Full text via link One of the most important drivers of change in the health care sector is the desire of elderly people to age in place. The growing use of internet applications and communication technology together with innovations in buildings have created new commercial opportunities to cater the demands of elderly to grow old in their home environment. Many of these opportunities are facilitated by institutional changes like deregulation and privatization, and benefit from globalization, for example trough stronger incentives for innovation and domestic implementation of ideas that arise in foreign markets
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This paper investigates the prospective application of arbitration by Transnational Private Regulation (TPR). It builds on the study of TPR developed by Fabrizio Cafaggi et al. TPR addresses the ever-increasing transfer of regulatory power from national to global levels, and from public to private regulators. TPR entails private regulatory co-operation be-yond the jurisdictional boundaries of States through voluntary standards. The regimes of TPR are built by a variety of actors, such as companies, NGOs, independent experts, and epistemic communities. Examples of TPR can be found in food safety, forestry management, trade, and derivatives, among other fields. More specifically, they concern private actors engaging in transnational coordination of standard setting such as the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) that was developed to foster responsible management of the world’s forests. There are four main characteristics of TPR: legitimacy, quality, effectiveness, and enforcement. I will describe those four characteristics in brief here. First, the legitimacy of TPR is built around consent through voluntary entry, participation, and exit of regulated entities. Important to this contribution is that the legitimacy of TPR goes beyond its legal dimension, measured by purely legal standards. Hence, the legitimacy of TPR is largely determined by standards developed by social and economic institutions relevant to specific TPR regimes. The role of those institutions in standard settings is higher in private TPR regimes than private-public TPR regimes, where some forms of compliance are mandatory. Second, the quality of TPR corresponds to the ex ante and ex post evaluation cycle of regulatory processes. It is also linked with the transparency of TPR. Third, the effectiveness of TPR is measured according to the extent to which the objectives of TPR (or selected TPR regimes) are met. And finally, enforcement of TPRis understood as ‘ensuring compliance with commitments’. Enforcement of TPR can take place through courts, administrative agencies, and private dispute resolution—including the arbitration at the core of this contribution. Cafaggi’s study identified rather selective use of arbitration in TPR, but also recommended changes to make arbitration law more adaptable to TPR. Furthermore, the study recommended that more specialized dispute resolution institutions are created to exclusively serve TPR. Against this background, I shift the main focus of analysis from TPR to arbitration. Whereas Cafaggi argued that arbitration may be suitable for TPR as a means of private enforcement, in this paper I go even further, arguing that arbitration as a means of informal, out-of-court dispute resolution is well suited to strengthen the normativity of TPR. This is so because private arbitration actors (including, inter alia, arbitrators and arbitral institutions) are already equipped with the tools necessary to facilitate cross-border TPR, which is done through informal standards and procedures with origins in the communitarian values and reputational mechanisms used by different communities before the development of modern States. The roots of most private justice regimes—including arbitration—are informed by communitarian values such as collaboration, participation, and personal trust. Those values, together with other core characteristics of arbitration correspond to all core characteristics of TPR, making both systems comparable and complementary. The analytical framework incorporated in this paper follows the four core characteristics of TPR. Hence, the paper is organized into five sections. The first section contains the introduction. In the second section, I analyze the legitimacy of arbitration vis-à-vis the legitimacy of TPR. In the third section, I investigate the accountability of arbitration as a means of quality signaling vis-à-vis TPR. In the fourth section, I focus on the remedies available to arbitrators in a view of TPR’s effectiveness. Finally, in the fifth section, I analyze enforcement through arbitration and its impact on the exclusiveness versus complementarity of TPR regimes. Conclusions follow, including recommendations for future research. Part of topic "The blurring distinction between public and private in international dispute resolution"
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Maatschappelijke uitdagingen In toenemende mate vertrouwen we een deel van ethische besluitvorming aan smart-technology toe. Technologie heeft vaker dan ooit een ethische lading. Dit kan soms verregaande consequenties hebben voor consumenten, burgers of organisaties. Hoe zeker moet een algoritme zijn van haar zaak om een burger van fraude te beschuldigen? Hoeveel risico mag een chat-bot die financieel advies geeft een klant laten lopen? Wie mag bepalen hoe een algoritme op een sociaal media platform omgaat met desinformatie? Dergelijke vragen leiden tot belangrijke uitdagingen op het gebied van morele autoriteit, ethische besluitvorming, en morele strategievorming. Strategievorming in snel veranderend speelveld In zijn rede zal Bart pleiten om niet zozeer dé oplossing bij ethisch technologische vraagstukken te vinden, maar vooral een manier te zoeken om op een bestendige manier om te gaan met een snel veranderend speelveld. In veel gevallen lijken oplossingen in zowel de private als publieke sector voor techno-ethische vraagstukken korte-termijn gericht. En zijn het vaak maatregelen die snel en vooral zichtbaar een negatief effect van technologie proberen in te dammen. In zijn lectorale rede zal Bart ingaan op hoe belangrijk het erkennen en herkennen van ethische vraagstukken bij het programmeren van nieuwe technologie is. Maar ook hoe men de menselijke maat kan vangen én gebruiken als input in het ontwerp van nieuwe technologie. Er is volgens hem vooral een bestendige strategie nodig.
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