Het onderzoek dat ten grondslag ligt aan dit artikel onderzoekt hoe de overheid markten reguleert voor (financiële) producten en diensten teneinde falen van de markt te voorkomen. Het behandelt specifiek EU Richtlijn 2014/57/EU betreffende strafrechtelijke sancties voor marktmisbruik en de implementatie daarvan in Nederland en opvolgend gebruik door het Openbaar Ministerie en Autoriteit Financiële Markten en hun Convenant ter voorkoming van ongeoorloofde samenloop van bestuurlijke en strafrechtelijke sancties. Het beantwoord de vraag of deze richtlijn de ontwikkeling van effectief reguleren van de financiële markt bevordert of remt. De slotsom ten aanzien van de implementatie van Richtlijn 2014/57/EU is – kort gezegd – dat “slechts” het aantal jaren gevangenisstraf voor handel met voorkennis en marktmisbruik van twee naar vier aangepast dient te worden. Het artikel concludeert tenslotte dat de huidige praktijk van het Convenant tussen OM en Autoriteit Financiële Markten kan blijven bestaan. De Autoriteit Financiële Markten kan haar inspanningen om haar toezicht verder in de geest van responsive regulation te verbeteren ongestoord door het OM voortzetten.
ENGLISH: A vast and growing body of research has shown that crime tends to run in families. However, previous studies focused only on traditional crimes and research on familial risk factors for cyber offending is very scarce. To address this gap in the literature, the present study examines the criminal behavior of the family members of a sample of cyber offenders prosecuted in the Netherlands. The sample consists of 979 cyber offenders prosecuted for computer trespassing between 2001 and 2018, and two matched groups of 979 traditional offenders and 979 non-offenders. Judicial information and kinship data from Dutch Statistics were used to measure criminal behavior among family members. Both traditional offenders and cyber offenders were found to be more likely to have criminal fathers, mothers, and siblings than non-offenders. Additional analyses, however, showed different patterns between cyber offenders who were only prosecuted for cyber offenses and those who also committed traditional crimes. While the former group of cyber offenders were similar to non-offenders in terms of family offending, the latter group of cyber offenders were more similar to traditional offenders. Overall, these results suggest that the traditional mechanisms of intergenerational transmission of crime can only partially explain cybercrime involvement. NEDERLANDS: Uit een groot en groeiend aantal onderzoeken blijkt dat criminaliteit vaak in families voorkomt. Eerdere studies richtten zich echter alleen op traditionele misdrijven en onderzoek naar familiaire risicofactoren voor cybercriminaliteit is zeer schaars. Om deze leemte in de literatuur op te vullen, onderzoekt deze studie het criminele gedrag van familieleden van een steekproef van cyberdelinquenten die in Nederland worden vervolgd. De steekproef bestaat uit 979 cyberdelinquenten die tussen 2001 en 2018 zijn vervolgd voor computervredebreuk, en twee gematchte groepen van 979 traditionele delinquenten en 979 niet-delinquenten. Justitiële informatie en verwantschapsgegevens van het Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek werden gebruikt om crimineel gedrag onder familieleden te meten. Zowel traditionele daders als cybercriminelen bleken vaker criminele vaders, moeders en broers en zussen te hebben dan niet-daders. Aanvullende analyses lieten echter verschillende patronen zien tussen cyberdelinquenten die alleen werden vervolgd voor cyberdelicten en degenen die ook traditionele delicten pleegden. Terwijl de eerste groep cyberdelinquenten vergelijkbaar was met niet-delinquenten wat betreft gezinsdelinquentie, leek de tweede groep cyberdelinquenten meer op traditionele delinquenten. In het algemeen suggereren deze resultaten dat de traditionele mechanismen van intergenerationele overdracht van criminaliteit de betrokkenheid bij cybercriminaliteit slechts gedeeltelijk kunnen verklaren.
This paper investigates the prospective application of arbitration by Transnational Private Regulation (TPR). It builds on the study of TPR developed by Fabrizio Cafaggi et al. TPR addresses the ever-increasing transfer of regulatory power from national to global levels, and from public to private regulators. TPR entails private regulatory co-operation be-yond the jurisdictional boundaries of States through voluntary standards. The regimes of TPR are built by a variety of actors, such as companies, NGOs, independent experts, and epistemic communities. Examples of TPR can be found in food safety, forestry management, trade, and derivatives, among other fields. More specifically, they concern private actors engaging in transnational coordination of standard setting such as the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) that was developed to foster responsible management of the world’s forests. There are four main characteristics of TPR: legitimacy, quality, effectiveness, and enforcement. I will describe those four characteristics in brief here. First, the legitimacy of TPR is built around consent through voluntary entry, participation, and exit of regulated entities. Important to this contribution is that the legitimacy of TPR goes beyond its legal dimension, measured by purely legal standards. Hence, the legitimacy of TPR is largely determined by standards developed by social and economic institutions relevant to specific TPR regimes. The role of those institutions in standard settings is higher in private TPR regimes than private-public TPR regimes, where some forms of compliance are mandatory. Second, the quality of TPR corresponds to the ex ante and ex post evaluation cycle of regulatory processes. It is also linked with the transparency of TPR. Third, the effectiveness of TPR is measured according to the extent to which the objectives of TPR (or selected TPR regimes) are met. And finally, enforcement of TPRis understood as ‘ensuring compliance with commitments’. Enforcement of TPR can take place through courts, administrative agencies, and private dispute resolution—including the arbitration at the core of this contribution. Cafaggi’s study identified rather selective use of arbitration in TPR, but also recommended changes to make arbitration law more adaptable to TPR. Furthermore, the study recommended that more specialized dispute resolution institutions are created to exclusively serve TPR. Against this background, I shift the main focus of analysis from TPR to arbitration. Whereas Cafaggi argued that arbitration may be suitable for TPR as a means of private enforcement, in this paper I go even further, arguing that arbitration as a means of informal, out-of-court dispute resolution is well suited to strengthen the normativity of TPR. This is so because private arbitration actors (including, inter alia, arbitrators and arbitral institutions) are already equipped with the tools necessary to facilitate cross-border TPR, which is done through informal standards and procedures with origins in the communitarian values and reputational mechanisms used by different communities before the development of modern States. The roots of most private justice regimes—including arbitration—are informed by communitarian values such as collaboration, participation, and personal trust. Those values, together with other core characteristics of arbitration correspond to all core characteristics of TPR, making both systems comparable and complementary. The analytical framework incorporated in this paper follows the four core characteristics of TPR. Hence, the paper is organized into five sections. The first section contains the introduction. In the second section, I analyze the legitimacy of arbitration vis-à-vis the legitimacy of TPR. In the third section, I investigate the accountability of arbitration as a means of quality signaling vis-à-vis TPR. In the fourth section, I focus on the remedies available to arbitrators in a view of TPR’s effectiveness. Finally, in the fifth section, I analyze enforcement through arbitration and its impact on the exclusiveness versus complementarity of TPR regimes. Conclusions follow, including recommendations for future research. Part of topic "The blurring distinction between public and private in international dispute resolution"
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