/EU is – kort gezegd – dat “slechts” het aantal jaren gevangenisstraf voor handel met voorkennis en marktmisbruik van twee naar vier aangepast dient te worden. Het artikel concludeert tenslotte dat de huidige praktijk van het Convenant tussen OM en Autoriteit Financiële Markten kan blijven bestaan. De Autoriteit Financiële Markten kan haar inspanningen om haar toezicht verder in de geest van responsive regulation te verbeteren ongestoord door het OM voortzetten.
This chapter explores the legal and moral implications of the use of data science in criminal justice at two levels: police surveillance and the criminal trial of a defendant. At the first level, police surveillance, data science is used to identify places and people at high risk of criminal activity, allowing police officers to target surveillance and take proactive measures to try to prevent crime (predictive policing). At the second level, the criminal trial of a defendant, data science is used to make risk assessments to support decisions about bail, sentencing, probation, and supervision and detention orders for high-risk offenders. The use of data science at these levels has one thing in common: it is about predicting risk. The uncertainty associated with risk prediction raises specific related legal and ethical dilemmas, for example in the areas of reasonable suspicion, presumption of innocence, privacy, and the principle of non-discrimination.
