Kahramanmaraş Earthquake Sequence of 6th of February is the deadliest earthquake that happened in Turkey in the era of instrumental seismology, claiming more than 55 thousand lives and leaving torn down cities and towns behind. More than 450 km long lateral strike-slip fault ruptured during these catastrophic earthquakes. As a result, more than 38 thousand buildings collapsed causing life losses. Considering that the large share of the Turkish building stock consists of RC buildings, the vulnerable RC building stock is the main responsible for this picture. Deficiencies of the Turkish RC building stock are well known since they manifested themselves several times in the past earthquakes. However, considering the improvements in the seismic codes and the seismic hazard maps achieved in the last two decades, the widespread collapse of buildings constructed after year 2000 was rather unexpected. Some of the observed structural damage patterns are similar to those observed also in the pre-2000 buildings in recent earthquakes, however, some other types of damages, such as out-of-plane bending and shear failures or shear-friction capacity failure of RC walls, brittle fracture and bond-slip failure of reinforcement, tension failure of beams and slabs are usually not witnessed. This paper presents a carefully selected set of examples comparing the pre-2000 and post-2000 building damages and collapses, also referring to a detailed summary and comparison of the code developments in Turkey.
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''On February 6th, 2023, two severe earthquakes struck southeastern Türkiye near the Syrian border. The first earthquake, Mw7.8, occurred at 04:17 local time in the East Anatolian Fault Zone near the city of Gaziantep. The second earthquake, Mw7.5, occurred approximately 9 h later at 13:24 local time near Elbistan County, in Kahramanmaraş province. These seismic events ruptured multiple segments of the East Anatolian Fault Zone (EAFZ), with rupture lengths exceeding 300 km, and deformation exceeding 5 m on both sides of the faults. In this study, we aim to analyze characteristics of the strong ground motion induced by the mainshocks, focusing on ground motion intensity measures such as the peak ground acceleration (PGA), the peak ground velocity (PGV), and the pseudo-acceleration response spectra (PSA). The first earthquake produced extremely high PGA values in both horizontal (> 2 g) and vertical (> 1 g) components. At near field distances, large PGVs are measured (> 180 cm/s) with more than 30 impulsive motions which may indicate source-related effects. Large spectral demands are also recorded for both earthquakes, partially underestimated by Ground Motion Models (GMMs), especially in the near-field. Specifically, we compare the PSA for horizontal directions with the design spectra provided by both the new and previous Turkish building codes. We also present building and ground damage observations that provide insights into the observed ground motions in the heavily damaged areas.''
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Collapses of school or dormitory buildings experienced in recent earthquakes raise the issue of safety as a major challenge for decision makers. A school building is ‘just another structure’ technically speaking, however, the consequences of a collapse in an earthquake could lead to social reactions in the complex aftermath of a seismic tremor more than any other type of structure may possibly cause. In this paper a school building that collapsed during 2011 Tabanli, Van Earthquake in eastern Turkey, is analysed in order to identify the possible reasons that led to collapse. Apart from the inherent deficiencies of RC buildings built in Turkey in the 80's and 90's, its structural design exhibits a strikingly high asymmetry. In the analyses conducted, much attention has been given to the direction of the earthquake load and its coincidence with the bi-axial structural response parameters. The failure of the structure to comply with the 1975 Code, in vigor at the time of construction, has also been evaluated with respect to the structure’s collapse. Among the parameters that controlled the collapse, the high plan asymmetry and the coincidence of the vulnerable directions with the dominant shaking direction were critical, as well as the underestimation of the seismic hazard and the lateral design force level, specified by the then Turkish Earthquake Code.
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I was somewhat surprized with the fog in Groningen upon my arrival. This is notthe fog that covers the beautiful landscapes of the northern Netherlands in theevening and in the early morning. No… It is the fog that obscures the real aspectsof the earthquake problem in the region and is crystallised in the phrase “Groningen earthquakes are different”, which I have encountered numerous times whenever I raised a question of the type “But why..?”. A sentence taken out of the quiver as the absolute technical argument which mysteriously overshadows the whole earthquake discussion.Q: Why do we not use Eurocode 8 for seismic design, instead of NPR?A: Because the Groningen earthquakes are different!Q: Why do we not monitor our structures like the rest of the world does?A: Because the Groningen earthquakes are different!Q: Why does NPR, the Dutch seismic guidelines, dictate some unusual rules?A: Because the Groningen earthquakes are different!Q: Why are the hazard levels incredibly high, even higher than most Europeanseismic countries?A: Because the Groningen earthquakes are different!and so it keeps going…This statement is very common, but on the contrary, I have not seen a single piece of research that proves it or even discusses it. In essence, it would be a difficult task to prove that the Groningen earthquakes are different. In any case it barricades a healthy technical discussion because most of the times the arguments converge to one single statement, independent of the content of the discussion. This is the reason why our first research activities were dedicated to study if the Groningen earthquakes are really different. Up until today, we have not found any major differences between the Groningen induced seismicity events and natural seismic events with similar conditions (magnitude, distance, depth, soil etc…) that would affect the structures significantly in a different way.Since my arrival in Groningen, I have been amazed to learn how differently theearthquake issue has been treated in this part of the world. There will always bedifferences among different cultures, that is understandable. I have been exposed to several earthquake engineers from different countries, and I can expect a natural variation in opinions, approaches and definitions. But the feeling in Groningen is different. I soon realized that, due to several factors, a parallel path, which I call “an augmented reality” below, was created. What I mean by an augmented reality is a view of the real-world, whose elements are augmented and modified. In our example, I refer to the engineering concepts used for solving the earthquake problem, but in an augmented and modified way. This augmented reality is covered in the fog I described above. The whole thing is made so complicated that one is often tempted to rewind the tape to the hot August days of 2012, right after the Huizinge Earthquake, and replay it to today but this time by making the correct steps. We would wake up to a different Groningen today. I was instructed to keep the text as well as the inauguration speech as simple aspossible, and preferably, as non-technical as it goes. I thus listed the most common myths and fallacies I have faced since I arrived in Groningen. In this book and in the presentation, I may seem to take a critical view. This is because I try to tell a different part of the story, without repeating things that have already been said several times before. I think this is the very reason why my research group would like to make an effort in helping to solve the problem by providing different views. This book is one of such efforts.The quote given at the beginning of this book reads “How quick are we to learn: that is, to imitate what others have done or thought before. And how slow are we to understand: that is, to see the deeper connections.” is from Frits Zernike, the Nobel winning professor from the University of Groningen, who gave his name to the campus I work at. Applying this quotation to our problem would mean that we should learn from the seismic countries by imitating them, by using the existing state-of-the-art earthquake engineering knowledge, and by forgetting the dogma of “the Groningen earthquakes are different” at least for a while. We should then pass to the next level of looking deeperinto the Groningen earthquake problem for a better understanding, and alsodiscover the potential differences.
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Citizen participation in local renewable energy projects is often promoted as many suppose it to be a panacea for the difficulties that are involved in the energy transition process. Quite evidently, it is not; there is a wide variety of visions, ideologies and interests related to an ‘energy transition’. Such a variety is actually a precondition for a stakeholder participation process, as stakeholder participation only makes sense if there is ‘something at stake’. Conflicting viewpoints, interests and debates are the essence of participation. The success of stakeholder participation implies that these differences are acknowledged, and discussed, and that this has created mutual understanding among stakeholders. It does not necessarily create ‘acceptance’. Renewable energy projects often give rise to local conflict. The successful implementation of local renewable energy systems depends on the support of the local social fabric. While at one hand decisions to construct wind turbines in specific regions trigger local resistance, the opposite also occurs! Solar parks sometimes create a similar variation: Various communities try to prevent the construction of solar parks in their vicinity, while other communities proudly present their parks. Altogether, local renewable energy initiatives create a rather chaotic picture, if regarded from the perspective of government planning. However, if we regard the successes, it appears the top down initiatives are most successful in areas with a weak social fabric, like industrial areas, or rather recently reclaimed land. Deeply rooted communities, virtually only have successful renewable energy projects that are more or less bottom up initiatives. This paper will first sketch why participation is important, and present a categorisation of processes and procedures that could be applied. It also sketches a number of myths and paradoxes that might occur in participation processes. ‘Compensating’ individuals and/or communities to accept wind turbines or solar parks is not sufficient to gain ‘acceptance’. A basic feature of many debates on local renewable energy projects is about ‘fairness’. The implication is that decision-making is neither on pros and cons of various renewable energy technologies as such, nor on what citizens are obliged to accept, but on a fair distribution of costs and benefits. Such discussions on fairness cannot be short cut by referring to legal rules, scientific evidence, or to standard financial compensations. History plays a role as old feelings of being disadvantaged, both at individual and at group level, might re-emerge in such debates. The paper will provide an overview of various local controversies on renewable energy initiatives in the Netherlands. It will argue that an open citizen participation process can be organized to work towards fair decisions, and that citizens should not be addressed as greedy subjects, trying to optimise their own private interests, but as responsible persons.
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