The transition from adolescence to adulthood also has been described as a window of opportunity or vulnerability when developmental and contextual changes converge to support positive turnarounds and redirections (Masten, Long, Kuo, McCormick, & Desjardins, 2009; Masten, Obradović, & Burt, 2006). The transition years also are a criminological crossroads, as major changes in criminal careers often occur at these ages as well. For some who began their criminal careers during adolescence, offending continues and escalates; for others involvement in crime wanes; and yet others only begin serious involvement in crime at these ages. There are distinctive patterns of offending that emerge during the transition from adolescence to adulthood. One shows a rise of offending in adolescence and the persistence of high crime rates into adulthood; a second reflects the overall age-crime curve pattern of increasing offending in adolescence followed by decreases during the transition years; and the third group shows a late onset of offending relative to the age-crime curve. Developmental theories of offending ought to be able to explain these markedly different trajectories
Prior research on network attacks is predominantly technical, yet little is known about behavioral patterns of attackers inside computer systems. This study adopts a criminological perspective to examine these patterns, with a particular focus on data thieves targeting organizational networks. By conducting interviews with cybersecurity experts and applying crime script analysis, we developed a comprehensive script that describes the typical progression of attackers through organizational systems and networks in order to eventually steal data. This script integrates phases identified in previous academic literature and expert-defined phases that resemble phases from industry threat models. However, in contrast to prior cybercrime scripts and industry threat models, we did not only identify sequential phases, but also illustrate the circular nature of network attacks. This finding challenges traditional perceptions of crime as a linear process. In addition, our findings underscore the importance of considering both successful and failed attacks in cybercrime research to develop more effective cybersecurity strategies.
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Currently, promising new tools are under development that will enable crime scene investigators to analyze fingerprints or DNA-traces at the crime scene. While these technologies could help to find a perpetrator early in the investigation, they may also strengthen confirmation bias when an incorrect scenario directs the investigation this early. In this study, 40 experienced Crime scene investigators (CSIs) investigated a mock crime scene to study the influence of rapid identification technologies on the investigation. This initial study shows that receiving identification information during the investigation results in more accurate scenarios. CSIs in general are not as much reconstructing the event that took place, but rather have a “who done it routine.” Their focus is on finding perpetrator traces with the risk of missing important information at the start of the investigation. Furthermore, identification information was mostly integrated in their final scenarios when the results of the analysis matched their expectations. CSIs have the tendency to look for confirmation, but the technology has no influence on this tendency. CSIs should be made aware of the risks of this strategy as important offender information could be missed or innocent people could be wrongfully accused.
Ambtenaren openbare orde en veiligheid spelen een centrale rol in de zorg voor maatschappelijke veiligheid. Hun focus ligt van oudsher op de preventie van slachtofferschap van veelvoorkomende criminaliteit (zoals diefstal, vernielingen en vandalisme) en high impact crime (zoals woninginbraak, overvallen en straatroven) binnen hun verzorgingsgebied. Intussen heeft de digitalisering van de samenleving een ongeëvenaarde gelegenheid voor criminaliteit gecreëerd. De totale maatschappelijke schade van cybercrime werd voor 2018 op 10 miljard euro geschat (1% van BNP). Uit cijfers van het CBS blijkt dat tussen 2012 en 2018 het slachtofferschap van hacken zelfs hoger lag dan dat van fietsendiefstal. Nederlandse gemeenten hebben cybercrime in de afgelopen twee jaar dan ook breed als beleidsprioriteit omarmd. Maar in de vertaling van deze beleidsprioriteit naar concrete acties gaat het mis. Duidelijk is dat de ambtenaren openbare orde en veiligheid een taak voor zichzelf zien in de preventie van cybercrime, maar waar te beginnen? In dit project bundelen professionals uit twaalf gemeenten en vier regionale veiligheidsnetwerken hun slagkracht met onderzoekers van twee hogescholen en het NSCR voor de cyberweerbaarheid van de samenleving. De hoofdvraag van dit project luidt: Met welke interventies kunnen ambtenaren openbare orde en veiligheid de cyberweerbaarheid van burgers en bedrijven binnen hun gemeente vergroten? Middels actieonderzoek werken professionals van gemeenten en regio’s samen met onderzoekers aan het verbeteren van bestaande en het ontwikkelen van nieuwe interventies. Daarbij verscherpen zij hun beeld van de omvang en achtergronden van slachtofferschap van cybercrime. Ook onderzoeken zij achtergronden en verklaringen voor het risicobewustzijn en preventief gedrag onder doelgroepen. Deze inzichten worden in verschillende iteraties aangevuld met effectstudies, om tot een set beproefde interventies te komen waarmee de cyberweerbaarheid van burgers en bedrijven zal toenemen.
