In case of a major cyber incident, organizations usually rely on external providers of Cyber Incident Response (CIR) services. CIR consultants operate in a dynamic and constantly changing environment in which they must actively engage in information management and problem solving while adapting to complex circumstances. In this challenging environment CIR consultants need to make critical decisions about what to advise clients that are impacted by a major cyber incident. Despite its relevance, CIR decision making is an understudied topic. The objective of this preliminary investigation is therefore to understand what decision-making strategies experienced CIR consultants use during challenging incidents and to offer suggestions for training and decision-aiding. A general understanding of operational decision making under pressure, uncertainty, and high stakes was established by reviewing the body of knowledge known as Naturalistic Decision Making (NDM). The general conclusion of NDM research is that experts usually make adequate decisions based on (fast) recognition of the situation and applying the most obvious (default) response pattern that has worked in similar situations in the past. In exceptional situations, however, this way of recognition-primed decision-making results in suboptimal decisions as experts are likely to miss conflicting cues once the situation is quickly recognized under pressure. Understanding the default response pattern and the rare occasions in which this response pattern could be ineffective is therefore key for improving and aiding cyber incident response decision making. Therefore, we interviewed six experienced CIR consultants and used the critical decision method (CDM) to learn how they made decisions under challenging conditions. The main conclusion is that the default response pattern for CIR consultants during cyber breaches is to reduce uncertainty as much as possible by gathering and investigating data and thus delay decision making about eradication until the investigation is completed. According to the respondents, this strategy usually works well and provides the most assurance that the threat actor can be completely removed from the network. However, the majority of respondents could recall at least one case in which this strategy (in hindsight) resulted in unnecessary theft of data or damage. Interestingly, this finding is strikingly different from other operational decision-making domains such as the military, police and fire service in which there is a general tendency to act rapidly instead of searching for more information. The main advice is that training and decision aiding of (novice) cyber incident responders should be aimed at the following: (a) make cyber incident responders aware of how recognition-primed decision making works; (b) discuss the default response strategy that typically works well in several scenarios; (c) explain the exception and how the exception can be recognized; (d) provide alternative response strategies that work better in exceptional situations.
Already for some decades lateral flow assays (LFAs) are ‘common use’ devices in our daily life. Also, for forensic use LFAs are developed, such as for the analysis of illicit drugs and DNA, but also for the detection of explosives and body fluid identification. Despite their advantages, including ease-of-use, LFAs are not yet frequently applied at a crime scene. This review describes (academic) developments of LFAs for forensic applications, focusing on biological and chemical applications, whereby the main advantages and disadvantages of LFAs for the different forensic applications are summarized. Additionally, a critical review is provided, discussing why LFAs are not frequently applied within the forensic field and highlighting the steps that are needed to bring LFAs to the forensic market.
Victim-offender contact has been studied extensively in prisons, but research on contact between victims and mentally disordered offenders in forensic mental health settings is lacking. Therefore, an exploratory study was conducted on contact between victims and offenders in four Dutch forensic psychiatric hospitals. These offenders have committed serious (sexually) violent offenses, for which they could not be held fully responsible due to severe psychopathology. During the mandatory treatment, it is possible for offenders and their victims to engage in contact with each other if both parties agree to this. To explore the conditions under which this contact is suitable, we interviewed 35 social workers about their experiences in 57 cases from four Dutch forensic psychiatric hospitals. Findings demonstrated that, according to the social workers, no type of offense or psychopathology were obvious exclusion criteria for victim-offender contact. Social workers described offenders' problem awareness, stable psychiatric condition, and ability to keep to agreements as important factors that enable victim-offender contact. Implications and suggestions for future research are provided.
