Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) is constantly gaining ground, both at domestic and international level. New forms of dispute settlement with a mix of public and private components are emerging in fields where this was not the case until recent times, as some contributions to this Zoom-out have attempted to demonstrate. In the field of investment law we have witnessed a somehow opposite trend. Traditionally, disputes in this field have been settled by means of arbitral tribunals established mostly on the basis of bilateral or multilateral investment agreements (IAs) under a variety of arbitration facilities, which are collectively referred to as investor-to-State dispute settlement (ISDS). Traditional ISDS presents many characteristics of ADR, starting from the strong role that private parties play in it (for example when it comes to the appointment of arbitrators). The practice has shown that the system has clear advantages but also undeniable disadvantages.
The prevailing opinion in recent years has been that the latter considerably outweigh the former, resulting in what has been termed the backlash against investment arbitration in a volume appeared a
few years ago. In this contribution, how-ever, I will not dwell on the details of the crisis that has affected investment arbitration, nor will I engage in a discussion of whether that backlash is entirely justified. My focus will be much more modest. One of the most tangible consequences of this growing dissatisfaction towards investment arbitration is the launch on the part of the EU of a court-like system to settle investment disputes –the now famous investment court system (ICS) –as a replacement to old-fashioned ISDS. The ICS now features in all EU IAs, and has become the standard position of the EU when it comes to dispute settlement in this field. Recently, the ICS has also received the green light of the European Court of Justice (ECJ),raising doubts as to whether traditional ISDS has conclusively been sent to oblivion, at least in the EU. From a political and policy perspective, it is undoubtful that there is a strong stance on the part of the EU and of its Member States against traditional ISDS. This article, however, will focus exclusively on the legal dimension, by examining whether the ECJ’s decision should be read as meaning that investment arbitration is incompatible with the EU legal system. While itis clear that Opinion 1/17 means that the ICS is compatible with EU law, it remains to be seen whether the Court’s finding allows an a contrario reading. Namely, whether it entails the incompatibility with EU law of traditional ISDS. The analysis will start with a brief summary of the events and developments that preceded the creation of the ICS and eventually led to the current situation (Section 2), followed by an examination of the relevant parts of Opinion 1/17 (Section 3). This part will be followed by an appraisal of the possible legal implications of the decision (Section 4). Some conclusions will be offered in the closing section (Section 5) in the attempt to look beyond the boundaries of EU law.

Part of topic "The blurring distinction between public and private in international dispute resolution"