This article attempts to explore the main impulses that might have led to the destruction of Buddha statues by Taliban in the Bamiyan Valley of Afghanistan. Drawing on existing literature, and anecdotal evidence, this article suggests that the main impulses that have led to destruction are rather linked to the overall political context of that time (i.e., political iconoclasm) rather than to pure Islamic iconoclasm or an explicit condition of disharmony in heritage (i.e., dissonant heritage). First, the Taliban did not consider the statues as "their" cultural heritage. The act of destruction, therefore, cannot be subscribed to the Afghan cultural dynamics but rather to the political-religious ideology imported by Taliban from outside of the country. Secondly, it seemed that Mullah Omar was viewing the statues as a revenue source at the beginning and as a political bargain chip at the end. In both circumstances, religion seems not to have played the main role. Lastly, the destruction seems a political iconoclasm-that is, a political exploitation, if not a direct political act. The Taliban and especially their external allies were very well aware of the consequences of the act of destruction. It seems implausible to suggest that there were no religion and/or culture in play when ordering the destruction of the statues. The latter is the least what this article aims for. However, to conclude that the destruction was solely triggered by theological and cultural factors might also be improbable. The author does not, in any way, attempt to rationalize the act of destruction, let alone justify the barbaric act.
Background: Optimizing transitional care by practicing family-centered care might reduce unplanned events for patients who undergo major abdominal cancer surgery. However, it remains unknown whether involving family caregivers in patients’ healthcare also has negative consequences for patient safety. This study assessed the safety of family involvement in patients’ healthcare by examining the cause of unplanned events in patients who participated in a family involvement program (FIP) after major abdominal cancer surgery. Methods: This is a secondary analysis focusing on the intervention group of a prospective cohort study conducted in the Netherlands. Data were collected from April 2019 to May 2022. Participants in the intervention group were patients who engaged in a FIP. Unplanned events were analyzed, and root causes were identified using the medical version of a prevention- and recovery-information system for monitoring and analysis (PRISMA) that analyses unintended events in healthcare. Unplanned events were compared between patients who received care from family caregivers and patients who received professional at-home care after discharge. A Mann-Whitney U test was used to analyze data. Results: Of the 152 FIP participants, 68 experienced an unplanned event and were included. 112 unplanned events occurred with 145 root causes since some unplanned events had several root causes. Most root causes of unplanned events were patient-related factors (n = 109, 75%), such as patient characteristics and disease-related factors. No root causes due to inadequate healthcare from the family caregiver were identified. Unplanned events did not differ statistically (interquartile range 1–2) (p = 0.35) between patients who received care from trained family caregivers and those who received professional at-home care after discharge. Conclusion: Based on the insights from the root-cause analysis in this prospective multicenter study, it appears that unplanned emergency room visits and hospital readmissions are not related to the active involvement of family caregivers in surgical follow-up care. Moreover, surgical follow-up care by trained family caregivers during hospitalization was not associated with increased rates of unplanned adverse events. Hence, the concept of active family involvement by proficiently trained family caregivers in postoperative care appears safe and feasible for patients undergoing major abdominal surgery.
Objectives: In patients with burns an early accurate diagnosis of burn depth is essential to determine optimal treatment. The combination of Laser Doppler imaging (LDI) and clinical assessment leads to an accurate estimate of burn depth. However, the actual effects of the introduction of LDI on therapeutic decisions, clinical outcomes and costs are unknown. The aim of our study was to analyse the effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of LDI in burn care. The effects of LDI on decision-making, clinical outcomes, costs, and cost-effectiveness were assessed. Methods: A randomised controlled trial was conducted in all three Dutch burn centres, including subsequent patients with burns of indeterminate depth. In the standard care (SC) group, burn depth and treatment choices were based on clinical assessment only, in the other group (LDI) clinical assessment and LDI results were combined. Primary outcome was the effect of the introduction of LDI on wound healing time. The economic evaluation was performed from a societal perspective with a bottom up approach, following the micro-costing method. Results: Mean time to wound healing from randomisation was 14.3 days in the LDI group and 15.5 days in the SC group (p= 0.258). In the subgroup of clinical patients requiring surgery earlier decision for surgery and a shorter wound healing time were observed in the LDI group (16.0 versus 19.9 days, p= 0.029). Mean total costs per patient were € 18 549 versus € 18 896 (p= 0.837). Conclusions: LDI proved to provide guidance for therapeutic decisions with a significantly shorter wound healing time in the subgroup of clinical patients requiring surgery. When time to surgery can be reduced by 2.4 days, similar to the time to decision for surgery in our study, cost savings of € 794 per scanned patient can be achieved.
