De term criminele inmenging is reeds onderdeel van het maatschappelijk en criminologisch discours, maar binnen de academische literatuur niet gedefinieerd en geconceptualiseerd. Bij criminele inmenging maken criminele organisaties gebruik van bonafide bedrijven voor de facilitering van criminele bedrijfsprocessen. We introduceren een definitie op basis van empirisch onderzoek en onderscheiden hierbinnen drie vormen hoe bonafide bedrijven als facilitator kunnen optreden. Dit schijnt zowel licht op de vehikelfunctie van ondernemingen als op manieren waarop criminele organisaties die vehikelfunctie aanwenden. Door te illustreren hoe verweving plaatsvindt, hopen we handvatten te bieden om ongewenste verwevenheid te voorkomen.English: Summary:While not a new phenomenon, research on criminal intrusion in (small) businesses is often focussed on the perspective of the criminal, reconstructed after a crime has taken place. In this article we add the perspective of the entrepreneur from the moment he/she is confronted with early signs of possible criminal intrusion. Firstly, we introduce a definition of criminal intrusion, based on 18 cases of (attempted) criminal intrusion in small business: The process by which an actor of a criminal organization turns to and associates with a bona fide corporation, making that corporation a facilitator of criminal business process without its deliberate intent. Secondly, we distinguish three (not necessarily limitative) main practices on how this facilitation of crime takes place within the scope of criminal intrusion in bona fide businesses: 1) a transactional model, which focusses on an exchange of products or services between criminal organizations and businesses; 2) a parasitic relationship where operational processes are abused for criminal gains, and 3) infiltration, in which targeted infiltration, corruption of employees or ‘criminal investment’ takes place to gain a foothold within the business. By introducing a theoretical framework for the categorisation of cases, we hope to further develop the possibilities of (criminological) analysis of criminal intrusion, while simultaneously provide small business owners insights to strengthen their resilience against organised crime.
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This article examines the network structure, criminal cooperation, and external interactions of cybercriminal networks. Its contribution is empirical and inductive. The core of this study involved carrying out 10 case analyses on closed cybercrime investigations – all with financial motivations on the part of the offenders - in the UK and beyond. Each analysis involved investigator interview and access to unpublished law enforcement files. The comparison of these cases resulted in a wide range of findings on these cybercriminal networks, including: a common division between the scam/attack components and the money components; the presence of offline/local elements; a broad, and sometimes blurred, spectrum of cybercriminal behaviour and organisation. An overarching theme across the cases that we observe is that cybercriminal business models are relatively stable.
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In deze studie onderzoeken we de ontwikkelingstrajecten van hackers, op basis van zelfgerapporteerde web defacements. Tijdens een web defacement wordt ongewenst de inhoud van een website aangepast. In totaal hebben we 50.330 defacements van websites met een Nederlandse extensie (.nl websites) geanalyseerd, die door 3640 verschillende defacers zijn uitgevoerd tussen januari 2010 en maart 2017. Met behulp van trajectory-modellen kunnen er zes groepen defacers worden onderscheiden in de analyses: twee groepen chronische daders en vier groepen daders die slechts gedurende een korte periode defacements uitvoerden. Deze groepen verschillen ook van elkaar in hun motivaties en modus operandi. De groep hoogfrequente chronische daders bestaat uit minder dan 2% van de daders, maar is verantwoordelijk voor meer dan de helft van alle defacements. Het zou dan ook het meest efficiënt zijn wanneer toekomstige interventies zich met name richten op deze kleine groep chronische daders. Voor vervolgonderzoek zou het interessant zijn om de inhoudelijke boodschap van de web defacements te onderzoeken.
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Uitspraak van het Europees Hof voor de Rechten van de Mens, met noot.
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By analysing intelligence-gathering reform legislation this article discusses access to justice for communications interception by the intelligence and security services. In the aftermath of the Snowden revelations, sophisticated oversight systems for bulk communications surveillance are being established across the globe. In the Netherlands prior judicial consent and a binding complaint procedure have been established. However, although checks and balances for targeted communications interference have been created, accountability mechanisms are less equipped to effectively remedy indiscriminate interference. Therefore, within the context of mass communications surveillance programs, access to justice for complainants remains a contentious issue.
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In May 2018, the new Dutch Intelligence and Security Services Act 2017 (Wet op de Inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten, Wiv) will enter into force. It replaces the previous 2002 Act and incorporates many reforms to the information gathering powers of the two intelligence and security services as well as to the accountability and oversight mechanisms. Due to the technologyneutral approach, both the civil and the military intelligence services are now authorized to, for example, intercept communications in bulk, hack third parties, decrypt files, store DNA or use any other future innovative technology. Also, the national security legislation extends the possibilities for the indiscriminate collection of data, and for the processing, storage and analysis thereof. The process leading to the law includes substantial criticism from the various stakeholders involved. Upon publication of this report, an official consultative referendum is being organized on the new act. The aim of this policy brief is to provide an international audience with a comprehensive overview of the most relevant aspects of the act and its context. In addition, there is considerable focus on the checks and balances as well as the bottlenecks of the Dutch intelligence gathering reform. The selection of topics is based on the core issues addressed during the parliamentary debate and on the authors’ insights.
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Longitudinal criminological studies greatly improved our understanding of the longitudinal patterns of criminality. These studies, however, focused almost exclusively on traditional types of offending and it is therefore unclear whether results are generalizable to online types of offending. This study attempted to identify the developmental trajectories of active hackers who perform web defacements. The data for this study consisted of 2,745,311 attacks performed by 66,553 hackers and reported to Zone-H between January 2010 and March 2017. Semi-parametric group-based trajectory models were used to distinguish six different groups of hackers based on the timing and frequency of their defacements. The results demonstrated some common relationships to traditional types of crime, as a small population of defacers accounted for the majority of defacements against websites. Additionally, the methods and targeting practices of defacers differed based on the frequency with which they performed defacements generally.
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People tend to disclose personal identifiable information (PII) that could be used by cybercriminals against them. Often, persuasion techniques are used by cybercriminals to trick people to disclose PII. This research investigates whether people can be made less susceptible to persuasion by reciprocation (i.e., making people feel obligated to return a favour) and authority, particularly in regard to whether information security knowledge and positive affect moderate the relation between susceptibility to persuasion and disclosing PII. Data are used from a population-based survey experiment that measured the actual disclosure of PII in an experimental setting (N = 2426). The results demonstrate a persuasion–disclosure link, indicating that people disclose more PII when persuaded by reciprocation, but not by authority. Knowledge of information security was also found to relate to disclosure. People disclosed less PII when they possessed more knowledge of information security. Positive affect was not related to the disclosure of PII. And contrary to expectations, no moderating effects were found of information security knowledge nor positive affect on the persuasion–disclosure link. Possible explanations are discussed, as well as limitations and future research directions. Uitgegeven door Sage, APA beschrijving: van der Kleij, R., van ‘t Hoff—De Goede, S., van de Weijer, S., & Leukfeldt, R. (2023). Social engineering and the disclosure of personal identifiable information: Examining the relationship and moderating factors using a population-based survey experiment. Journal of Criminology, 56(2-3), 278-293. https://doi.org/10.1177/26338076231162660
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In this article, the main question is whether and, if so, to what extent online journalism raises new moral issues and, if any, what kind of answers are preferable. Or do questions merely appear new, since they are really old ones in an electronic wrapping, old wine in new bottles? And how does journalism deal with the moral aspects of online journalism? The phenomenon of the Internet emerged in our society a few years ago. Since then, a large number of Dutch people have gone online, and the World Wide Web is now an integral part of our range of means of communication. Dutch journalism is online too, although certainly not in the lead. More and more journalists use the Internet as a source, especially for background information. Newspapers have their web sites, where the online version of the printed paper can be read. And that is it for the time being. There are no more far-reaching developments at present, certainly not on a large scale. Real online journalism is rather scarce in the Netherlands. The debate concerning the moral aspects of online journalism is mainly being conducted in the United States. First of all, by way of introduction, I will present an outline of online journalism. The first instance is the online version of the newspaper. Here, only to a certain degree new issues come up for discussion, since the reputation of reliability and accuracy of the papers, in spite of all criticism, also applies to their online versions. Besides, especially in the United States and increasingly in European countries as well, there is the so-called dotcom journalism, the e-zines, the online news sites without any relationship with printed newspapers. This may be the reason why these sites do not have a strong commitment to moral standards, at least as they have developed in the journalistic culture of the newspapers. After having outlined the moral issues arising in online journalism, the question will be addressed whether and, if so, to what extent it is meaningful and desirable to develop instruments of self-regulation for this new phenomenon of journalism.
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Patienten in der forensischen Psychiatrie sind während ihrer Behandlung häufig Aggressionen von Mitpatienten ausgesetzt. Uns sind jedoch keine Untersuchungen darüber bekannt, wie sich dies auf das Wohlbefinden der Patienten und den Behandlungsverlauf auswirkt. In dieser Studie befragten wir neun Patienten zu ihren Erfahrungen mit Viktimisierung während der psychiatrischen Zwangsbehandlung. Die Interviews wurden analysiert mit Hilfe eines Grounded-Theory-Ansatzes in Kombination mit Elementen der konsensuellen qualitativen Forschung und der interpretativen phänomenologischen Analyse. Aus den Daten ergaben sich drei Hauptthemen, nämlich situative Beschreibungen sowie intra- und interpersonelle Konsequenzen. Die Patienten waren nicht nur körperlicher Gewalt und verbaler Aggression durch andere Patienten ausgesetzt, sondern auch einem allgegenwärtigen Strom von mikroaggressiven Kommentaren. Die Möglichkeiten, diesen Situationen zu entkommen, waren begrenzt. Dies bedeutet, dass die Viktimisierungsprozesse, die bei den meisten Patienten bereits in einem früheren Lebensabschnitt begonnen haben, während der forensisch-psychiatrischen Behandlung fortgesetzt werden. Zu den intrapersonellen Folgen gehören Angst, Hypervigilanz, reaktive Aggression, Flashbacks sowie Vermeidungs- und Rückzugsverhalten. Zu den zwischenmenschlichen Auswirkungen zählen verstärkte Machtunterschiede zwischen den Patienten und nachteilige Behandlungsergebnisse, wie z. B. Probleme mit dem Selbstwertgefühl. Viktimisierungsprozesse werden in einem Umfeld, das sich auf die Risiken und die Behandlung von kriminellem Verhalten konzentriert, nicht immer rechtzeitig bemerkt. Daher ist ein höheres Maß an Traumasensibilität in der forensisch-psychiatrischen Versorgung erforderlich. Es werden Empfehlungen für die Umsetzung einer traumainformierten Versorgung gegeben.
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