The role and ethics of professionals in business and economics have been questioned, especially after the financial crisis of 2008. Some suggest a reorientation using concepts such as craftsmanship. In this article, I will explore professional practices within the context of behavioural theory and business ethics. I suggest that scholars of behavioural theory need a strategy to deal with normative questions to meet their ambition of practical relevance. Evidence-based management (EBMgt), a recent behavioural approach, may assist business ethics scholars in understanding how professionals infer ‘evidence’ to make decisions. For a professional, ethical issues are an integral part of decision-making at critical moments. As reflective practitioners, they develop insights related to ethical concerns when collecting and assessing evidence within decision-making processes.
An important step in the design of an effective educational game is the formulation of the to-be-achieved learning goals. The learning goals help shape the content and the flow of the entire game, i.e. they provide the basis for choosing the game’s core (learning) mechanics. A mistake in the formulation of the learning goals or the resulting choice in game mechanics can have large consequences, as the game may not lead to the intended effects. At the moment, there are many different methods for determining the learning goals; they may be derived by a domain expert, based on large collections of real-life data, or, alternatively, not be based on anything in particular. Methods for determining the right game mechanics range from rigid taxonomies, loose brainstorming sessions, to, again, not any method in particular. We believe that for the field of educational game design to mature, there is a need for a more uniform approach to establishing the learning goals and translating them into relevant and effective game activities. This paper explores two existing, non-game design specific, methods to help determine learning goals and the subsequent core mechanics: the first is through a Cognitive Task Analysis (CTA), which can be used to analyse and formalize the problem and the knowledge, skills, attitudes that it is comprised of, and the second is through the Four Components Instructional Design (4C-ID), which can be used to determine how the task should be integrated into an educational learning environment. Our goal is to see whether these two methods provide the uniform approach we need. This paper gives an overview of our experiences with these methods and provides guidelines for other researchers on how these methods could be used in the educational game design process.
When engaging in social interaction, people rely on their ability to reason about unobservable mental content of others, which includes goals, intentions, and beliefs. This so-called theory of mind ability allows them to more easily understand, predict, and influence the behavior of others. People even use their theory of mind to reason about the theory of mind of others, which allows them to understand sentences like Alice believes that Bob does not know about the surprise party'. But while the use of higher orders of theory of mind is apparent in many social interactions, empirical evidence so far suggests that people do not use this ability spontaneously when playing strategic games, even when doing so would be highly beneficial. In this paper, we attempt to encourage participants to engage in higher-order theory of mind reasoning by letting them play a game against computational agents. Since previous research suggests that competitive games may encourage the use of theory of mind, we investigate a particular competitive game, the Mod game, which can be seen as a much larger variant of the well-known rock-paper-scissors game. By using a combination of computational agents and Bayesian model selection, we simultaneously determine to what extent people make use of higher-order theory of mind reasoning, as well as to what extent computational agents can encourage the use of higher-order theory of mind in their human opponents. Our results show that participants who play the Mod game against computational theory of mind agents adjust their level of theory of mind reasoning to that of their computer opponent. Earlier experiments with other strategic games show that participants only engage in low orders of theory of mind reasoning. Surprisingly, we find that participants who knowingly play against second- and third-order theory of mind agents apply up to fourth-order theory of mind themselves, and achieve higher scores as a result.
