While there is extensive research on how Russian interference – in particular Russian disinformation operation – has played out in different European countries, indications of Russian interference directly targeting EU, its institutions or policies received little attention. This paper argues why there is good reason to assume that the EU, its institutions and its policies are an ideal a target for authoritarian regimes to exploit. It then explores in what ways, if any, Russian disinformation campaigning targeted EU institutions and their policies during the political and electoral campaigns leading up to the European Parliament (EP) elections of May 2019. In this context disinformation campaigning in terms of both network flows and contents (‘narratives’) have been examined, on the basis of a review of various reports identifying Russian interference and disinformation and of analyses of overall disinformation flows in Europe and the use of a database monitoring occurrences of disinformation.
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The purpose of this research is to find evidence for the assumption that allowing children to create their own news messages is an effective approach to teach them how to distinguish between reliable news and fake news. Three students of the primary teacher training programme of The Hague University of Applied Sciences developed five lessons concerning fake news and five Kahoot! quizzes for each of those lessons. They taught the lessons they developed under the supervision of a primary school teacher and one of their lecturers from the university. A Friedman test on the scores of the Kahoot! quizzes indicate that the children made progress over the course of the study. In addition, it appears that the children appreciated the lessons and that they have learned how news is created and how fake news can be recognised. The outcomes of this study have prompted a larger, international Erasmus+ project. Schools and libraries in three countries will investigate similar innovative blended-learning approaches for pupils between ages 12 to 15.
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Increasingly, Instagram is discussed as a site for misinformation, inau-thentic activities, and polarization, particularly in recent studies aboutelections, the COVID-19 pandemic and vaccines. In this study, we havefound a different platform. By looking at the content that receives themost interactions over two time periods (in 2020) related to three U.S.presidential candidates and the issues of COVID-19, healthcare, 5G andgun control, we characterize Instagram as a site of earnest (as opposedto ambivalent) political campaigning and moral support, with a rela-tive absence of polarizing content (particularly from influencers) andlittle to no misinformation and artificial amplification practices. Mostimportantly, while misinformation and polarization might be spreadingon the platform, they do not receive much user interaction.
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