At the end of the 1940s and the early 1950s, the question whether or not to rearm West Germany was a fiercely and hotly debated topic in Europe. The Americans suggested doing this by integrating the Federal Republic in NATO. However, many Europeans feared the resurgence of German militarism. Nowhere was this more true than in France. Therefore, the French Foreign Minister René Pleven launched the so-called Pleven Plan, designed to allow West German units to be established, but only in small units. That way, Europe could profit from West Germany’s manpower, without the country becoming a military threat. Discussions on the European Defence Community were tough, but in the end was signed by the six Founding Fathers. The Dutch did so reluctantly, especially because the Americans were left out, favouring security arrangements in NATO and rearming and incorporating West Germany in the Western alliance. To the Netherlands, it was essential to incorporate the British and especially the Americans in the Western defense; the Dutch always favoured an Atlantic alliance, opposing too much supranationality in the European integration project. The Federal Republic of Germany on the other hand, saw it as an opportunity to regain sovereignty. In the end, the French National Assembly did not ratify the EDC-Treaty, opening the way to rearming West Germany and making it a full member of NATO. https://www.ceeol.com/search/article-detail?id=735130 LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/martijn-lak-71793013/
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This critical, literature-review based research project, inspired by the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war, examines the limitations and possibilities of restorative justice in a time of war. Any armed conflict creates and amplifies the need for extreme militarisation and securitisation, accompanied by belligerent rhetoric. Thus, for restorative justice scholars and practitioners, the outbreak of war challenges the applicability of restorative justice values and practices, as bipolar interpretations of events, conflicts, and human suffering displace more balanced views. The purpose of our research is to critically discuss the applicability of restorative justice in times of war and in the context of the Russo-Ukrainian War in particular. Our motivation to focus on this specific war and to examine the (im)possibilities of restorative justice from Eurocentric perspective stems from three observations: (1) In the last 20 years restorative justice was continuously promoted in Europe as a new “culture” of justice; (2) The Russo-Ukrainian War currently takes place on the European continent and impacts the European security architecture more than that of other world regions; (3) This war has a particular meaning to the world (e.g., a violent clash between the (former) Cold War superpowers, an element of surprise, the shattered myth of overwhelming Russian military might, the nuclear threat coupled with a global energy crisis etc.).
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The world is changing in many ways. Digital developments follow each other in quick succession and have an impact on many existing structures. The future may be uncertain, but we can still learn from what has happened in the past. We usually know what we don’t want, but few of us know yet what we do want. Still, this is something we can only discover for ourselves, I think. Who are we? To what extent are we individuals and to what extent are we part of a collective? Remarkably, in these questions we can also find parallels with the Middle Ages.
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During an interview at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service one student questioned Prime Minister Rutte about an official apology for slavery. The Dutch Prime Minister assured that each island-nation to whom the Kingdom apologized “has full power to decide to leave the Kingdom. They are not colonized. They are independent.” Rutte described the current role of The Netherlands as that of a “gateway” to bring their products to Europe. The emphasis on trade relationship smacks of neo-colonial interests. Rutte’s portrayal of The Netherlands acting as the “in” to the European market for the former colonies is far from the recovery that one would expect for the descendants of the enslaved. In fact, the Slavery Past Dialogue made a number of recommendations to the Dutch Kingdom, including “active prevention of discrimination and institutional racism throughout society” and “the establishment of a Kingdom Fund […] for structural and sustainable financing of recovery measures.” The Dutch Prime Minister’s comments belie a singular focus on trade with the Caribbean nations rather than a holistic approach, looking at non-pecuniary interests involving the well-being of the descendants and the societies in which they live today. The “republicanization” serves as a backdrop to the years-long journey during which the Dutch government (and the Dutch crown) seemingly dragged their feet, refusing to issue a formal apology for the trade of Africans by the Dutch West Indies corporation. That much-solicited apology was finally issued in December 2022, despite warnings that any gesture that excluded reparations would not be favorably received by the Dutch Caribbean nations.
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In maart 2011 dreigde Muammer Gaddafi van Libya duizenden onschuldige burgers van de stad Benghazi uit hun huizen te halen om hen te vermoorden. De Veiligheidsraad van de Verenigde Naties verwees de situatie door naar het Internationaal Strafhof in Den Haag, dwong een no-flyzone af en gaf de NAVO een mandaat om burgers te beschermen with all necessary means, met de uitzondering van grondtroepen. Deze operatie was snel, robuust en effectief. Het principe van The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) -de verantwoordelijkheid van de internationale gemeenschap om genocide, misdaden tegen de menselijkheid, etnische zuivering en oorlogsmisdaden te voorkomen en te stoppen- werd voor het eerst volledig toegepast. Is R2P daarmee een norm geworden? Dit onderzoek plaatst de casus Libië in het model van de "Norm Life Cycle" (de levenscyclus van een norm) van de Constructivistische theoretici Finnemore en Sikkink (1998). Libië toont aan dat R2P nu een tipping point (omslagpunt) heeft bereikt, en zich van de fase norm emergence (opkomende norm) naar de fase norm cascade heeft verplaatst. Er is echter een spanning ontstaan: de terughoudendheid van de Veiligheidsraad om R2P toe te passen in Syrië (2012) wijst de andere kant uit. Er is dus nog een lange weg te gaan, voordat R2P als een internalised norm (vanzelfsprekende norm) kan worden beschouwd. ABSTRACT In March 2011, Muammar Gaddafi of Libya threatened to pull thousands of civilian protesters in the city of Benghazi out of their homes and kill them. The Security Council of the United Nations referred the crisis to the International Criminal Court, imposed a no-fly zone and provided NATO with a mandate to protect civilians by all necessary means, with the exception of ground troops. This operation was fast, robust and effective. It also marked the first time that the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) principle was fully implemented, being the responsibility of the international community to prevent and respond to genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes if the state in question is not able or not willing to protect its citizens itself. Has R2P become a new norm? This study situates the case of Libya in the 'Norm Life Cycle' model of Constructivist theorists Finnemore and Sikkink (1998). It suggests that R2P has reached a tipping point and has moved from the stage of norm emergence to the stage of norm cascade. However, a certain tension still exists: the reluctance of the Security Council to implement R2P again in the crisis in Syria (2012)points in the opposite direction. This suggests there is still a long way to go before R2P becomes an internalised norm in the international community.
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De African Digital Rights Network (ADRN) heeft een nieuw rapport gepubliceerd waarin de toevoer en verspreiding van digitale surveillance technologie in Afrika in kaart is gebracht. Onderzoeker Anand Sheombar van het lectoraat Procesinnovatie & Informatiesystemen is betrokken bij het ADRN-collectief en heeft samen met de Engelse journalist Sebastian Klovig Skelton, door middel van desk research de aanvoerlijnen vanuit Westerse en Noordelijke landen geanalyseerd. De bevindingen zijn te lezen in dit Supply-side report hoofdstuk van het rapport. APA-bronvermelding: Klovig Skelton, S., & Sheombar, A. (2023). Mapping the supply of surveillance technologies to Africa Supply-side report. In T. Roberts (Ed.), Mapping the Supply of Surveillance Technologies to Africa: Case Studies from Nigeria, Ghana, Morocco, Malawi, and Zambia (pp. 136-167). Brighton, UK: Institute of Development Studies.
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tract Micro wind turbines can be structurally integrated on top of the solid base of noise barriers near highways. A number of performance factors were assessed with holistic experiments in wind tunnel and in the field. The wind turbines underperformed when exposed in yawed flow conditions. The theoretical cosθ theories for yaw misalignment did not always predict power correctly. Inverter losses turned out to be crucial especially in standby mode. Combination of standby losses with yawed flow losses and low wind speed regime may even result in a net power consuming turbine. The micro wind turbine control system for maintaining optimal power production underperformed in the field when comparing tip speed ratios and performance coefficients with the values recorded in the wind tunnel. The turbine was idling between 20%–30% of time as it was assessed for sites with annual average wind speeds of three to five meters per second without any power production. Finally, the field test analysis showed that inadequate yaw response could potentially lead to 18% of the losses, the inverter related losses to 8%, and control related losses to 33%. The totalized loss led to a 48% efficiency drop when compared with the ideal power production measured before the inverter. Micro wind turbine’s performance has room for optimization for application in turbulent wind conditions on top of noise barriers. https://doi.org/10.3390/en14051288
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While there is extensive research on how Russian interference – in particular Russian disinformation operation – has played out in different European countries, indications of Russian interference directly targeting EU, its institutions or policies received little attention. This paper argues why there is good reason to assume that the EU, its institutions and its policies are an ideal a target for authoritarian regimes to exploit. It then explores in what ways, if any, Russian disinformation campaigning targeted EU institutions and their policies during the political and electoral campaigns leading up to the European Parliament (EP) elections of May 2019. In this context disinformation campaigning in terms of both network flows and contents (‘narratives’) have been examined, on the basis of a review of various reports identifying Russian interference and disinformation and of analyses of overall disinformation flows in Europe and the use of a database monitoring occurrences of disinformation.
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De eerste uitgave van deze publicatie is in 1991 samengesteld onder auspiciën van de werkgroep "Kwaliteitsborgingsaspecten bij de vervaardiging van gelaste constructie" ressorterend onder de stuurgroep van het NIL Collectieve Onderzoeksproject "Lassen in de Ketel- en Apparatenbouw". In 2009 is deze publicatie aangepast aan de huidige stand der techniek. De inhoud van deze publicatie gaat in op de verschillende normen ten aanzien van kwaliteitsborging en de warmtehuishouding bij het lassen. Tevens wordt getracht informatie te verschaffen met betrekking tot het hoe en waarom van de "variabelen" die staan vermeld op de lasmethodebeschrijving. Dit laatst genoemde document zal in belangrijkheid gaan toenemen als instrument bij een verantwoord kwaliteitsbeleid. Bij gelaste constructies wordt uitgegaan van een minimum wanddikte van 3 mm.
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From the traditional and pragmatic perspective on European cooperation shared by the Dutch political establishment, the French initiative for the Conference on the Future of Europe (CoFoE) was initially met with scepticism. Yet, during the experiment, the Dutch government and parliament translated their initial reluctance into assertive involvement. Rapporteurs from the bicameral parliament of the Netherlands became actively involved in CoFoE. They used it as an opportunity structure to pursue their political interests, which came down to watering down too-ambitious text proposals and stressing that the active participation of the citizens should be taken seriously. This chapter shows how both Houses used a wide range of parliamentary instruments – rapporteurs, delegations, plenary debates, committee hearings, questions, and a parliamentary citizens’ consultation – to debate, scrutinise and influence the CoFoE. Representatives and staff actively engaged in inter-parliamentary information exchange. In preparation for the plenaries, a sense of ‘esprit de corps’ developed between Dutch government representatives, members of parliament (MPs), Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), and supporting staff. This resulted in a remarkably coherent all-Dutch positioning up until the closure of the Conference and shared disappointment on the lack of a follow-up.
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