In case of a major cyber incident, organizations usually rely on external providers of Cyber Incident Response (CIR) services. CIR consultants operate in a dynamic and constantly changing environment in which they must actively engage in information management and problem solving while adapting to complex circumstances. In this challenging environment CIR consultants need to make critical decisions about what to advise clients that are impacted by a major cyber incident. Despite its relevance, CIR decision making is an understudied topic. The objective of this preliminary investigation is therefore to understand what decision-making strategies experienced CIR consultants use during challenging incidents and to offer suggestions for training and decision-aiding. A general understanding of operational decision making under pressure, uncertainty, and high stakes was established by reviewing the body of knowledge known as Naturalistic Decision Making (NDM). The general conclusion of NDM research is that experts usually make adequate decisions based on (fast) recognition of the situation and applying the most obvious (default) response pattern that has worked in similar situations in the past. In exceptional situations, however, this way of recognition-primed decision-making results in suboptimal decisions as experts are likely to miss conflicting cues once the situation is quickly recognized under pressure. Understanding the default response pattern and the rare occasions in which this response pattern could be ineffective is therefore key for improving and aiding cyber incident response decision making. Therefore, we interviewed six experienced CIR consultants and used the critical decision method (CDM) to learn how they made decisions under challenging conditions. The main conclusion is that the default response pattern for CIR consultants during cyber breaches is to reduce uncertainty as much as possible by gathering and investigating data and thus delay decision making about eradication until the investigation is completed. According to the respondents, this strategy usually works well and provides the most assurance that the threat actor can be completely removed from the network. However, the majority of respondents could recall at least one case in which this strategy (in hindsight) resulted in unnecessary theft of data or damage. Interestingly, this finding is strikingly different from other operational decision-making domains such as the military, police and fire service in which there is a general tendency to act rapidly instead of searching for more information. The main advice is that training and decision aiding of (novice) cyber incident responders should be aimed at the following: (a) make cyber incident responders aware of how recognition-primed decision making works; (b) discuss the default response strategy that typically works well in several scenarios; (c) explain the exception and how the exception can be recognized; (d) provide alternative response strategies that work better in exceptional situations.
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Computer security incident response teams (CSIRTs) respond to a computer security incident when the need arises. Failure of these teams can have far-reaching effects for the economy and national security. CSIRTs often have to work on an ad hoc basis, in close cooperation with other teams, and in time constrained environments. It could be argued that under these working conditions CSIRTs would be likely to encounter problems. A needs assessment was done to see to which extent this argument holds true. We constructed an incident response needs model to assist in identifying areas that require improvement. We envisioned a model consisting of four assessment categories: Organization, Team, Individual and Instrumental. Central to this is the idea that both problems and needs can have an organizational, team, individual, or technical origin or a combination of these levels. To gather data we conducted a literature review. This resulted in a comprehensive list of challenges and needs that could hinder or improve, respectively, the performance of CSIRTs. Then, semi-structured in depth interviews were held with team coordinators and team members of five public and private sector Dutch CSIRTs to ground these findings in practice and to identify gaps between current and desired incident handling practices. This paper presents the findings of our needs assessment and ends with a discussion of potential solutions to problems with performance in incident response. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2017.02179 LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/rickvanderkleij1/
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Cybersecurity threat and incident managers in large organizations, especially in the financial sector, are confronted more and more with an increase in volume and complexity of threats and incidents. At the same time, these managers have to deal with many internal processes and criteria, in addition to requirements from external parties, such as regulators that pose an additional challenge to handling threats and incidents. Little research has been carried out to understand to what extent decision support can aid these professionals in managing threats and incidents. The purpose of this research was to develop decision support for cybersecurity threat and incident managers in the financial sector. To this end, we carried out a cognitive task analysis and the first two phases of a cognitive work analysis, based on two rounds of in-depth interviews with ten professionals from three financial institutions. Our results show that decision support should address the problem of balancing the bigger picture with details. That is, being able to simultaneously keep the broader operational context in mind as well as adequately investigating, containing and remediating a cyberattack. In close consultation with the three financial institutions involved, we developed a critical-thinking memory aid that follows typical incident response process steps, but adds big picture elements and critical thinking steps. This should make cybersecurity threat and incident managers more aware of the broader operational implications of threats and incidents while keeping a critical mindset. Although a summative evaluation was beyond the scope of the present research, we conducted iterative formative evaluations of the memory aid that show its potential.
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Although the prevalence of cybercrime has increased rapidly, most victims do not report these offenses to the police. This is the first study that compares associations between victim characteristics and crime reporting behavior for traditional crimes versus cybercrimes. Data from four waves of a Dutch cross-sectional population survey are used (N = 97,186 victims). Results show that cybercrimes are among the least reported types of crime. Moreover, the determinants of crime reporting differ between traditional crimes and cybercrimes, between different types of cybercrime (that is, identity theft, consumer fraud, hacking), and between reporting cybercrimes to the police and to other organizations. Implications for future research and practice are discussed. doi: https://doi.org/10.1177/1477370818773610 This article is honored with the European Society of Criminology (ESC) Award for the “Best Article of the Year 2019”. Dit artikel is bekroond met de European Society of Criminology (ESC) Award for the “Best Article of the Year 2019”.
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The Junior Adverse Drug Event Manager (J-ADEM) team is a multifaceted intervention focusing on real-life education for medical students that has been shown to assist healthcare professionals in managing and reporting suspected adverse drug reactions (ADRs) to the Netherlands Pharmacovigilance Centre Lareb. The aim of this study was to quantify and describe the ADRs reported by the J-ADEM team and to determine the clinical potential of this approach. The J-ADEM team consisted of medical students tasked with managing and reporting ADRs in hospitalized patients. All ADRs screened and reported by J-ADEM team were recorded anonymously, and categorized and analysed descriptively. From August 2018 through January 2020, 209 patients on two wards in an academic hospital were screened for ADR events. The J-ADEM team reported 101 ADRs. Although most ADRs (67%) were first identified by healthcare professionals and then reported by the J-ADEM team, the team also reported an additional 33 not previously identified serious ADRs. In 10% of all reported ADRs, the J-ADEM team helped optimize ADR treatment. The ADR reports were largely well-documented (78%), and ADRs were classified as type A (66%), had a moderate or severe severity (85%) and were predominantly avoidable reactions (69%). This study shows that medical students are able to screen patients for ADRs, can identify previously undetected ADRs and can help optimize ADR management. They significantly increased (by 300%) the number of ADR reports submitted, showing that the J-ADEM team can make a valuable clinical contribution to hospital care.
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Background: Advanced medical technologies (AMTs), such as respiratory support or suction devices, are increasingly used in home settings and incidents may well result in patient harm. Information about risks and incidents can contribute to improved patient safety, provided that those are reported and analysed systematically. Objectives: To identify the frequency of incidents when using AMTs in home settings, the effects on patient outcomes and the actions taken by nurses following identification of incidents. Methods: A cross-sectional study of 209 home care nurses in the Netherlands working with infusion therapy, parenteral nutrition or morphine pumps, combining data from a questionnaire and registration forms covering more than 13 000 patient contacts. Descriptive statistics were used. Results: We identified 140 incidents (57 adverse events; 83 near misses). The frequencies in relation to the number of patient contacts were 2.7% for infusion therapy, 1.3% for parenteral nutrition and 2.6% for morphine pumps. The main causes were identified as related to the product (43.6%), the organisation of care (27.9%), the nurse as a user (15.7%) and the environment (12.9%). 40% of all adverse events resulted in mild to severe harm to the patient. Incidents had been discussed in the team (70.7%), with the patient/informal caregiver(s) (50%), or other actions had been taken (40.5%). 15.5% of incidents had been formally reported according to the organisation's protocol. Conclusions: Most incidents are attributed to product failures. Although such events predominantly cause no harm, a significant proportion of patients do suffer some degree of harm. There is considerable underreporting of incidents with AMTs in home care. This study has identified a discrepancy in quality circles: learning takes place at the team level rather than at the organisational level.
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The aim of the study was to evaluate whether multiple sclerosis (MS) is associated with risk of cataract or glaucoma. We conducted a population-based cohort study utilizing the UK General Practice Research Database (1987–2009) linked to the national hospital registry of England (1997–2008). Incident MS patients (5576 cases) were identified and each was matched to six patients without MS (controls) by age, gender, and practice. Cox proportional hazard models were used to estimate hazard ratios (HRs) of incident cataract and glaucoma in MS. Time-dependent adjustments were made for age, history of diseases and drug use.
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In order to find out whether victims adequately recover from cybercrime incidents, it is important to gain insight into its effects and impact on users. However, as it stands now, there is not much literature on the impact of cybercrime. We address this gap by qualitatively examining the impact of two types of cybercrime, namely phishing and malware attacks targeting online banking customers. We used the coping approach as a framework to study how victims deal with the negative events they have experienced. In order to study the impact of cybercrime and how victims cope with it, 30 cybercrime victims were interviewed. We observed that, next to financial damage, victims described different forms of psychological and emotional effects. Victims also reported various kinds of secondary impacts, such as time loss and not being treated properly when handling the incident. In addition, the interview data provided insight into cognitive and behavioral change, which potentially offers opportunities for cybercrime prevention. Our study demonstrates that the level of impact varies among cybercrime victims, ranging from little or no impact to severe impact. In addition, while some victims were only affected for a few days, some were still feeling the effects. The effects and impact of these fraudulent schemes on victims should therefore not be underestimated. We conclude that the coping approach provides a useful framework to study the effects and impact of cybercrime victimization and how victims recover from it. The results of our study provide a steppingstone for future studies on this topic. https://www.linkedin.com/in/rutgerleukfeldt/
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Background Little is known about the nature and reactions to sexual abuse of children with intellectual disability (ID). The aim was to fill this gap. Method Official reports of sexual abuse of children with ID in state care were examined (N = 128) and compared with children without ID (N = 48). Results Clear signs of penetration or genital touching by male (adolescent) peers or (step/foster) fathers were found in most ID reports. Victims often received residential care and disclosed themselves. Type of perpetrator seemed to affect the nature and reaction to the abuse. Cases of children with and without ID seemed to differ in location and reports to police. Conclusions Screening of (foster)homes seems crucial. Residential facilities should find a balance between independence of children and protection. Care providers should be trained in addressing sexual issues and sexual education, accounting for different types of perpetrators (peers/adults). Uniform reporting guidelines are needed.
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In order to design effective Persuasive Technology (PT) interventions, it is essential that designers understand the multitude of factors that lead to behavioral change, rather than guessing at a solution or imitating successful techniques without understanding why. The few available PT design frameworks solely distinguish behavioral determinants on an individual (micro) level (e.g., motivation), whereas successfully persuading a user is a multifaceted and complex task depending also on factors on a meso (e.g., available resources) and macro (e.g., social support and praise) level. We developed an analysis grid that enables PT designers to acknowledge the multifaceted character of determinants leading to behavioral change and select appropriate PT channels and strategies, preventing the failure of PT design. This analysis grid was validated in a case study in which we designed a PT intervention aimed at reporting minor crime incidents among citizens.
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