The paper presents a framework that through structured analysis of accident reports explores the differences between practice and academic literature as well amongst organizations regarding their views on human error. The framework is based on the hypothesis that the wording of accident reports reflects the safety thinking and models that have been applied during the investigation, and includes 10 aspects identified in the state-of-the-art literature. The framework was applied to 52 air accident reports published by the Dutch Safety Board (DSB) and 45 ones issued by the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) from 1999 to 2014. Frequency analysis and statistical tests showed that the presence of the aspects in the accident reports varied from 32.6% to 81.7%, and revealed differences between the ATSB and the DSB approaches to human error. However, in overall safety thinking have not changed over time, thus, suggesting that academic propositions might have not yet affected practice dramatically.
Reason’s typology of safety culture (i.e. Just, Informative, Learning, Flexible and Reporting cultures) is widely used in the industry and academia. Through literature review we developed a framework including 36 markers that reflect the operationalization of Reason’s sub-cultures and general organizational prerequisites. We used the framework to assess to what extent safety culture development guidelines of seven industry sectors (i.e. aviation, railway, oil and gas, nuclear, healthcare, defense and maritime) incorporate academic references, and are similar to each other. Gap analysis and statistics showed that the guidelines include 53–69 % of the safety culture markers, with significant differences across subcultures and industry sectors. The results suggested that there is a gap between the industry guidelines and literature, as well as variant approaches to safety culture across the industry. The framework suggested in the study might be used as reference for completing existing safety culture development plans and constructing safety culture assessment instruments.
A symbiotic relationship between human factors and safety scientists is needed to ensure the provision of holistic solutions for problems emerging in modern socio-technical systems. System Theoretic Accident Model and Processes (STAMP) tackles both interactions and individual failures of human and technological elements of systems. Human factors topics and indicative models, tools and methods were reviewed against the approach of STAMP. The results showed that STAMP engulfs many human factors subjects, is more descriptive than human factors models and tools, provides analytical power, and might be further improved by including more aspects of human factors. STAMP can serve in minimizing the gap between human factors and safety engineering sciences, which can collectively offer inclusive solutions to the industry.